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Preface 
This thesis is about moral philosophy, moral education, 
and the relationship which one has to the other. I argue 
for a particular moral philosophy and derive from that a 
view of moral education. 	 But I also argue that the 
relationship between the two is of a special nature and 
differs from the relationship which might exist between 
philosophy and education in general or between, say, the 
philosophy of mathematics and education in mathematics. 
The moral theory I offer incorporates a view of moral 
thinking which is, in many respects, similar to that 
given by Hare. However, the thesis includes an extended 
criticism of Hare's form of utilitarianism and, 
especially, of his rationalist justification for the form 
of moral thinking which he recommends. The criticism of 
Hare's theory, and of his approach, forms the background 
against which I recommend a fundamental modification of 
utilitarian moral theory. 	 Although the theory offered 
yields a utilitarian view of right action, it is a non-
consequentialist theory which is based upon a notion of 
an ideal agent. The theory is founded upon a notion of 
the benevolent archangel as universal ideal. 
The moral theory is offered as a perspective upon those 
moral views which we share. 	 That perspective is 
recommended as one which can elucidate, underpin and 
inspire those moral views. The form of moral education 
which is derived from that theory focusses centrally upon 
the development of the virtues of benevolence, non-
malevolence, understanding and humility. 
3 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION. 	 7 
Philosophy of education and aims for education. 
CHAPTER 1. 	 21 
Philosophy of X and educational aims for X. 
The relevance of established branches of philosophy. 
The philosophy of mathematics. 
Aims, objectives and methodology of mathematics teachers. 
Moral philosophy and moral education. 
CHAPTER 2. 	 49 
Moral judgment and an inclination to act. 
Hare's characterisation of critical thinking. 
Critical thinking and moral education. 
Hare's route to Utilitarianism. 
CHAPTER 3. 	 67 
Consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral theories. 
Rational choice and morality. 
Consequentialism and non-consequentialism. 
Consequentialism as involving a ranking of consequences. 
Consequentialism as involving no agent-relative features. 
Consequentialism and non-consequentialism redefined. 
4 
CHAPTER 4. 	 92 
Moral thinking, moral motivation and moral worth. 
Kant's radical non-consequentialism. 
Morality and freedom. 
Moral experience and moral education. 
Objections to Kant's theory. 
Choosing to act against inclination. 
CHAPTER 5. 	 123 
Critical thinking, universalisability and impartiality. 
Hare's claims with regard to universalisability. 
Mackie's characterisation of universalisability. 
Hare's characterisation of universalisability. 
The use of universalisability. 
CHAPTER 6. 	 139 
Rejection of Hare's position on logical requirements. 
Critical thinking is not a logical requirement. 
The fanatic and the amoralist. 
Hare's epistemological premiss. 
My aversion to your suffering. 
The inadequacy of Hare's appeal to 'moral' language. 
Hare's response to the central educational question. 
5 
CHAPTER 7. 	 167 
Objections to Utilitarianism. 
Recapitulation. 
Consequentialism as indirectly self-defeating. 
Malevolent preferences. 
CHAPTER 8. 	 181 
Preferences about preferences and ideal selves. 
Second-order preferences. 
Personal second-order preferences. 
Decisions involving second-order preferences. 
Critical thinking and a personal ideal self. 
Universal second-order preferences. 
Utilitarianism and a universal ideal self. 
CHAPTER 9. 	 204 
Two types of Archangel. 
The benevolent archangel and the malevolent archangel. 
The benevolent archangel as ideal self. 
Non-consequentialist 'Utilitarianism'. 
6 
CHAPTER 10. 	 219 
Morality and education in the light of our imperfection. 
Hare's two levels of moral thinking. 
The benevolent archangel as ideal for imperfect agents. 
The role of cognitive humility. 
Partiality to self. 
Decisive preferences and general moral principles. 
CHAPTER 11. 	 243 
An educational approach to moral theory. 
Summary. 
Human nature, moral intuitions and decision procedures. 
The benevolent archangel as an educational ideal. 
Morality and the limits of philosophy. 
CHAPTER 12. 	 260 
A community of (imperfect) benevolent archangels. 
Aims for education and aims for moral education. 
Moral relativism and moral education. 
Educating for benevolence, non-malevolence and humility. 
Love, humility and assessment. 





Philosophy of education and aims for education. 
Peters (1972 p.vii) states that philosophy of education 
is to be conceived of "as drawing on established branches 
of philosophy and bringing them together in ways which 
are relevant to educational issues". When tackling such 
issues the philosopher of education will "draw on and 
develop" work done by philosophers in epistemology, 
ontology, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of 
mind, philosophy of mathematics, and so on. 	 In some 
cases the relevant philosophical work will not have been 
done and philosophers of education may then have to 
undertake the philosophical work themselves before 
proceeding to draw on and develop the results of that 
work in an educational context. 
For example, Peters (1972) says, philosophical work on 
'rights', 'punishment', and 'authority' may be drawn on 
and developed when tackling issues in education to do 
with the rights of parents and children, punishment in 
schools, and the authority of the teacher; and 
philosophers of education may themselves work on concepts 
of 	 'education', 	 'teaching', 	 'learning', 	 and 
'indoctrination' in order (I take it) to draw on that 
work when tackling issues to do with aims and methods. 
The emphasis here is upon analysis of concepts and is in 
tune with the analytic approach which at that time 
pervaded philosophy itself. Those who are disenchanted 
with conceptual analysis (especially in an educational 
context) may point out that 'analysis' of a concept such 
as 'punishment' might help to avoid confusion in a 
discussion of, say, the role of punishment in schools but 
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it cannot begin to settle substantive questions about the 
desirability, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the use of 
punishment. 	 So too, analysis, clarification, revision, 
or stipulation of the use of such terms as 'education' 
and 'indoctrination' may permit us to justify a remark 
such as "That isn't education, it's indoctrination", but 
it does not take us one bit closer to settling whether 
the activity referred to is to be condemned or applauded. 
Furthermore, some may feel that philosophy of education 
need not merely consist of the application, to issues in 
education, of knowledge and understanding derived from 
established branches of philosophy. 	 Some may wish to 
cast off such constraints in order, say, to elaborate and 
advocate a view of the broad aims of education - ie. to 
develop 'a philosophy of education'. Such an enterprise 
may require the special skills of a philosopher (whatever 
they may be) and may, in part, draw upon knowledge and 
understanding derived from established branches of 
philosophy; but those who engage in it may feel that it 
is unnecessary (and, indeed, not possible) to found their 
philosophy of education upon specific philosophical 
theories - the link to established branches of philosophy 
may be partial and piecemeal. 
Recognition of the sterility of much "conceptual 
jousting" - a phrase used by J.White (1982) - and a 
reluctance to be constrained by a 'narrower' (and less 
ambitious) view of the philosophy of education, may lead 
the philosopher of education to wish to get on with the 
"main business" of justifying, prioritising, comparing, 
and discovering the relations between, possible general 
aims for education. Surely, J.White (1982 p.x) says, one 
would expect "that general discussions of educational 
aims would be just what it [philosophy of education] 
would engage in". He goes on to remark that some may 
object that if one leaves off analysis and begins to put 
forward views as to what aims ought to be then one is no 
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longer doing philosophy. But, he declares, he is not too 
concerned with whether the advocation of aims is referred 
to as 'philosophy', 'casuistry', 'moralising', or even 
'mush'; it remains true to say that discussion of what 
the aims of education ought to be is an important task 
which ought not to be neglected. 
It is easy to agree with this last point - discussion of 
what the aims of education ought to be is extremely 
important. 	 Indeed we may well feel that it is 
sufficiently important for us to wish to encourage all 
those involved in education to engage in it. But we may 
also feel that those involved in planning and pursuing 
any large-scale activity ought to spend some time 
considering the central aims and purposes which that 
activity might be designed to achieve. 	 If there is 
disagreement over, or conflict between, or difficulty in 
achieving, those aims then we may also feel that it is 
desirable that there be some attempt to elaborate and 
advocate alternative sets of aims and priorities. But is 
there any reason for supposing that this task should 
especially fall to the philosopher, or for supposing that 
this is just what one would (or should) expect the 
philosopher working in education (or any other large-
scale activity) to engage in? 
The philosopher's approach to the consideration of broad 
aims for education may involve an attempt to subsume 
diverse aims under some more general idea; to ferret out 
and remove contradictions and incompatibilities; to 
achieve clarity, simplicity and coherence; and (most 
importantly) to provide convincing reasons for adopting 
the proposed system of aims and for rejecting 
alternatives. 	 Such an approach is not confined to 
philosophers. 	 The psychologist, historian, or 
sociologist may well adopt a similar approach when 
considering broad aims for education - the difference is 
perhaps likely to lie in the nature of the rationale 
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which is offered in defence of the proposed aims. But, 
leaving that aside, we may ask whether an approach from 
within the philosophy of education, which does not draw 
heavily on knowledge and understanding derived from a 
range of disciplines other than philosophy, can achieve 
the goal of advocating and elaborating one particular set 
of aims. Is it possible for the philosopher of education 
(as such) to achieve that goal? 	 Furthermore, is the 
achievement of that goal necessary and would it (thus 
conceived) be sufficient to the task of settling rational 
debate over aims? 
Achieving clarity and greater coherence is certainly 
possible for any set of aims for education (or for any 
educational doctrine); and, as Passmore (1980 p.9) points 
out, many philosophers of education, wishing to avoid 
"mere preaching" or "amateurish psychology or sociology", 
have seen clarification as their primary task. But to 
simply clarify existing educational doctrines or, 
alternatively, to expose educational 'theories' as 
pseudo-theories is, according to Passmore, a humble task; 
and there is "something more than a little unsatisfactory 
in this conception of the philosopher of education as an 
odd-job gardener" whose business is to tidy up the 
careless work of the educational theorist. 
It is, of course, possible for rational and informed 
debate to go much further than clarification. 	 For 
example, beginning with a favoured wider aim (such as a 
stable democracy, a successful economy, a contented 
population, a maximisation of artistic and scientific 
achievement) it may be possible to determine the aims for 
education which are most likely to lead to the 
achievement of that wider aim (or aims). But would an 
approach which did not draw heavily on knowledge and 
understanding derived from a range of disciplines other 
than philosophy be sufficient to that task? 
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Perhaps some philosophers of education would anyway 
reject this alternative goal and would seek to advocate a 
set of aims for education without reference to any wider 
aims. Yet it is clear that the educational aims which we 
pursue will have a significant impact upon the nature of 
our society, the nature of individuals within that 
society, and the lives which those individuals lead. 
Education may be seen, by some, as an end in itself; but 
it is also (at least in part) a means to other ends. 
Thus it is likely that the aims we adopt for education 
(and, perhaps, for some other large-scale activities) 
will reflect the views we have about the desirability of 
this or that form of life, or form of society. 	 The 
philosopher may see this as precisely the point at which 
it is possible to make the most significant contribution: 
through discovering rationales for ways of life, or forms 
of society, and then deriving implications for 
educational aims. 
For example, J.White seeks to advocate a particular view 
of the good of the individual, and of the relationship 
between that good and the good of society (where the 
latter centrally concerns the moral obligations which 
members of that society have to one another). The well-
being of the individual, he says (J.White 1982 p.58 and 
p.95), involves an awareness of the enormous range of 
human desires, of the permanence of one's 'natural' 
desires, and of "the need to hold all of one's desires 
together in an integrated unity"; it involves the passage 
from such awareness towards the construction of an 
informed 'life-plan' and, thus, towards "an integrated 
system of hierarchically organised preferences"; and it 
involves having those capacities and dispositions which 
allow one to effectively pursue such a life-plan. Then, 
given that we accept that the good of society requires 
that individuals have some concern for each other, he 
argues that the requirement of 'psychical unity' (through 
the possession of a life-plan and system of preferences) 
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entails that the good of the individual further requires 
that the needs and interests of others be accomodated 
within that life-plan and system. 
I would argue that we face ultimate choices and 
commitments here. I do not believe that it is possible 
to discover rationales for ways of life or forms of 
society unless those 'rationales' are founded upon such 
choices. 	 J.White 	 (1982 	 p.129) 	 agrees 	 that 
"justifications can't go on forever and that somewhere 
one reaches bedrock commitments" - for example, that one 
should attend to the well-being of others. In a later 
work (J.White 1990) he makes a similar point when he 
argues that the value of personal autonomy is relative to 
the type of society in which we find ourselves. But, I 
believe, we reach bedrock much sooner than he would 
allow. 
J.White (1982 p.50 and p.58) claims that each individual 
has permanent natural desires ("to be loved, to be 
secure, etc.") and other wants fostered by institutions 
and culture; and that he "has to" learn to cope with the 
conflict between such desires by integrating them "within 
a single scheme". Each of us, he argues (1990 p.31), has 
to organise our desires, "to impose a hierarchical 
structure on them and resolve conflicts between them". 
It is this commitment to thinking through one's desires 
and arriving at an integrated scheme which is central to 
his view. 	 It is true that he also stresses the 
importance of unreflective pursuit of enthusiasms; and of 
a disposition to act upon one's desires and to approach 
one's projects with enthusiasm; but it is the notion of 
an autonomous and integrated (albeit evolving) life-plan 
which, in its elaboration, gives rise to a particular 
view of the broad aims of education. 
Do we have to regard some of our desires as an inevitable 
and permanent feature of our lives? And, if so, then 
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which desires? Must we really include, for example, the 
desire to be loved? Do we have to integrate all of our 
desires within a single scheme? 	 Is that the only 
(rational) response to the inevitable conflict which 
results from the diversity of those desires? 	 What 
constitutes a 'single scheme'? We may have many schemes 
and projects: to be a good teacher, contented, a caring 
parent, a researcher in the philosophy of education, a 
responsive friend, and so on. Do we have to prioritise 
and integrate them within a single scheme? 
Faced with conflict between such schemes and concerns, 
some may devise priorities, schedules, and timetables; 
but others may simply 'muddle along' - responding to 
opportunity, external pressure, and changing (and 
unforeseen) circumstance. Are the latter less rational; 
must they resolve these conflicts by means of an 
integrated life-plan? 	 It is here, I believe, that we 
reach bedrock in J.White's justification for a particular 
view of the well-being of the individual: in a particular 
response to the difficulties inherent in leading a life 
(and in a particular view as to which desires are 
natural, inevitable and permanent). 
However, there is no doubt that, if it were possible to 
discover a rationale for a particular view of the well-
being of the individual (or of society) then that 
accomplishment would provide 'a philosophy of education'. 
Our broad aims for education would simply be: to provide 
an education which contributed towards the achievement of 
that way of life (or form of society). The nature of 
those broad aims could be indicated as the features of 
that way of life were elaborated. If, for example, the 
well-being of the individual requires the construction of 
an integrated system of hierarchically organised 
preferences then appropriate broad aims for education 
would include the development of an ability to create 
such a construction. 
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It may then be possible to further elaborate the view of 
education beyond that which is straightforwardly implied 
by the offered view of the 'good life' for the 
individual, in order to present a more detailed view of 
the education which would contribute most towards the 
achievement of such a life for each individual. But, to 
return to the central point of this introduction, would 
an approach which did not draw heavily on knowledge and 
understanding derived from a range of disciplines other 
than philosophy be sufficient to that task? If education 
is a means to 'the good life' or 'the good society (or to 
any other end) then the elaboration of broad aims for 
education has to draw upon knowledge and understanding 
derived from a wide range of disciplines - the 
philosopher of education may well contribute to that task 
but cannot expect to have a central, or crucial, role. 
The different task of advocating one particular set of 
broad aims for education could, as we have seen, be 
pursued by means of the search for rationales for a 
favoured view of the well-being of the individual. But I 
do not believe that such a search can result in a 
justification for only one such view. We reach differing 
bedrock commitments at an early stage in the 
justification process. 
Having claimed that this route, to a rationale for one 
particular set of broad aims for education, will not 
succeed; we may go on to question whether that goal is, 
in fact, necessary. 	 J.White (1982 p.3) argues that 
unless those who are involved in education can come to a 
reasoned conclusion as to which broad aims are 
acceptable, then cohesion between the different parts of 
the educational system is endangered. 	 The work of 
primary 	 schools, 	 secondary 	 schools, 	 colleges, 
universities, teacher-training institutions, and staff 
within each institution must "mesh together"; and that is 
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to be achieved by means of the shared aims which (it is 
hoped) would result from rational discussion. 	 Thus: 
shared aims are necessary, that requires agreement about 
aims, and that requires a shared rationale. 
But, firstly, does the work of all the institutions 
listed (and of parents and others involved in education) 
have to mesh together in this way? Must the primary 
school, university, parent, and polytechnic share the 
same aims? There are many aspects to human development 
and I see no fundamental reason why different 
institutions and groups should not focus on different 
aspects of that development; or have very differnt 
priorities within a range of broad aims; or have aims 
which are, to some extent, conflicting. 
Furthermore, such institutions may set out to meet 
different needs or to meet the same needs in distinctive 
ways. 	 Individual secondary schools, for example, may 
deliberately seek to have or to emphasise different, 
albeit overlapping, aims. 	 Far from seeking to mesh 
together in the sense of having identical aims, ethos and 
priorities, they may seek to mesh together by means of a 
collaboration aimed at offering a range of distinct 
alternatives to the local community (see Jenkins 1991 
Ch.9). 
Secondly, even if shared aims were necessary would that 
require agreement? 	 It is perhaps possible for 
institutions to work to coherent, shared aims and yet 
tolerate a large measure of disagreement over those aims; 
or, perhaps more likely, without there being any great 
measure of explicit agreement. 	 However, even though 
agreement may be overrated, it may be desirable. If so 
then we can ask, thirdly: do shared aims and agreement 
require a shared rationale? 
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J.White (1982 p.2) lists a few of the aims which are 
"currently at large in the world of education": to 
promote the growth of understanding (or knowledge, or 
reason, or the mind) for its own sake; to help each pupil 
to develop his potentialities to the full; to enhance 
personal autonomy; to promote all-round development (in a 
balance between intellectual and practical achievements 
or between the arts and sciences); to promote excellence 
within specialisms; to ensure a literate and numerate 
work-force; to ensure an intelligent participatory 
democracy; to foster art and culture; to develop (moral) 
character. 	 As he says, the list of aims is almost 
endless. 	 Furthermore, we might add, some immediately 
conflict and some will conflict when we begin to 
interpret and pursue them in detail. 
We are thus likely to be faced by conflict between the 
aims which are favoured by different individuals and, 
indeed, by conflict between the aims which each of us, as 
a single individual, would wish to favour. 	 Yet as 
individuals we may, nevertheless, persist in regarding 
all (or some subset) of these aims as desirable and 
respond to our dilemma simply by choosing to foster that 
educational system which we believe will maximise 
achievement of all of those aims. 
Likewise a group of individuals who cannot agree upon 
aims, can agree to compromise and to choose an 
educational system which will allow a measure of 
achievement for each of the favoured sets of aims. Such 
courses of action do not require a rationale which 
provides an over-riding aim and a resulting system of 
priorities. Shared rationales are not the only route to 
agreed systems and objectives. 	 Furthermore, unless we 
are so optimistic as to believe that rational enquiry can 
lead to one set of broad aims which all rational people 
involved in education must pursue, then such compromise 
is inevitable. 
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Consensus decisions reached through such compromise need 
not be seen as mediocre decisions which necessarily 
affect the quality of the outcome. 	 As Caldwell and 
Spinks (1988 p.197) point out, the quality of the outcome 
will depend upon: a) how acceptable the decision is to 
those who must implement it or who will be affected by 
it; and b) how effective the chosen systems and 
objectives are in achieving the aims. 
For example, in order to reach a view as to how we can 
maximise achievement of a set (or several sets) of aims 
which involve conflict, we will have to determine the 
impact which the achievement of each aim would have upon 
the achievement of each of the others. This process may 
result, say, in our assigning low priority to some aims 
in order to enhance overall achievement; and will thus 
result in a system of priorities. 	 That system of 
priorities will be effective only if the nature of the 
conflict between the aims has been correctly understood. 
This type of route to consensus will require knowledge 
and skills derived from a wide range of specialisms. 
Furthermore, whatever our route to a system of priorities 
(whether through a rationale involving an over-riding 
principle, or through compromise, or through steadfastly 
pursuing personal preference, ...), the final choice of 
aims will require consideration of 'practical' factors. 
We will have to take into account, for example, the time, 
resources and skills which we can realistically hope to 
make available; the nature and extent of the alterations 
to our society which may be required in order to achieve 
any great measure of success for our chosen priorities; 
the lessons which can be learned from other times and 
places as to the likely consequences of adopting this or 
that set of aims; and so on. 
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Those who reach a settled system of priorities through 
consensus and compromise may well incorporate 
consideration of such factors into the process by which 
they achieve a consensus. 	 However, those who seek a 
rationale for one particular set of broad aims for 
education are likely to see such factors as involving 
conditions which need to be altered or sustained in order 
to achieve those aims; and will thus see consideration of 
such factors as external to the debate about aims. In 
the latter case, the broad aims may be seen as somehow 
'intact' even though they may not, in fact, be pursued as 
stated. Our stated aim is, say, to help each pupil to 
achieve independence and to develop their potential to 
the full; but our aim, in practice, is to help pupils to 
develop independence in some respects and to develop some 
of their potential. 
This is not a trivial point. If, in practice, we cannot 
hope to achieve a satisfactory measure of success for 
each of our favoured set of aims then it may sometimes be 
sensible not merely to trim our sails but rather to 
change tack somewhat - ie. adopt different priorities 
from amongst the range of aims which we find acceptable. 
Consideration of such factors, and the ability to make 
informed judgments as to whether aims need to be altered 
(despite our rationale), will once again require 
knowledge and skills derived from a wide range of 
specialisms. The task of settling aims (not merely the 
task of elaborating those aims, nor merely the task of 
discovering how aims are to be realised) is extremely 
complex. To see that task as the special province of the 
philosopher of education, or as just what one should 
expect philosophy of education to engage in, is, I 
believe, to obscure the fact that considered and informed 
discussion of the issues involved will require skills and 
knowledge derived from many different specialisms. 
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A denial that the elaboration and advocacy of aims and 
priorities in education is just what the philosophy of 
education should engage in, need not be based on the view 
that such activities amount to casuistry, moralising, or 
mush. 	 We do not have to choose between allowing the 
title 'philosophy of education' or accepting such 
pejorative terms as 'mush'. Nor do we need to rely on a 
false contrast between 'analysis' and 'going beyond 
analysis' to advocate and elaborate broad aims. The true 
contrast is between a philosophy of education which 
attempts such an advocacy, and one which restricts itself 
to attempts to draw on and develop work done in 
established branches of philosophy in ways which are 
relevant to educational issues (and the latter need not, 
of course, restrict itself to 'analysis'). 
I have tried to argue that the former task, of advocating 
and elaborating broad aims, cannot be achieved without 
drawing upon knowledge and understanding derived from a 
wide range of disciplines. 	 If that task is tackled 
purely from a philosopher's perspective then, I believe, 
it will at best articulate a particular set of favoured 
commitments. 
The latter approach, of drawing on and developing work 
done in established branches of philosophy, certainly 
need not confine itself to conceptual analysis but it may 
be that it cannot easily escape the same objection: 
perhaps little can be achieved without drawing upon 
knowledge and understanding derived from a wide range of 
disciplines. 
It is the latter approach which I shall be following in 
this thesis. 	 In the first chapter I shall, therefore, 
discuss whether that approach can escape the same 
objection. 	 In order to highlight some of the issues 
which are involved in answering that question I shall 
consider, in some detail, the relationship between the 
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philosophy of mathematics and the aims of mathematical 
education. The issues raised will then be used in order 
to begin a consideration of the topic with which this 
thesis is concerned: the relationship between moral 
philosophy and moral education. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
Philosophy of X and educational aims for X. 
The relevance of established branches of philosophy. 
The philosophy of mathematics. 
Aims, objectives and methodology of mathematics teachers. 
Moral philosophy and moral education. 
The relevance of established branches of philosophy. 
Most would now deny that there are logical links between 
broad theories of education and broad philosophical 
theories. For example, Passmore (1980 ch.l) rejects the 
notion that to each philosophical school there 
corresponds a philosophy of education. The conclusions 
which traditional philosophers of education sought to 
sustain cannot, he says, be derived from epistemological, 
ontological, or metaphysical premisses. "That is exactly 
why Feigl and Russell divorced their educational from 
their philosophical writings. 	 There is no possible 
passage from logical atomism to Russell's radical 
educational innovations, from logical empiricism to 
Feigl's defence of liberal education.". 
If this is so then is there any relationship between 
philosophical theory and educational theory? And if 
philosophical theory is not directly relevant to the task 
of establishing broad educational doctrines or aims (but 
psychological, sociological and other factors are 
directly relevant to that task) then do philosophers of 
education have no choice but to articulate a particular 
set of favoured commitments (whilst making use of the 
work and views of psychologists, sociologists and 
others)? 
21 
Philosophy of X and educational aims for X. 
22 
An alternative is for the philosopher of education to 
engage in a different task. Broad doctrines and aims are 
not the only issue in education. 	 Even if broad 
educational doctrines cannot be deduced from 
philosophical theories, and even if it is neither 
possible nor necessary to 'settle' broad educational aims 
through the use of philosophical argument, this does not 
of course mean that work done in established branches of 
philosophy has no bearing upon controversies in 
education. Perhaps no-one would deny that philosophy may 
be helpful in such a context. 
	 But are there 
controversies in education which can be settled by 
drawing on and developing work done in established 
branches of philosophy and without equally detailed 
reference to work done in other disciplines? 
Passmore (1980 p.12-15) claims that there are many ways 
in which the philosopher, qua philosopher, can make, and 
has made, a direct contribution: 
Problems in social, political, and moral philosophy 
are, for example, directly relevant to such 
controversies as those over the selection of 
students, government of schools, grading, and the 
relation between schooling and employment. 
Many controversies in education involve philosophical 
concepts which call for close analysis - there has 
been too little "discussion of such questions as the 
circumstances in which we can properly say of a 
child, for example, that he has been 'well-trained'; 
that he has learnt to 'appreciate' literature; that 
he acquired the ability to 'think for himself'; that 
a particular form of teaching will develop his 
understanding or imagination". 
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Epistemology may not form the basis for a general 
doctrine of education but it may well be directly 
relevant to pedagogical issues - for example, "to 
reject the view that all knowledge is based on sense-
impressions is to deny that, insofar as it aims at 
the imparting of knowledge, teaching must proceed by 
giving children sense-impressions". 
Also, Passmore says, such branches of philosophy as 
the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of 
science, and so on, will bear "directly upon 
controversies about the processes of teaching". 
"Every 'philosophy of aids the teacher to see more 
clearly what he is doing when he teaches the subject 
that 'philosophy of is about". 
The first two of these examples illustrate the way in 
which philosophy may usefully contribute to controversies 
which arise from discussions about different forms of 
education. They would serve as examples of the way in 
which those tackling educational issues might draw on 
work done in philosophy as well as work done in other 
disciplines. 	 The role of philosophy may be seen as 
similar to that required in debates over broad aims for 
education - ie. as one of many contributions. There may 
be no implied claim that the work of the philosopher may 
(of itself) determine the form of education which we will 
(or ought to) engage in, or that it may (of itself) 
settle controversies about specific aspects of education. 
However, the last two examples perhaps imply a more 
direct and crucial role for the philosopher. Just what, 
for example, does the claim that the philosophy of 
mathematics, or science, will 'bear directly' upon 
controversies about the processes of teaching amount to? 
A philosophy of mathematics may well be a contributing 
factor in rational decision making about objectives and 
methods, but is it ever a determining factor? 
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Some are willing to claim that a philosophy of 
mathematics is, or ought to be, a determining factor in 
settling issues about the teaching of mathematics. For 
example, Clark (1987) asks the question: "Why ought a 
teacher to avoid pointing around the environment if she 
holds that mathematics is analytic; and, conversely, why 
is a teacher who proceeds in this way committed to an 
empiricist view of the subject, even if she has never 
heard of such a view?". The answer which he gives rests 
on the claim that to do otherwise is to be "afflicted 
with a kind of incoherence". 
Clark claims that when we teach a subject we ought to 
direct the attention of the learner to the "place where 
the propositions are verified". Thus, if we believe that 
the truth of mathematical propositions is determined 
simply by the meaning of the terms used in those 
propositions then, as teachers of mathematics, we ought 
not to proceed by directing the learner's attention 
around the environment. 	 Furthermore, Clark claims, 
'genuine' teaching requires that the teacher has a view 
as to where the propositions of the subject are verified 
(the attention of the learner must be deliberately 
directed to the place of verification as such); thus 
teachers cannot avoid incoherence simply by declining to 
be committed to any particular philosophy of mathematics. 
I.Scheffler (1973 p.34-40) also claims that a philosophy 
of a given subject is necessary to the teaching of that 
subject. A philosophy of - an analysis and understanding 
of the form of thought embodied by a subject - is 
necessary for several reasons. For example: 
facilitating the acquisition of habits and methods 
appropriate to a given subject requires the ability 
to analyse and articulate them, and to understand 
their point; 
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the teacher must be prepared to justify the 
perpetuation or alteration of those habits and 
methods, and that requires the ability to criticise 
and evaluate them. 
Thus the teacher, Scheffler claims, needs to have not 
only a facility in such methods but also the ability to 
analyse and evaluate them. Such analysis and evaluation 
is precisely what a philosophy of a given subject 
involves. 
Such views perhaps go further than the claims made by 
Passmore (1980 p.13): for example "the philosopher of 
science, by giving students a better grasp of the 
connection between science and commonsense, can help to 
prevent the teaching of science from becoming a kind of 
magic", and "the philosopher of history can make it plain 
just how history teaching must differ, in its criteria of 
success, from the teaching of the social sciences". 
Here Passmore may merely be asserting that it can be 
helpful to be clear about the nature of the subject 
taught. 	 But how clear? 	 Is it really necessary for 
teachers to take sides in the kind of controversies which 
occupy philosophers when they wrestle with problems in 
the philosophy of mathematics, science, or history? Must 
teachers decide between different 'philosophies of'? Is 
there a direct and obvious relationship between a 
particular philosophy of, say, mathematics and a 
particular set of aims, objectives and methods for 
teaching mathematics? 
The Philosophy of Mathematics. 
Korner (1960 p.9-10) points out that the "apparent 
contrast between the indefinite flux of sense-impressions 
and the precise and timeless truths of mathematics has 
been among the earliest perplexities and problems not of 
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the philosophy of mathematics only, but of philosophy in 
general". 	 Philosophers have asked: Why is it that 
mathematical propositions appear to be necessarily, self-
evidently or indubitably true? Are they true in this 
peculiar way because they are asserted about objects of 
some special type, or because they are asserted about 
objects in general or 'as such', or because of their not 
being asserted of any objects at all? Is their truth due 
to the particular method by which they are reached or are 
verifiable - for example, an immediate and incorrigible 
act of intuition or of understanding? 
Korner goes on to consider three schools within the 
philosophy of mathematics: the logicist, the formalist, 
and the intuitionist. 	 For the purposes of this 
discussion it will be convenient to concentrate our 
attention upon just one of these 'schools'. 
The logicist believes that (pure) mathematics deals 
exclusively with concepts definable in terms of a very 
small number of fundamental logical concepts, and that 
all its propositions are deducible from a very small 
number of logical principles (by means of a small number 
of methods of inference). 	 In attempting to derive 
mathematics from logic the logicist makes use of truth-
functional tautologies (eg. p or not p), postulates from 
the logic of classes (eg. a U b = b U a), and postulates 
relating to the use of the terms 'all' and 'some' (eg. in 
a universe of discourse consisting of a finite number of 
objects, say al,a2,..an, '(x)f(x)' is equivalent to 
'f(al) and f(a2) .. and f(an)'). 	 As Korner (1960 p.50) 
says, "every logicist system draws its list of postulates 
and rules of inference from the logic of truth-functions, 
the extended logic of classes and the logic of 
quantification". 
The first point to note is the claim that "the list of 
postulates and the list of inference rules are not 
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independent .. [eg.] a suitably large list of postulates 
enable one to economize in inference rules". Thus we can 
have different systems which aim to derive mathematical 
propositions from different sets of logical postulates. 
The second point (which Korner notes earlier) is that 
problems with the logic of classes seem to require that 
some of the postulates are not 'logical' principles at 
all. 	 For example, if any class is admitted then the 
logic of classes leads to contradictions. 	 One such 
contradiction Russell (1919 p.136) describes: "Form now 
the assemblage of all classes which are not members of 
themselves. This is a class: is it a member of itself or 
not? If it is, it is one of those classes that are not 
members of themselves, ie. it is not a member of itself. 
If it is not, it is one of those classes that are not 
members of themselves, ie. it is a member of itself.". 
Either way we have a contradiction. Russell's response 
is to adopt various rules for stratifying classes into 
types in order to avoid the possibility, within the logic 
of classes, of a class containing itself as a member. 
Others have adopted similar rules and would not claim 
that such rules are themselves logical principles. 
Further difficulties arise when the logic of 
quantification is extended to universes of discourse 
consisting of an infinite number of objects. With regard 
to a finite universe consisting of objects al..an the 
proposition 'f(al) and f(a2) .. and f(an)' can be written 
'(x)f(x)' and then since, in our logic of truth-
functions, the proposition 'Mai) and f(a2) .. and 
f(an)) -> f(ai)' is a tautology it follows that the 
proposition '(x)f(x) -> f(ai)' is also a tautology within 
that finite universe. 	 But if we wish to regard the 
proposition '(x)f(x) -> f(ai)' as valid for an infinite 
universe then we cannot do so for the same reasons; 
rather we must adopt this as a postulate or adopt such 
postulates as will ensure that this proposition will be 
deducible as a theorem. Furthermore, those propositions 
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which involve quantification over infinite ranges can be 
interpreted in many different ways: for example, as mere 
technical devices, or as inadmissible, or as involving an 
empirical assumption about the world. Once again we may 
be involved in making postulates (that there is an 
infinite class of individuals in the universe) which we 
would not wish to claim are logical principles. 
The responses which logicists make to these difficulties 
will differ. Furthermore, it is clear - as Korner (1960 
p.34) points out - that if the logicist is to derive 
particular theorems of arithmetic from an initial set of 
logical propositions then he will need to change symbols 
en route: "somewhere in the path leading from the 
premisses to, say, '1+1=2', the transition from obviously 
logical symbols to symbols not obviously logical must 
occur". The transition will, therefore, be mediated by 
definitions and the account which logicists give of those 
definitions may be very different. 	 The definition of 
number, for instance, may be regarded (with Russell) as a 
mere device of notation which declares that a newly 
introduced combination of symbols is to mean the same as 
another combination of symbols whose meaning is already 
known, or it may be regarded (with Frege) as an attempt 
to demarcate a class of objects whose members exist as 
independent entities. These two accounts of definition 
lie at the heart of two very different branches of 
logicism: the nominalistic, in which the propositions of 
mathematics are seen as not being 'assertions' at all; 
and the realistic, in which the propositions of 
mathematics are regarded as making assertions about 
'logical' objects. 
The philosopher of mathematics who wishes to adopt a 
logicist position must decide, amongst other things, in 
what way to avoid the antimonies generated by the logic 
of classes, how to interpret propositions which quantify 
over infinite ranges, and what account to give of the 
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definitions which permit the transition from logical 
principles to mathematical propositions. 
Does the teacher of mathematics also have to make such 
decisions? Perhaps those who insist upon the importance, 
to the mathematics teacher, of the philosophy of 
mathematics would be satisfied if the teacher were to 
decide between broad schools of mathematical philosophy 
and would not require the teacher to decide between the 
various different philosophical theories which have 
arisen within each 'school'. Perhaps it is sufficient to 
decide between, say, logicism, formalism, intuitionism, 
or empiricism. As a logicist, for example, I may have at 
least decided upon what I believe to be the method of 
verification for mathematical propositions (derivation 
from logical principles). 	 But a brief look at the 
development of the 'logicist school' reveals that even 
this may not be as clear as we might suppose. 
Some logicists have held not only that mathematical 
propositions can all be derived from a small number of 
logical principles but also that such principles share 
some fundamental feature which clearly demarcates them as 
'logical' - for example, that they are known a priori, or 
are true by definition, or are indubitable, or are non- 
empirical. 	 Other logicists have doubted that it is 
possible to make clear a distinction between, say, 
empirical and non-empirical propositions and have 
therefore held only that mathematical propositions can be 
derived from a small number of principles (no attempt 
being made to characterise those principles in some 
special way). 
If we adopt the latter position, and if we believe that 
mathematical propositions are verified by deriving them 
from some specific set of principles, then the question 
arises: 'How are those principles themselves verified?'. 
For example, in classical logic 
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'(p or q) and r -> (p and r) or (q and r)' 
is a truth-functional tautology. But is there a method 
of verification for this principle? If so, then is that 
'method' such that the logical principle could turn out 
to be false? 
Putnam (1975 p.174) asks the question "could some of the 
'necessary truths' of logic ever turn out to be false for 
empirical reasons?" and he goes on to argue that "the 
answer to this question is in the affirmative and that 
logic is, in a certain sense, a natural science". Putnam 
claims, for example, that anomalies which have arisen 
within quantum mechanics can be resolved if the 
distributive laws, which form part of classical logic, 
are given up. 	 Alternative methods of resolving such 
anomalies involve (roughly speaking) the claim that the 
process of measuring (say, the energy level of an atom) 
affects the value obtained by measurement: "there is a 
mysterious 'disturbance by the measurement". But, says 
Putnam (1975 p.183), there are two problems with the 
latter resolution: firstly, no theory of this disturbance 
is offered; and, secondly, "if a procedure distorts the 
very thing it seeks to measure, it is peculiar that it 
should be accepted as a good measurement, and fantastic 
that a relatively simple theory should predict the 
disturbed values when it can say nothing about the 
undisturbed values". 	 Therefore the resolution which 
involves our abandoning the distributive laws of 
classical logic is, according to Putnam, to be preferred. 
Putnam concludes that logic is empirical; it is, in a 
certain sense, a natural science. 	 As soon as we 
recognise that alternative logics might have serious 
physical application, then the a prioricity of logic 
vanishes. 
However, one who accepted Putnam's views as to the nature 
of logic might remain, in a sense, a logicist. It would 
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still be possible to maintain that the business of the 
mathematician is to derive logical consequences from a 
limited set of logical principles; and to believe that 
mathematics as a whole can be derived from a particular 
set of such principles. 	 Some 'logicists' (those who 
believe that all mathematical propositions can be derived 
from a small number of logical principles) may then be, 
in a sense, empiricists. 
Does the teacher of mathematics have to decide whether to 
espouse or reject this particular strand of logicism? If 
he espouses it then does he, when teaching mathematics, 
'direct the learner's attention around the environment' 
or refrain from so doing? If the claim that to each 
philosophy of mathematics there must correspond a 
particular methodology for teaching mathematics were 
correct then the task of determining what methodology for 
teaching was appropriate to a particular philosophy of 
mathematics would be far from straightforward. 
We might go on to ask, at this point, not only whether 
teachers of mathematics need to adopt a philosophy of 
mathematics but also whether mathematicians need to do 
the same. 	 Is the mathematician who uses 'empirical' 
methods committed to a certain philosophy of his subject? 
Putnam points out that mathematicians have often used 
what he calls 'quasi-empirical' methods and have felt 
that their belief in certain theorems has been justified 
as a result of those methods. 	 Such methods involve 
arriving at a hypothesis by means of intuitively 
plausible though not certain analogies, checking the 
results of the hypothesis to see if any counter-examples 
are generated, and then demonstrating that the hypothesis 
has important consequences for mathematics and science. 
(Putnam offers several examples - 1975 p.64-69.) 
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Putnam points to these examples as a means of support for 
his claim that the methods of proof and of quasi-
empirical inference are complementary - and for the 
further claim that much of mathematics is 'empirical'. 
Putnam (1975 p.76) accepts that proof (rigorous deduction 
from axioms) is the primary method of mathematical 
verification but he insists that quasi-empirical methods 
can also verify mathematical theorems - we often know 
such theorems to be true before we succeed in finding a 
proof. 
The non-empiricist may insist, on the contrary, that such 
methods are not methods of verification - they may 
suggest hypotheses but we do not know those hypotheses to 
be true until a proof is found, proof is the only method 
of mathematical verification. 
The point I wish to make is that the mathematician who 
makes use of such methods is not committed to either 
view, nor is it necessary that he should make such a 
commitment. 	 If the theorem has application and if 
counter-examples are not found then the mathematician may 
adopt it and work with it (eg. determine its implications 
and apply it to the 'solution' of specific problems) and 
leave aside the question of whether it has been verified. 
Of course, if a mathematician aims to 'verify' theorems 
then he will have to commit himself to a view as to the 
methods of verification appropriate to mathematics, but 
that may not be his aim. 	 Furthermore, even if a 
mathematician believed that the ultimate aim of 
mathematical activity is to verify theorems, and that 
such verification requires, say, derivation from logical 
principles, he may nevertheless choose not to devote 
himself to that task and may employ quasi-empirical (and 
other) methods in the belief that the propositions he 
arrives at may be useful and significant, or that his 
work will prepare the ground for others with more 
rigorous and less speculative leanings. 
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As a mathematician one will need a firm view as to 
methods of verification only if one is firmly in the 
business of 'verifying' and claiming verification. The 
problem of the nature of verification for mathematical 
propositions is one of many difficult problems in the 
philosophy of mathematics but a decision as to which 
solution to adopt (to this and other such problems) is 
not a necessary condition of engaging in mathematics. 
Nevertheless, some (eg. I.Scheffler 1973 p.35) might 
insist that it is a necessary condition of teaching 
mathematics. The mathematician may arrive at true (and 
useful) mathematical propositions by quasi-empirical 
methods (or manipulation of objects, or guesswork) but if 
it is the case that the method of verification is, for 
example, derivation from logical principles then that is 
an important fact about mathematics. 	 Ought not the 
teacher, who believes this to be the case, to teach 
accordingly and avoid encouraging pupils to use quasi-
empirical methods (or manipulation of objects, or 
guesswork)? And if that is so, if a belief about methods 
of verification determines the appropriate approach to 
teaching, then does not the teacher have to decide what 
his belief is? 
If the teacher's aim is (or has to be) to teach pupils 
how mathematical propositions are verified, or to give 
pupils skill in verifying mathematical propositions, then 
the answer to both of these questions clearly has to be 
in the affirmative. But there are other aims which a 
mathematics teacher might have. 
Aims, objectives and methodology of mathematics teachers. 
The Dainton Committee (1968) listed the following reasons 
for the study of mathematics: 
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as a means of communicating quantifiable ideas; 
as a training for discipline of thought and for 
logical reasoning; 
as a tool in activities arising from the developing 
needs of engineering, technology, science, 
organisation, economics, sociology, etc.; 
as a study in itself. 
Just as one might accept the legitimacy of each and every 
one of the aims for education in general which J.White 
pointed out as being "currently at large", so too one 
might accept that each of the aims above are legitimate 
aims for the teacher of mathematics. One might also feel 
that each of them is not only legitimate but also has 
value. But, even if this were the case, one might ask 
whether they have equal priority and whether, given 
limited time, they are in practice compatible. 
The decisions we make about priorities may depend upon a 
very wide range of factors. Some of these may be to do 
with the nature of our aims for education in general but 
others may relate to our views, for example, as to 
whether particular aims are in fact achievable, or as to 
what objectives are most appropriate to children of a 
particular age or level of achievement, or as to the 
intrinsic difficulties involved in achieving objectives 
appropriate to this or that aim, or as to ways in which 
the achievement of objectives appropriate to one aim help 
(or hinder) our achieving objectives appropriate to 
another aim, and so on. 
The aims we adopt, and the priorities we decide upon, 
will then influence our choice of methodology. 	 For 
example, the methods appropriate to mathematics teaching 
which primarily aims to train pupils for general 
discipline of thought may be very different from those 
which are appropriate if we place a high priority on the 
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ability of our pupils to use mathematics as a tool in 
activities arising from the developing needs of 
engineering, 	 technology, 	 science, 	 organisation, 
economics, sociology, etc. 	 Furthermore, both of these 
aims might be seen as making use of the study of 
mathematics as a means to something else. Thus if either 
(or both) of these aims is prioritised then there need 
not be any connection between methodology of teaching and 
our espoused philosophy of mathematics (in particular the 
method of verification which we believe to be appropriate 
to mathematics). 
Even if our chosen aim exclusively involves teaching 
mathematics 'for itself' (and we believe, say, that 
mathematical verification involves rigorous derivation 
from logical principles) we may still feel that a 
methodology of teaching which involves practical 
activity, investigative work, and the use and application 
of mathematics, would be more likely to awaken the 
pupil's interest. So that, in the early stages at least, 
our choice of methods may once again have little or no 
connection with our philosophy of mathematics. 
Encouraging pupils to use mathematics in concrete 
situations, or to investigate and speculate about 
mathematical relationships between features of their 
environment, may be the best introduction to a study of 
mathematics 'itself'. 	 If mathematics 'itself' is 
primarily a matter of verifying mathematical propositions 
(and I am not sure that it is) then pupils may be much 
more likely to take an interest in it if they learn that 
the verified propositions can be useful and illuminating. 
Not only is our choice of methodology likely to be 
influenced by a very wide range of factors but the 
process of using those methods is a learning process and 
the discoveries we make about the success of this or that 
methodology may sometimes influence the choice of aims. 
The teaching of mathematics used to involve (especially 
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in the teaching of geometry) a rigorously deductive 
approach. In part this was, perhaps, because of beliefs 
about the nature of mathematics but it was also a result 
of the belief (shared by the Dainton Committee) that such 
methods would train pupils for discipline of thought and 
for logical reasoning. This latter belief has often been 
challenged; for example, the Director's Report (1962-3) 
for the SMP 0-level mathematics course claimed that "for 
the majority of pupils, formal geometry offers little 
training in logical reasoning and emphasises, instead, 
practice in the memorising of theorems and proofs of no 
particular worth". 
Most would now agree in rejecting the idea that exposure 
to rigorous mathematical reasoning is a means to 
achieving general discipline of thought or to encouraging 
pupils to be more logical in their thinking. This aim, 
as an aim for mathematics teaching, is now rarely 
mentioned - the methods employed did not seem to achieve 
the stated aim and few believed that the methods could be 
altered in a way which would improve success in that aim. 
If we look at the aims, objectives, and programmes of 
study for mathematics in the 1989 orders for the National 
Curriculum, we find no mention of mathematics teaching as 
a means of training for discipline of thought. We also 
find a shift away from rigour and towards a much greater 
emphasis upon investigative and speculative work; the use 
and application of mathematical concepts, knowledge, 
understanding and techniques; and practical activities 
relevant to the pupil's interests. 
Most teachers would agree (for a range of reasons) that 
it is desirable to place a high priority on endeavouring 
to ensure that school mathematics is interesting and 
enjoyable, and there is now a large measure of agreement 
as to the objectives and methods which will excite 
interest and cause enjoyment in school pupils ('relevant' 
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skills and topics, a practical and intuitive rather than 
a rigorous approach). There also seems to be a consensus 
in the wider society that the pupil's ability to use and 
apply mathematics ought to have a much greater priority. 
Such factors as these have (and ought to have) influenced 
the teacher's choice of objectives and methods, and they 
have done so independently of any views as to how the 
propositions of mathematics are verified. 
The process of deciding (or coming to agreement) upon 
aims, objectives, and methods for mathematics teaching 
is, of course, one which ought to involve a good deal of 
reflection and debate. 	 In the course of that process 
problems will arise the solution of which may require 
skill in philosophy, or knowledge and understanding 
derived from established branches of philosophy. But I 
do not believe that philosophical theories about the 
nature of mathematics can determine the methods or aims 
we ought to adopt for mathematics teaching, any more than 
I believe that broad philosophical theories (about the 
nature of knowledge or reality) can determine our broad 
aims for education. 
Just as informed debate about the broad aims of education 
requires skills and knowledge derived from a range of 
specialisms; so too, I believe, consideration of aims, 
objectives and methodology for mathematics teaching will 
need to draw upon an equally wide range of skills. The 
relationship between a philosophy of mathematics and 
decisions about mathematics teaching is far from 
straightforward. 	 Furthermore, the degree of relevance 
which the former has to the latter will depend upon the 
broad aims we adopt for mathematics teaching and for 
education in general. 
The same point could be made with respect to the 
philosophy of any discipline or area of the curriculum. 
We cannot simply assume that proposed solutions to the 
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problems which interest a philosopher of this or that 
discipline will be relevant to issues relating to the 
teaching of that discipline: that they will (as Passmore 
claims, 1980 p.13) "bear directly upon controversies 
about the processes of teaching". 
The philosopher who wishes to investigate the 
relationship between education and a philosophy of a 
particular discipline or area of the curriculum must, I 
believe, outline the conditions under which proposed 
solutions to philosophical problems would be relevant to 
the choice of aims, objectives, content, or methodology. 
The area of the curriculum which I wish to investigate at 
length is that of moral education. 	 The aim of this 
thesis will be to consider some proposed solutions to 
certain problems in moral philosophy, to criticise and 
modify those proposed solutions, and to attempt to 
determine the relationship between those proposed 
solutions and issues in moral education. 	 I shall, 
therefore, conclude this chapter by briefly discussing 
the conditions under which certain aspects of moral 
philosophy would be relevant to issues in moral 
education. Later chapters will, hopefully, make clear in 
detail how the proposed solutions to problems in moral 
philosophy are related to those issues (given those 
conditions). 
Moral philosophy and moral education. 
Central issues in the philosophy of mathematics relate to 
difficulties in establishing the nature of the truth 
conditions, and methods of verification, for mathematical 
propositions. 	 In moral philosophy we have the added 
difficulty of establishing the nature of the judgments 
made: are they statements, prescriptions, or expressions 
of feeling? Those who characterise moral judgments as 
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statements will then have to go on to explain the nature 
of the truth conditions, and methods of verification, for 
those statements. Those who claim that moral judgments 
are prescriptions may go on to offer descriptions of 
methods by which those prescriptions are arrived at, or 
may be arrived at, or must be arrived at if they are to 
be 'moral' judgments. 	 Those who claim that moral 
judgments are expressions of feeling may go on to 
describe what they believe to be the psychological or 
sociological causes of those expressions of feeling which 
are characterised as 'moral'. 
Even though such issues are central to moral philosophy, 
we cannot assume that the solutions which are proposed to 
these (and other) problems in moral philosophy will be 
straightforwardly relevant to issues in moral education. 
For example, let us suppose that the only aim of a 
particular group engaged in providing moral education is 
to ensure that the actions of the educatees accord with 
the moral judgments of the educators. 	 (And let us 
suppose that an argument to the effect that an activity 
with such an aim could not be referred to as moral 
'education' would not be particularly illuminating.) If 
this were the aim then proposed solutions to the problems 
outlined above would not be straightforwardly relevant to 
problems of teaching. 
Given such an aim, moral education would be a matter of 
ensuring conformity to the expectations and demands of 
the educators. 	 Such an authoritarian moral education 
would require, as Dearden (1968 p.170) says, that the 
pupil acquires the 'virtues' of unquestioning obedience, 
conscientious compliance and deference; and that the 
motivation to obedience be sustained by the 
'impressiveness' of authority. 	 The choice of detailed 
aims, objectives, and methods would then largely be 
guided by an understanding of the psychological and 
sociological factors involved in maintaining the 
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impressiveness of authority and a disposition to 
obedience. 	 It may well be the case that philosophical 
problems will be raised in this context - for example, 
how do certain forms of constraint and punishment accord 
with our notion of justice, how can we determine when a 
pupil is 'disposed' to comply with a given moral 
principle - but proposed solutions to the question of the 
existence and nature of methods by which moral judgments 
are to be arrived at would not (given this aim) be 
relevant. 
However, if the judgments of the educators were not, 
themselves, such as would be arrived at by a method 
appropriate to moral judgment then, we could claim, they 
are not 'moral' judgments at all. Thus we might insist 
that the aim of moral education cannot merely be to 
ensure that the actions of the educatees accord with the 
judgments of the educators. Rather the aim must be (at 
least) to ensure that the actions of the educatees accord 
with those moral judgments which would be arrived at by 
methods appropriate to such judgments. 
An aim of this sort clearly presupposes that there are 
such methods and therefore raises just those problems in 
moral philosophy which we have been discussing. But it 
is important to note that although proposed solutions to 
those problems may thus determine the nature of the 
judgments to be transmitted (that is, the 'content' of 
moral education), they would not necessarily determine 
the detailed objectives and methods appropriate to that 
education. The aim as stated is still compatible with 
the educators having the role of merely transmitting, and 
ensuring behaviour in accordance with, those moral 
judgments which they (or others skilled in such methods) 
make. In order to achieve this aim, the educators must, 
of course, now ensure that the judgments made are such as 
would be arrived at by such methods, but the educatees 
need not be party to this process and may therefore be 
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encouraged to accept such judgments on 'authority'. The 
choice of detailed objectives and methods would still be 
guided by an understanding of the factors involved in 
ensuring obedience, deference, and behaviour according to 
the judgments made (or passed on) by the educators. 
It may well be the case that those who believe that there 
are methods appropriate to the making of those moral 
judgments which relate to action would not be satisfied 
with an educational aim which made no reference to the 
ability of the educatees to themselves use such methods. 
Such dissatisfaction may be due to a commitment to the 
wider educational aim of achieving autonomy for the 
educatees (in all areas and perhaps because such autonomy 
is seen as desirable in itself) or it may be due to a 
conviction that the inscrutability of authority is 
especially dangerous in the context of morality. 	 As 
Dearden says (1968 p.171) if obedience can be relied upon 
then the demands of authority "can safely be extended to 
cover unfair privileges" and "the temptation to .. an 
abuse of trained gullibility must be very great"). 
The point which Dearden, and others, make is not, 
however, one which need necessarily lead us to modify the 
aim described above. 	 If the aim is achieved then the 
actions of the educatees will accord with those moral 
judgments which would be arrived at by methods 
appropriate to such judgments. The 'authority' appealed 
to by that aim is not the authority of a particular group 
and the judgments which they happen to make, but rather 
is that of the methods and the judgments which result 
from their use. 
But we may, nevertheless, feel that educatees should be 
able to make their own moral judgments, and thus 
scrutinise and see the merit of the judgments to which 
they are being asked to conform. We may have various 
reasons for believing this. For example: 
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In the absence of such ability it may well be the 
case that, even if the educators are able to 
influence the behaviour of the educatees, that 
influence will be temporary and will also not extend 
to behaviour which is not witnessed by the educators. 
The constraints upon the educators (and others 
entrusted with the task of making moral judgments by 
means of appropriate methods) may not be sufficient 
to ensure that the stated aim is achieved - ie. those 
who are entrusted with responsibility for ensuring 
that the authority of the methods is maintained are 
likely to abuse the authority which that role gives 
them. 
Just as aesthetic development is not merely a matter 
of learning what are the 'correct' judgments, or even 
of making choices based on such judgments, but is 
fundamentally about appreciating beauty; so too moral 
development involves the ability to make moral 
judgments oneself, to appreciate their significance, 
to understand what is right or good and not simply to 
accept it on authority. 
To educate people in a way which fails to enable them 
to make their own moral judgments is morally wrong. 
These examples illustrate the very different types of 
reason which may lead us to modify our aims for moral 
education. 	 The first would need to refer to the 
particular nature of the society in which the educators 
and educatees found themselves. The elaboration of the 
second would require an understanding of human 
psychology. The third of these reasons would need to be 
justified by philosophical argument. 
	 The last appeals 
directly to a moral judgment. 
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The examples illustrate the way in which discussions of 
aims may appeal to a wide range of insights. As in the 
case of mathematical education, informed criticism of our 
aims for moral education may require us to draw upon 
knowledge and understanding derived from a range of 
specialisms. But the last of the examples points to a 
very different possibility. 	 In the case of moral 
education, our moral judgments may themselves influence 
our choice of aims. 
We might elaborate the last reason in the following way: 
to aim merely to mould the behaviour of educatees is to 
ignore their capacity for moral judgment and is to ignore 
the fact that their behaviour could stem from such 
judgment; the pursuit of such an aim fails to treat 
educatees as morally responsible agents; such an 
education would treat them as means to our ends (albeit 
worthy ends) and would, therefore, be morally wrong. The 
possibility of this type of consideration means that our 
moral judgments may directly influence our choice not 
only of the 'content' of moral education but also of its 
aims, objectives and methodology. 
I shall return to this point in a later chapter but, for 
the moment, we can thus envisage a range of 
considerations which may lead us to favour a moral 
education which has at least two aims: 
a) to impart an ability and willingness to arrive at 
(by appropriate methods) moral judgments; 
b) to encourage an inclination to act in accordance 
with moral judgments arrived at (by appropriate 
methods) by self or others. 
If such aims were adopted then problems as to the nature 
and existence of methods appropriate to moral judgment 
would become straightforwardly relevant to the process of 
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moral education. 	 The solutions which are proposed to 
these central problems in moral philosophy would bear 
directly upon controversies about detailed objectives and 
methods of teaching - just as solutions to problems in 
mathematical philosophy would "bear directly" if our aims 
included that of imparting the ability to verify certain 
types of mathematical propositions. 
Furthermore, the particular nature of the solutions 
proposed to these philosophical problems may provide 
additional reason for adopting those aims in preference 
to the aims of a more authoritarian moral education. 
Equally, however, such solutions may also lead us in the 
opposite direction - towards authoritarian aims. We can 
see how either of these may be the case if we consider a 
moral theory such as that given by Hare (1981). 
Hare's theory yields a characterisation of moral thinking 
which involves two elements: ascertaining the 
consequences of alternative actions in a given situation 
and imaginatively identifying with the preferences of all 
those involved in that situation. 	 According to Hare, 
action in accordance with such judgment would maximise 
preference satisfaction in each situation. Thus Hare's 
theory yields a form of utilitarianism. 	 The form of 
thinking which leads to utilitarian judgment also, it is 
claimed, results in an inclination to act accordingly. 
Thus the achievement of aim a) would bring with it 
achievement of aim b). This last claim may well lead us 
to adopt aim a) as the primary focus for moral education. 
However, as we shall see in later chapters, Hare's 
elaboration of that theory leads to a view of moral 
education in which aim a) and (a form of) aim b) have 
equal importance. That elaboration takes account of the 
fact that we are seldom able to engage in the form of 
thinking which Hare describes - that is, to determine 
which action would maximise preference satisfaction in a 
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particular situation. Thus, Hare claims, moral education 
should involve an aim to impart a disposition to act 
according to general principles which would ensure 
maximisation of preference satisfaction over a range of 
situations. Hence a form of aim b) is necessary. Aim a) 
will also be necessary for if we had such dispositions 
but lacked an ability to engage in such thinking we would 
not, for example, be able to determine how we ought to 
act in those situations in which the general principles 
conflict. 	 Thus moral education will focus upon both 
aims. 
But we may now be only a small step away from excluding 
any focus upon aim a) for all but a 'gifted' few (those 
destined to be in authority). Moral thinking of the type 
described is, as Hare says, very difficult. 	 We may 
believe that (all or some group of) our educatees are not 
capable of acquiring sufficient skill in ascertaining 
consequences and imaginatively identifying with the 
preferences of others. We may also believe that they are 
not capable of avoiding a tendency to give undue weight 
to their own preferences (or to the preferences of those 
to whom they are 'close'). 	 We may, therefore, decide 
that their moral education should not include an aim 
along the lines of a). The nature of the moral theory, 
and our knowledge of human abilities and weaknesses, may 
lead to the abandonment of aim a). 
For Hare it is the maximisation of preference 
satisfaction which matters. If (for the reasons given) 
the pursuit of an aim along the lines of a) would result 
in a decrease in overall preference satisfaction then 
that aim should be avoided. A capacity and disposition 
to engage in moral thinking has (for Hare) no intrinsic 
moral worth. The fact that the theory involves an ideal 
outcome of action (the maximisation of preference 
satisfaction) does not directly yield particular aims for 
moral education. 	 There may be different ways of 
Philosophy of X and educational aims for X. 
46 
achieving those outcomes and each may involve very 
different aims for moral education. 
Thus far we have only considered moral worth and moral 
education in relation to action and outcome. Some moral 
theories incorporate such a focus. In such theories the 
nature of agent is not centre stage; the agent has moral 
worth only insofar as the nature of that agent is such 
that it ensures morally worthy actions and morally good 
outcomes. But not all moral theories have such a focus. 
If our moral theory were to focus primarily upon the 
moral worth of the agent rather than upon the value of 
the outcomes of action, if it were to centre upon a 
notion of an ideal agent rather than upon an ideal 
outcome, then the link to aims for moral education may 
turn out to be much more direct. If, for example, our 
moral theory yielded the view that a form of thinking 
similar to that outlined by Hare had intrinsic moral 
worth then it would entail that all ought to have the 
capacity and disposition to engage in such thinking. A 
moral theory of this type, which incorporates a notion of 
an ideal agent, will thus directly involve aims for moral 
education - the statement of such an ideal is a statement 
of an aim for moral education. 
I claimed, in the last section, that the degree of 
relevance which our philosophy of mathematics has to 
decisions about mathematical education will depend upon 
the broad aims we adopt for mathematical education and 
for education in general. Here we see that the nature 
and extent of the relevance which moral philosophy has to 
decisions about moral education will depend upon the 
particular nature of the moral judgments we make and of 
the moral theory we espouse. 
In this thesis I will consider and criticise Hare's moral 
theory. I will offer an elaboration and modification of 
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Hare's theory and in so doing I will propose a theory 
which incorporates a shift of focus from outcomes to 
agent. The nature of the resulting theory will be such 
that it will directly involve aims for moral education. 
I will begin with Hare's theory not only because the form 
of thinking which it describes is very similar to that 
which I will recommend as being an essential feature of 
an agent having moral worth, but also because criticism 
of that theory will allow me to make clear the contrast 
between Hare's 'rationalist' approach and my own 
approach. 
Hare claims that the form of moral thinking which he 
describes can be used to underpin and systematise those 
moral views which most of us share. 	 His rationalist 
approach involves the further claim that a fully rational 
agent must, when attempting to form his own moral 
judgments, employ such a form of thinking. 	 I hope to 
support the former claim, but I will argue against the 
latter. 
I will argue that a moral theory which involves such a 
form of thinking is just one way in which we can provide 
a perspective upon those moral views which we share. If 
we are to decide which such perspective to adopt then we 
will need to adopt criteria of selection which cannot be 
derived from a consideration of the nature of 
rationality. 	 I will claim that our choice of such a 
moral perspective/theory/philosophy may ultimately (and 
legitimately) be determined by a consideration of issues 
in education. In particular: 'How does that perspective 
enhance the ability of the educator to develop those 
moral views in self and others?' and 'How does that 
perspective relate to our experience of educational 
development?'. 
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I will thus be claiming that the relationship between our 
response to issues in moral philosophy and our response 
to issues in moral education may not only be very direct 
but may also be a relationship of interdependence. On 
the one hand, the moral theory we espouse may directly 
entail aims for moral education; on the other hand, our 
consideration of aspects of educational development may 
be a crucial factor in the selection of that moral 
theory. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
Moral judgment and an inclination to act. 
Hare's characterisation of critical thinking. 
Critical thinking and moral education. 
Hare's route to Utilitarianism. 
Hare's characterisation of critical thinking. 
Hare (1981 p.20) says that he hopes "that by 
investigating the meanings of moral words we shall manage 
to generate logical canons which will govern our moral 
thinking". 	 The two characteristics, which Hare claims 
are features of the meanings of moral words and which are 
central to this project, are prescriptivity and 
universalisability. 
Hare hopes to show that these features entail a method of 
moral thinking which all rational agents, as rational, 
must adopt. This method is that of 'critical thinking'. 
Very roughly, the argument which generates Hare's 
characterisation of critical thinking is, I believe, as 
follows: 
a. a fully rational agent only makes a prescription for 
action in a given situation if he knows what are the 
consequences of the various possible actions in that 
situation; 
b. the prescription which results from such knowledge 
is rational only if it depends upon what are the 
preferences of that agent with regard to those 
consequences; 
c. some moral judgments are prescriptive; 
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d. prescriptive moral judgments are 'universalisable' -
that is, the same prescription must also be 
made for all situations (actual and possible) 
which are identical save with regard to the 
numerical identity of those involved; 
thus, the same prescription must be made for 
each of those hypothetical situations in which 
the agent is each of the persons involved; 
e. a fully rational agent only makes a prescription 
which is universalised in this way if he knows what 
are the consequences of the various possible actions 
in those situations; 
f. the prescription which results from such knowledge 
is rational only if it depends upon what are the 
preferences of that agent for each of those 
situations; 
g. in order that the prescription may so depend, the 
agent must acquire knowledge of what his preferences 
would be if he were each of the persons involved; 
h. such knowledge requires an imaginative 
identification with those persons such that the 
agent actually acquires their preferences; 
i. the resulting prescription (if rational) will thus 
depend upon what are the preferences of each of 
those involved with regard to the consequences of 
the various possible actions. 
Steps e. to i. yield the description of critical 
thinking. Thus: I acquire the preferences of all those 
involved in a particular situation (by identifying 
imaginatively with each), I consider the consequences of 
alternative actions in that situation, and I reach a 
decision in the light of all the preferences which I now 
have (after imaginative identification). 
Steps a. to d. make claims with regard to rationality, 
prescriptivity, and universalisability, which are 
intended to justify the claim that moral thinking 
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logically requires critical thinking. The argument, as 
it stands, involves claims about the logic of moral words 
(made in c. and d.), but it also makes claims about the 
rationality of choice (made in a. and b., repeated in e. 
and f.) and about necessary conditions for knowledge of 
the preferences of others (h.). The argument generates a 
characterisation of the method of arriving at moral 
judgments. 
When rational agents are engaged in an attempt to reach a 
moral judgment, this method would require each rational 
agent to consider the same facts in the same way. Hence, 
insofar as such agents have knowledge of the relevant 
facts, they will all reach the same judgment. 
But not only will full employment of the method of 
critical thinking yield agreement as to what is the 
morally right thing to do in a certain situation; it will 
also result in a preference to act in the appropriate 
way. 	 The prescription which is the result of 
moral/critical thinking is an expression of the 
preference which the rational agent has after 
imaginatively identifying with the preferences of all 
those involved, and acquiring knowledge of the 
consequences of alternative actions, in a given 
situation. 
Thus if people understand the meanings of the words they 
use, if they are rational, and if they have the necessary 
knowledge when making moral judgments then they will not 
only agree in their moral judgments but will also (as a 
result of reason alone) prefer to act accordingly. Such 
a theory of moral thinking would, if correct, have 
important implications for central issues in a moral 
education involving aims of the sort outlined in the last 
chapter. 
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Critical thinking and moral education. 
If Hare is correct, then if those who make moral 
judgments could be made more rational and could be given 
the ability to acquire knowledge of the relevant facts, 
then that of itself could ensure not only agreement in 
judgment but also right action. 
	 Rationality and the 
ability to acquire knowledge may, in a sense, be 
sufficient to virtue. 
On this view, reason is not the mere "slave of the 
passions" (Hume), rather it is the case that the exercise 
of reason can "determine the will" (Kant). 
	 There are 
important caveats to be made here, if we are to do 
justice to Hare's theory, but it remains true to say 
that, for Hare, reason can lead to right action without 
there having to be present a 'good disposition' which 
merely employs reason as its tool. 
There are other moral philosophies in which there is a 
direct link between the means of arriving at a moral 
judgment and the disposition to act. For example, moral 
realists such as Platts (1979 p.261) may claim that the 
"distinctive feature of clear moral perception is that it 
gives us a compelling reason to act". 	 But what the 
realists seem not to do is to show how we should deal 
with someone who fails to see the 'moral facts'. How do 
we achieve clear moral perception and how do we help 
others to achieve it? Platts (1979 p.247) says that "We 
detect moral aspects [of a situation] in the same way we 
detect .. other aspects: by looking and seeing". 
	 But 
then how do we account for, and educate, those who are 
able to detect just those other aspects which the realist 
detects but are (mysteriously) unable to detect the 
'moral aspects' which the realist claims to detect - ie. 
do not share the realist's moral views and do not receive 
a compelling reason to act in the way which the moral 
realist favours? 
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The realist is likely to say that that person is simply 
not 'sensitive' to the moral features of a situation. 
That much follows from the theory: perception of moral 
features implies that one has a compelling reason to act, 
therefore if one lacks such a reason to act then one has 
not perceived the moral features. But the theory offers 
no means of distinguishing those who can perceive moral 
features from those who cannot, other than their sharing 
the realist's views and having an 'appropriate' 
disposition to act. From within an educational context 
we will wish to be offered some further elucidation of 
this skill. Without such an elucidation we have no clue 
as to the type of education which is likely to produce an 
improvement (in skill and thus, according to the theory, 
in behaviour). In practice, such a theory is likely to 
give rise to the view either that we can do nothing, or 
that we can (at best) ensure that our educatees behave in 
a way which conforms to the judgments of those who are 
blessed with the required skill. 	 In either case this 
would mean that we were unable to pursue the aims 
involved in the type of moral education which we are 
considering. 
Hare's claim that moral judgment results in a disposition 
to act follows from the detailed description which he 
offers of the process of moral judgment. 	 That 
description not only provides the link to action but also 
clarifies the essential features of a moral education 
which aims to impart an ability to make such judgments. 
The educatee must acquire the ability to: 
determine the facts in a specific situation, 
ascertain the range of alternative actions, 
establish the consequences of those possible actions, 
determine the preferences of those involved, 
imaginatively identify with those preferences, 
relate consequences to the preferences thus acquired. 
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The exercise of such abilities would result in a 
preference which was based upon the facts in a given 
situation and the logic of our moral language. 
In short, the broad outlines of a moral 'education' (of 
the sort we are considering) are spelt out in the theory. 
If those engaged in moral education aim to develop the 
ability of the educatees to themselves arrive at moral 
judgments, and aim to encourage an inclination to act 
according to such judgments, then this philosophy of 
morality has clear implications for the nature of the 
detailed objectives involved. 
Like Kant, Hare not only claims a form of 'objectivity' 
for moral judgments but also offers a description of a 
method of arriving at those judgments. That method is 
one which even those who oppose the claim of objectivity 
(as I shall) can understand and utilise. 	 It also 
involves skills which we all have and which we can, given 
appropriate education, improve. There is no appeal to a 
form of perception or intuition which, as well as being a 
mystery to the opponents of realism or intuitionism, is 
such that the proponents of those theories can give 
little guidance as to how we might educate those who are 
deficient in it. 
Hare's view does not, of course, entail that the method 
of critical thinking need be the only route to right 
action. A central feature of Hare's overall position is 
his 'two-level' theory whereby the importance of general 
principles and appropriate dispositions is constantly 
emphasised. 	 When our action is the result of a 
disposition to be guided by this or that general 
principle then we are operating at the intuitive level 
(the level of the 'prole'); when our action is the result 
of deliberations of the sort outlined above then we are 
operating at the level of critical thinking (the level of 
the 'archangel'). 
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Unfortunately we are seldom able to operate at the level 
of critical thinking; we have limited knowledge of 
consequences and limited skill in determining the 
preferences of others. Reason alone may determine choice 
and may not, therefore, need the 'guidance' of good 
dispositions but such dispositions will nevertheless be 
important in those situations where we lack the ability 
or opportunity to fully exercise reason - and that is 
nearly always. 
There are thus, according to Hare (1981 p.45), two ways 
in which each of us can achieve virtue in our actions: as 
proles we can act on the basis of our good dispositions; 
as archangels we can act as a result of critical 
thinking. If someone had all the characteristics of the 
archangel (was capable of perfect critical thinking) then 
"everything would be done by reason in a moment of time" 
and that person would not "need the sound general 
principles, the good dispositions, the intuitions which 
guide the rest of us". But in fact "we all share the 
characteristics of both [archangel and prole] to limited 
and varying degrees and at different times." 
Both archangel and prole are ideals. 	 The archangel 
clearly so - he can, when confronted with a novel 
situation, instantly fulfil all the requirements of 
critical thinking. But the prole is also an ideal - he 
has good dispositions, sound principles. As moral agents 
we will need (if Hare is correct) to strive after both 
ideals - to have the qualities of the archangel so that 
we can exercise them when we have the opportunity, and to 
have the qualities of the prole so that we can cope with 
more pressing situations. 
The outlines of a moral education (of the type we are 
considering) are, thus, further spelt out by the theory. 
As moral educators we may see our role as falling into 
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two parts. 	 First, to instil dispositions to act 
according to general principles which have resulted from 
the limited critical thinking which we, as a community, 
have been able to undertake; and, second, to give our 
pupils the ability to acquire knowledge and exercise 
reason in order that they might think critically 
themselves. 
As Hare (1952 p.76) says there are, according to his 
view, two aspects to moral education. Firstly, a child 
must be provided with "a solid basis of principles"; and, 
secondly, it is necessary to provide ample opportunity to 
engage in the decision-making process by which such 
principles "are modified, improved, adapted to changed 
circumstances, or even abandoned". 
	 The first is 
necessary because we do not, generally speaking, have the 
time or the skill to engage in full decision-making. The 
second is necessary because a body of principles will not 
meet all circumstances in a complex and changing world, 
and because those principles may sometimes yield 
conflicting judgments; so that if a child is to achieve 
autonomy in such situations, then that child will need to 
acquire skill in the decision-making process. 
The view which Hare puts forward is one in which these 
two aspects of moral education are both essential to the 
development of virtue; but it is the second which is seen 
to be the ultimate guarantor. For without such skill the 
individual could not arrive at a correct moral judgment 
for those situations which are not dealt with, or are 
dealt with in conflicting ways, by the body of 
principles; and the community as a whole could not build 
up such a body of principles. 
Furthermore, as has been said, central to this view is 
the claim that the skills of critical thinking may be, in 
a sense, sufficient to virtue. When critical thinking is 
employed there is no need for 'good' dispositions. The 
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canons of thinking which are generated when we understand 
the meaning of moral words, and which will govern our 
thought insofar as we are rational, would be sufficient 
to yield a preference to act in the right way. 
If Hare were correct, then those involved in education 
would be right in thinking that the development of those 
capacities required by critical thinking would, when 
employed to make moral judgments, result in improved 
behaviour. 	 Such a view would give educators the hope 
that, when aiming to develop virtue, they could do 
something more than to simply 'mould' behaviour. They 
could encourage capacities which would, of themselves, 
improve behaviour and which would, equally importantly, 
be immensely useful in other contexts (eg. in making 
decisions of prudence). 	 The successful moulding of 
character and dispositions could then be seen as only a 
part, and ultimately a secondary part, of a wider, less 
'authoritarian' project. 
Educators would be able to give genuine reasons and 
explanations for the moral judgments they hold and, most 
importantly, give to their pupils the means of arriving 
at just the same judgments. 	 Such a possibility would 
mean that those engaged in moral education could live up 
to the ideal of rationality which philosophers such as 
I.Scheffler (1973) describe - according to which the 
teacher's central task is to encourage the pupil to 
exercise his own judgment. 	 "Teaching is, in this 
standard sense, an initiation into open rational 
discussion"; it is not merely the passing on of views and 
attitudes from teacher to pupil. 	 It is not then a 
question of those who have a highly developed 'moral 
intuition', or who are peculiarly perceptive and 
sensitive to the 'moral features' of situations, passing 
on the results of their skills to others less fortunate, 
and ensuring that the latter are so disposed as to act 
according to the judgments received. 
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The type of moral education which we are considering aims 
not only to impart an ability to make moral judgments but 
also to encourage a disposition to act accordingly (and 
thus to improve behaviour). The moral theory which we 
are considering describes the process of moral judgment 
in a way which makes clear not only the requirements of 
the first aim but also the way in which the achievement 
of that aim will contribute to the achievement of the 
second. If it is not possible to establish such a moral 
theory then it may be that a moral education which 
includes the second aim cannot avoid having as a primary 
task the imparting of certain fundamental attitudes or 
dispositions. 
Hare's moral theory purports to avoid that consequence. 
But some commentators would claim that such a fundamental 
attitude (namely a sentiment of generalised benevolence) 
is surreptitiously appealed to by Hare. 
Hare's route to Utilitarianism. 
There are, as I understand it, two main propositions 
which the theory of critical thinking would yield: 
a. as a result of the process of making moral 
judgments, fully rational agents who know all the 
relevant facts will agree as to what is the morally 
right thing to do in a given situation; 
b. as a result of the process of making moral 
judgments, fully rational agents who know all the 
relevant facts will have a preference that the right 
action should be performed. 
The first proposition says that moral disagreements must 
be the result of misuse of moral concepts or of ignorance 
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of 'non-moral' facts. As Nagel (1982) says, it implies 
that "there are no disagreements which are moral all the 
way down" and that "all fundamental moral disagreements 
are in a sense illusory". 
One would expect someone who believes that moral 
judgments 'describe' moral facts to make the claim that 
full knowledge must result in agreement, but what is 
unusual about Hare's position is that this claim is made 
from a non-descriptivist position. 
	 Hare is not a 
naturalist, he does not believe that moral words are tied 
by virtue of their meanings to fixed non-moral 
properties; nor is he a realist or an intuitionist, he 
does not believe that there are 'moral facts' which can 
be perceived or intuited. 
Both of the propositions above (a and b) are derived from 
claims about the meanings of moral words - viz. that they 
involve universalisability and prescriptivity. As Nagel 
says, Hare extracts a very large moral rabbit from what 
looks at first like a very small and empty linguistic 
hat. 
This, perhaps, makes the second proposition even more 
surprising than the first. Hare claims that his theory 
(which initially concerns only the formal, logical 
properties of moral words) yields "a system of moral 
reasoning whose conclusions have a content identical with 
that of a certain kind of utilitarianism". 
	 But Hare's 
theory involves the further claim that the exercise of 
reason (according to the canons of moral reasoning) will, 
of itself, yield a preference to act in the way which 
such reasoning dictates. In the light of this additional 
claim, it will be useful to contrast Hare's route to 
Utilitarianism with earlier approaches. 
Utilitarianism involves the assertion that an action is 
morally right insofar as it results in a maximisation of 
Moral judgment and an inclination to act. 
60 
utility (or happiness or preference satisfaction). Such 
an assertion raises many questions. 	 Two fundamental 
questions are: 'Why should we judge the morality of an 
action in terms of utility?' and 'Why should we act (or 
be inclined to act) according to judgments of 
morality/utility?'. 
Bentham's response to the first question rests, in part, 
upon his belief that we do (to a great extent) judge the 
morality of actions in this way and that, insofar as we 
do not, we simply express our own personal and unfounded 
sentiments. 	 The principle of utility, Bentham claims 
(1789 Chapter 1), offers the only means of giving meaning 
to the words 'ought', and 'right' and 'wrong'; and there 
has never been a "human creature breathing, however 
stupid or perverse, who has not on many, perhaps on most 
occasions of his life, deferred to it". If someone does 
not defer to that principle then he "expresses neither 
more nor less than the mere averment of his own unfounded 
sentiments"; and where the sentiments of two such people 
differ they can say no more than 'I like it' and 'I do 
not like it'. 
Part of the appeal of Utilitarianism may be that, through 
the principle of utility, it appears to offer not only a 
means of justifying those moral views we share but also a 
means of resolving disagreements between our moral views. 
Utilitarianism seems to provide a simple, coherent 
foundation for particular moral views. 	 According to 
Bentham, it provides the only such foundation. 
Williams (1988) contrasts an approach in which we seek a 
'foundation' for our moral opinions with an approach in 
which we are "merely .. concerned with the implications, 
presuppositions, and incoherences of those opinions". 
Williams favours the latter approach and denies that 
there is any need to 'go back to foundations' - in a 
'Cartesian sense'. He criticises Hare for rejecting the 
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latter approach and for treating as mere prejudice moral 
views which have not been derived from such a foundation. 
Thus Williams attributes to Hare an approach which is 
certainly attributable to Bentham (and, perhaps, other 
Utilitarians). 
Whether Hare would plead guilty to the charge of 
'foundationalism' would depend upon how that expression 
is used. 	 As Hare (1988 p.291-2) makes clear in his 
response to Williams, he would reject a 'Cartesian' 
approach based upon an appeal to substantive moral 
opinions which are claimed to be clear, distinct and 
self-evident. He would reject such an approach because 
as he says (1981 p.12) the opinions or convictions which 
are appealed to may indeed have been generated by 
prejudice and will merely reflect the moral environment 
in which each of us have grown up. This is the case 
whether the appeal is to those convictions favoured by a 
moral intuitionist or whether the appeal is to a single 
'utilitarian' moral principle. None of these convictions 
are, according to Hare, shared by all and, far from 
providing foundations which offer the means of resolving 
moral disagreements, they themselves represent 
fundamental moral disagreements. If we are to provide 
'foundations' then we cannot do so by means of 
substantive moral convictions. 
Hare (1990 p.292) seeks "a secure method of moral 
reasoning", "based on an understanding of what we are up 
to when we are thinking morally", and "achieved by a 
thorough examination of the concepts we are using in our 
thought". According to Hare, we do not all share moral 
convictions but we do all share a use of certain words 
and concepts. 	 Our use of those words and concepts 
involves our acceptance of the universalisability and 
prescriptivity of moral judgments and, Hare argues, if we 
examine carefully what that entails then we will see that 
moral reasoning must yield conclusions which have a 
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content identical to that of a certain kind of 
Utilitarianism. 
Hare claims to provide a rationally unavoidable and very 
distinctive route to Utilitarianism. An understanding of 
the proposed route allows us to see that Nagel's early 
criticism is not adequately argued. 	 Nagel (1982) says 
that Hare, in order to perform the conjuring trick of 
producing a moral rabbit from a linguistic hat, has 
smuggled in a substantial moral intuition "the same one 
that Sidgwick saw to be the basis of utilitarianism: 'I 
ought not to prefer my own lesser good to the greater 
good of another'". This intuition, Nagel claims, is what 
allows Hare to derive a utilitarian position from limited 
claims about the logic of moral words. However, "there 
are those who do not share it". 
Hare would agree - there are those whose upbringing has 
not resulted in a conviction that "the good of any one 
individual is of no more importance .. than the good of 
any other" (Sidgwick 1874 Book 3 Chapter 13) and there 
are those who have not understood the logic of their use 
of certain moral words and concepts. 
Hare does not claim (like Bentham) that the principle of 
utility offers the only means of justifying moral opinion 
nor does he claim (like Sidgwick) that a substantive 
Utilitarian principle is intuitively self-evident. This 
is not the way in which Hare derives a utilitarian 
position. 	 Hare's thesis is that: in each particular 
situation, and as a result of moral reasoning in 
accordance with the canons generated by the logic of 
moral terms, I will not prefer my own lesser good to the 
greater good of another. The utilitarian preference for 
the greater good of another is, case by case, the result 
of moral reasoning - this preference has its source in 
such reasoning. It is this fact, if it is a fact, which 
means that the results of moral reasoning will accord 
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with the conclusions of a certain kind of utilitarianism. 
Nagel's claim (undoubtedly correct) that there are those 
who do not share Sidgwick's moral intuition is, as a 
criticism of Hare, misplaced. 
We can see in more detail the distinctiveness of Hare's 
route to Utilitarianism if we consider the nature of the 
response which it allows to our earlier question 'Why 
should we act (or be inclined to act) according to 
judgments of morality/utility?'. That route would allow 
us to say (along the lines of the second proposition 
given at the beginning of this section) that those who 
make moral judgments will act (or be inclined to act) 
accordingly. 
It could be claimed that if someone makes a sincere moral 
judgment then that logically entails that they have a 
preference that action should accord with that judgment. 
So that there is a sense in which the second proposition 
is true by definition. But what is important about that 
proposition in the context of Hare's theory, is the claim 
that the source of that preference is the process of 
moral reasoning. 	 One could perfectly well perform 
utilitarian calculations out of idle curiosity and with 
no resulting inclination to act; but one could not 
perform critical thinking (as described by Hare, ie. as 
involving 	 imaginative 	 identification) 	 in 	 a 
'disinterested' way - and it is critical thinking which, 
Hare argues, the rational agent making a moral judgment 
has to perform if he understands the logic of moral 
terms. 
Utilitarians (following a different route) may argue that 
an appeal to benevolence is required in order to yield an 
inclination to act in accordance with the dictates of 
moral/utilitarian reasoning. 	 For example, Smart (1973 
p.7) says that the Utilitarian must, when addressing 
others, appeal to a shared sentiment of generalized 
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benevolence - ie. 'the disposition to seek happiness, or 
at any rate, in some sense or other, good consequences 
for all mankind'. 
Bentham (1834), on the other hand, argues that a genuine 
understanding of our own self-interest is what is needed 
in order to generate an inclination to act according to 
the conclusions of utilitarian reasoning. 
	 The aim of 
'deontology', Bentham (1834 p.123) says, is to point out 
"to each man on each occasion what course of conduct 
promises to be in the highest degree conducive to his 
happiness: to his own happiness, first and last; to the 
happiness of others, no further than insofar as his 
happiness is promoted by promoting theirs; ... what will 
also be shown is in how many different ways, more than is 
very generally understood, each man's happiness is 
ultimately promoted by an intermediate regard shown in 
practice for the happiness of others". 
Bentham (1834 p.148) claims that "the intrinsic and 
ultimate object of pursuit to every man at all times" is 
his own well-being. He regards "as an incontrovertible 
fact, that no man ever has done or ever can do any act 
which at the moment of action is not .. , in his own eyes 
at least, his interest to do" (p.175). Given this claim, 
and given the assertion that the morality of our actions 
is measured by their utility, then the only purpose of 
ethics must be to point out the extent to which the 
pursuit of the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
(extra-regarding interest) serves the pursuit of our own 
happiness (self-regarding interest) (p.192). The extent 
to which the one serves the other is (Bentham insists) 
much greater than is commonly thought. 
It is in this context that Bentham makes some appeal to 
benevolence. 	 Many of us, on many occasions, will feel 
sympathy towards others and will thus gain pleasure 
through acting in ways which bring about the pleasure, or 
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prevent the pain, of others. 	 But Bentham goes on to 
refer to two other factors which will provide a motive 
for acting virtuously. Firstly, through acting in ways 
which show our regard for the well-being of others we 
will gain a reputation which will increase the regard 
which others show for our well-being. Secondly, through 
acting in ways which benefit those with whom we have 
regular dealings we increase the chance that the 
individuals benefited will reward us at some later date. 
These two factors Bentham (1834 p.184) sees as providing 
an inducement which "is of the same sort as that which 
the husbandman has for the sowing of his seed, or that 
which the frugal man has for laying up his money". "By 
every act of virtuous beneficence which a man exercises, 
he contributes to a sort of fund - a sort of Saving Bank 
- of general good-will, out of which services of all 
sorts may be looked for as about to flow on occasion out 
of other hands into his". 
I have considered Bentham's route to Utilitarianism in 
some detail because it presents very starkly the problems 
which are raised when we try to discover factors relating 
to our existing motivations and preferences which could 
provide an inducement for acting according to judgments 
of morality/utility. If our motivations and preferences 
cannot be influenced by moral perception or by self-
evident substantive moral intuition, and if they do not 
already include a sentiment of generalised benevolence, 
then we appear to be driven towards factors which seem 
very unsatisfactory both in extent and nature. 	 My 
rational desire to build up substantial funds in a Saving 
Bank of good will seems to provide an insufficient and 
highly inappropriate inducement to moral virtue. 
There are alternatives and one is to claim, with Hare, 
that the process of making rational moral judgments 
involves a form of thinking which brings with it an 
inclination to act. By identifying moral thinking with a 
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form of thinking which involves acquiring the preferences 
of others, Hare seems to avoid the problem of discovering 
motivations or preferences which could provide an 
inducement for acting accordingly. The motivation to act 
is provided by those preferences which I acquire through 
the imaginative identification which is required by moral 
thinking. 
But, as Hare himself points out and as we shall see in a 
later chapter, the problem is merely shifted so that the 
question becomes: 'Why engage in moral thinking?'. That, 
in turn, makes central the question: 'Why educate 
ourselves and others to be inclined to engage in moral 
thinking?'. 
I too will seek to argue for an identification between 
moral thinking and critical thinking. However, firstly, 
the description of critical thinking which I shall offer 
will be somewhat different to Hare's. 	 That difference 
will stem from my criticism of Hare's argument. 
Secondly, the answer I shall attempt to give to the 
central educational question ('Why educate ourselves and 
others to be inclined to engage in moral/critical 
thinking?') will be very different to Hare's. 	 That 
difference will stem from my rejection of the form of 
Utilitarianism which arises from Hare's argument. 	 It 
will involve a shift of focus (in morality) from outcome 
to agent and (in moral education) from performance to 
motivation. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
Consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral theories. 
Rational choice and morality. 
Consequentialism and non-consequentialism. 
Consequentialism as involving a ranking of consequences. 
Consequentialism as involving no agent-relative features. 
Consequentialism and non-consequentialism redefined. 
Rational choice and morality. 
The first steps in Hare's argument (as presented in the 
previous chapter) concern the rationality of choice - 
'What makes a prescription rational?'. 	 It is claimed 
that: 
a. a fully rational agent only makes a prescription for 
action in a given situation if he knows what are the 
consequences of the various possible actions in that 
situation; 
b. the prescription which results from such knowledge 
is rational only if it depends upon what are the 
preferences of that agent with regard to those 
consequences. 
At that stage of the argument, we are concerned only with 
prescriptions which are a response to the question 'What 
shall I do now?'; we are not yet concerned with 
prescriptions as a response to the question 'What ought I 
to do now?' (where that 'ought' is a moral ought). 
Hare follows Brandt (1979) in saying that 'rational' 
refers to "actions, desires, or moral systems which 
survive maximal criticism by facts and logic". In the 
context of actions, this definition requires that a 
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rational agent gains knowledge of any facts which might 
affect the decision as to how to act. A prescription 
will fail to be fully rational insofar as the agent lacks 
knowledge such that having such knowledge might have 
resulted in a different prescription. 
Prescriptions express choices and decisions, and we 
cannot rationally decide what to do unless we know what 
we would be doing if we did this or that. As Hare (1952 
p.56) says, "The whole point about a decision is that it 
makes a difference to what happens; and this difference 
is the difference between the effects [consequences] of 
deciding one way, and the effects [consequences] of 
deciding the other.". The prescription made will then 
depend upon what my preferences are with regard to those 
consequences. 	 Any consequences which relate to those 
preferences, and might thus make a difference to the 
decision, will need to be considered if the prescription 
is to be fully rational. 
When moral considerations are not involved then rational 
consideration of the question 'What shall I do?' requires 
knowledge of what acting in different ways would entail 
in the given circumstances (knowledge of consequences). 
Furthermore, the consequences which we, as rational 
agents, are required to consider are those which relate 
to our preferences. If some consequences are not related 
to my preferences then I may not need to consider them; 
but if other consequences are related to my preferences 
then I may be foolish to neglect to consider them. 
When moral considerations are not involved then 
preferences and consequences are not only relevant to the 
appraisal of actions, they are central. 	 If we aim to 
give our educatees the ability to appraise actions and to 
come to informed decisions (rather than relying upon the 
guidance of others) then we will aim to develop an 
ability to consider consequences and preferences. 
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Now if morality has anything to do with looking at things 
from a wider perspective than that of our individual 
concerns and preferences, then it would seem natural to 
extend what has so far been said in such a way as to 
relate it to the preferences of all concerned rather than 
to the preferences of a single agent. Thus: when moral 
considerations are involved then rational consideration 
of the question 'What ought I do?' requires knowledge of 
what acting in different ways would entail in the given 
circumstances (knowledge of consequences); and, 
furthermore, the consequences which we are required, as 
rational agents, to consider are those which relate to 
the preferences of all those involved. 
As Rawls (1971 p.23 and p.27) says, when describing the 
attraction of classical utilitarianism, "why should not a 
society act on precisely the same principle applied to 
the group and therefore regard that which is rational for 
one man as right for an association of men?". Thus "the 
most natural way .. of arriving at utilitarianism .. is 
to adopt for society as a whole the principle of rational 
choice for one man". 
Whether such a parallel between the approach to questions 
of prudence and questions of morality does seem 'natural' 
will, of course, depend upon the way in which one is 
disposed to approach 'moral' questions about actions. 
But what is true is that most of us do, on some 
occasions, consider how alternative actions might affect 
others - we sometimes do appraise possible actions in 
terms of what they are likely to entail in the 
circumstances and in the light of the preferences of 
others. What is also true is that most of us are, on 
some occasions, motivated by such considerations - you go 
to see someone because they are expecting you and you 
know that they will be disappointed if you do not go, I 
buy my daughter roller skates because I know that she 
Consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral theories. 
70 
will be pleased, the doctor tells someone that they are 
dying because he believes that they would prefer to be 
told, and so on. 
Can we not say that we are, in such cases, deciding what 
we (morally) ought to do and that we are motivated by 
moral considerations? We may not wish to go so far as to 
claim that moral appraisal of actions, and moral 
motivation, only involves consideration of consequences 
in the light of the preferences of others. But, surely, 
it would not be unreasonable to investigate deliberations 
about consequences, in the light of the preferences of 
others, on the grounds that they may have some relevance 
to a moral theory. 
Yet some would claim that investigation of such 
deliberations cannot have a central place in a moral 
theory because, when it comes to answering the moral 
question 'What ought I to do?', considerations of 
consequences are (sometimes) simply not relevant. 	 As 
Anscombe says (1958 p.192): "there are certain things 
forbidden whatever consequences threaten". 
Indeed in some cases, it is claimed, such deliberation 
would not only be irrelevant but would also be morally 
wrong. If someone thinks, Anscombe says, that it is open 
to question "whether such an action as procuring the 
judicial execution of the innocent should be quite 
excluded from consideration - I do not want to argue with 
him; he shows a corrupt mind". Those who are willing to 
suspend judgment until a consideration of consequences 
and preferences has taken place sometimes show a corrupt 
mind. 
If this were so then those who educate others in a way 
which results in them (always) making 'moral' decisions 
through a consideration of consequences and preferences 
would, presumably, be responsible for that corruption. 
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The acquisition of that ability may contribute to other 
aspects of a person's education; but, in order for moral 
education to take place, the educatee must learn that the 
exercise of such abilities is (at least sometimes) not a 
means to moral judgment. 
The sort of moral intuition which Anscombe is expressing 
has been used to mark a general contrast between 
'consequentialist' and non-consequentialist' moral 
theories. The way in which that contrast has been made 
has, however, varied a great deal. Some contrasts fail 
and others focus upon different aspects of moral 
evaluation of actions. 
Since, throughout this thesis, I will not be using those 
terms in the way in which they are currently used in 
debates over moral theory, I now wish to consider the 
ways in which that contrast has been made and to give 
reasons for the focus which I shall recommend. 
Consequentialism and non-consequentialism. 
Consequentialists are often contrasted with deontologists 
- 'one must do one's duty regardless of the 
consequences'. 	 The deontologist is sometimes 
characterised as one who believes that the moral value of 
an action is a feature of the action itself as opposed to 
being a feature of the consequences (or effects, or 
extrinsic features) of the action. For example, Hudson 
(1970 p.87) characterises the deontologist as one who 
holds that "the rightness or wrongness, goodness or evil, 
of an action is intrinsic to the action itself". 
We might begin by pointing out that if the deontologist 
were to accept that the expression 'the consequences of a 
particular action' is equivalent to something like 'that 
which is the case given the performance of the action in 
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the present circumstances', and if it were the case that 
consequences so defined are not relevant, then it would 
be difficult to see how the fact that one has done one's 
duty could itself be morally relevant. 	 As Hare says 
(1952 p.57), "Even to do our duty - insofar as it is 
doing something - is effecting certain changes in the 
situation.". 
If 'consequences' are defined in the same way that Hare 
defines 'effects' (ie. so broadly that it refers to 
anything which is the case given the performance of the 
action in the present circumstances) then it may appear 
necessary to make a distinction between types of 
consequence. The deontologist, who (say) claims that we 
always have a duty to tell the truth or that we are 
always forbidden to kill an innocent person, singles out 
some types of consequences as relevant to moral 
appraisal. 	 So too the 'consequentialist', who (say) 
claims that one ought to act so as to maximally satisfy 
the preferences of all concerned, singles out other types 
of consequence. Thus we might attempt to find a way of 
contrasting such types of consequence other than by 
merely listing them. 
Mackie 	 (1977 	 chapter 	 7) 	 characterises 	 the 
consequentialist as one who builds a moral system around 
the notion of some 'goal' to be attained. He also, like 
Hudson, seems to identify the non-consequentialist with 
the deontologist; and sees the deontologist as one who 
builds a moral system around the notion of rules, 
principles, duties, rights, or virtues. 	 The 
consequentialist, Mackie suggests, sees as central the 
prescription: 'Act so as to bring about X' (where X is 
the goal, or a disjunction of goals, to be attained); he 
may give some place to rules, principles, etc. and thus 
prescribe 'Do things of kind Y', but only insofar as such 
things are conducive to the goal(s) specified. 
	 The 
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deontologist, on the other hand, sees as central the 
prescription 'Do things of kind Y'. 
But, once again, if any consequence of an action (as 
defined above) can be taken as a 'goal' then this notion 
does not seem to be particularly helpful. If an action 
can be described, say, as one of telling the truth then 
we can say that a consequence of that action is that the 
truth is told. The deontologist who tells us that we 
ought to tell the truth ('Do things of kind Y') is 
telling us that those actions in which we make an 
assertion ought to have the consequence that the truth is 
told ('Act so as to bring about X'). If the idea of a 
'goal' is to be the basis of a genuine distinction 
between the consequentialist and the non-consequentialist 
then it will have to be defined more narrowly so that 
some consequences are not specifiable as goals. 
Perhaps there are other ways in which we can make a 
contrast between types of consequence. 	 For example, 
'intrinsic' consequences (features of the action itself 
as Hudson might call them) as opposed to 'extrinsic' 
consequences. 
This approach would seem to require that, from amongst 
all the possible descriptions of an action, we are able 
to distinguish those that are a description of 'the 
action itself'. 	 Other statements would either not 
concern the action, or would describe extrinsic features 
of the action. The non-consequentialist might then be 
characterised as one who would claim that the only 
consequences which are morally relevant are those 
consequences which are described in statements which are 
logically entailed by a description of 'the action 
itself'. 
But it is doubtful whether a distinction can be made 
which will serve the purpose. 	 If, for example, it is 
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true that if a small tumour is bombarded with radiation 
then it will, in the following days and weeks, shrink and 
disappear. Then we might say of a radiologist treating a 
patient that he is: 
1. destroying the tumour; 
2. bombarding the tumour with radiation; 
3. pointing the radiation device at the tumour and 
switching it on; 
4. turning the device in such a direction and pressing 
this lever; 
5. holding the device, flexing such and such muscles.. 
It would seem to be possible to describe the 'action 
itself' in any of these ways; and, given the approach 
outlined here, what is or is not an intrinsic feature of 
the action (and what is or is not an extrinsic feature or 
effect of the action) will depend upon which description 
is employed. If we cannot distinguish descriptions of an 
action which describe 'the action itself', then the 
required distinction between the morally relevant and the 
morally irrelevant features of an action will depend upon 
which description is being considered. 
We can make a point about action-talk which is similar to 
that made by Melden (1961). The conviction that we can 
clearly distinguish the consequences of an action from 
the action itself may be based upon a false picture of 
the way in which we talk about actions. That picture is 
one in which 'the action' is some element, or combination 
of elements, from amongst a causal chain involving 
various 'happenings' - some concurrent and some 
consecutive - for example, a decision to destroy the 
tumour, various bodily movements, the pointing of the 
device, more bodily movements, the switching on of the 
device, emission of radiation, bombardment of the tumour, 
absorption of the radiation, shrinking of the tumour, 
disappearance of the tumour. 'The action' is then seen 
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to occur at some point in this causal chain and to have 
various consequences which occur at later points in the 
chain - 'it' brings about the emission of radiation, the 
bombardment of the tumour, and the ultimate disappearance 
of the tumour. 
It does indeed seem natural to say, for example, that by 
turning the device in this direction and switching it on 
he brought about the emission of radiation and the 
bombardment of the tumour and so on. But we may say 
(equally naturally and with reference to the very 'same 
action') that by bombarding the tumour with radiation he 
brought about its destruction. 
The distinction between what is done and the consequences 
of what is done is entirely relative to the way in which 
we choose to describe the action. 	 If the terms 
'consequentialism' and 'non-consequentialism' are to mark 
some generally significant distinction then we will need 
to consider features of moral judgment other than the 
fact that it involves evaluation of whatever is the case 
given the performance of the action. 
I shall consider three approaches to that distinction. 
Given those different approaches consequentialist 
theories will be those in which (very roughly) evaluation 
of action involves: 
a. a ranking of overall consequences; 
b. no agent-relative features; 
c. no motive-relative features. 
Consequentialism as involving a ranking of consequences. 
The consequentialist is here characterised as one who 
claims that the moral appraisal of an action involves a 
comparison between the consequences of that action and 
those of alternative actions according to some general 
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principle of evaluation. 	 The application of such a 
principle determines a ranking of those sets of 
consequences such that one (or more) set is 'best', and 
the 'right' action is then the action with that set of 
consequences. 
The non-consequentialist might then be characterised as 
one who claims that, on the contrary, some actions are 
just right or wrong regardless of any such comparison. 
The applicability of one of certain descriptions (eg. 
truth told, innocent person killed) to a consequence of 
an action is always sufficient to determine the nature of 
the moral appraisal. 
As Hampshire says (1978 p.7), there are certain moral 
impossibilities which belong to the very notion of 
morality, "a morality is, at the very least, the 
regulation of the taking of life and the regulation of 
sexual relations, and it also includes rules of 
distributive and corrective justice; family duties; 
almost always duties of friendship" and so on. 
	 Some 
things are just wrong and others are just right; morality 
involves certain prohibitions and duties. Once we know 
that a certain description would apply to the 
consequences of a particular action then the moral 
judgment is not open to question. 
It is the consequentialist's willingness to consider all 
the actions which are possible in a particular situation, 
to fail to rule out of court (or to immediately accept) 
some possible actions despite the appropriateness of 
certain descriptions, which is felt (by some) to be not 
only incorrect but also unacceptable. 
	 The 
consequentialists show 'corrupt minds' because they are 
willing to withhold judgment until they have considered 
all the consequences of that action and compared them 
with those of other possible actions in the 
circumstances. 	 They may agree that the fact that the 
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consequences of an action may be described as 'the 
killing of an innocent person' is highly relevant to 
moral appraisal but deny that that is, of itself, 
sufficient to settle the issue - the consequences of all 
alternative actions may be considered and compared. 
Williams (1973) initially characterises consequentialism 
by its focus on the causal properties of an action (the 
states of affairs, or sets of consequences, brought about 
by an action) as opposed to a focus on the action 
(itself). 	 Williams points out, and we have already 
noted, the difficulties in clarifying the terms used 
here. He then goes on to offer a characterisation of 
consequentialism along the lines suggested here. 
Consider the following statements: 
a. in S, x did the right thing in doing A, 
b. the state of affairs P is better than any other 
state of affairs accessible to x, 
(in which P may be what is brought about by A and/or may 
consist of x's doing A). 
A consequentialist view will be one in which b. is given 
as a reason for a., and (perhaps) a. only has sense 
because b. has sense. 	 As Williams points out (1973 
p.88/89) a non-consequentialist view may then involve one 
of three responses: 
no sense is attached to b.; 
b. has sense only insofar as a. is true; 
b. has some independent sense but is not relevant to 
moral appraisal of the action. 
As Williams says (1973 p.88), the non-consequentialist 
(who responds in the first or second way) "may have no 
general way of comparing states of affairs from a moral 
point of view at all", and the "emphasis on the necessary 
comparability of situations is a peculiar feature of 
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consequentialism in general, and of utilitarianism in 
particular". 
Some forms of utilitarianism appeal to only one feature 
of the consequences of actions when making a comparative 
evaluation - the overall utility (or, in Hare's case the 
preference satisfaction) which is involved. 	 Such a 
theory can, therefore, be called a 'monistic' 
consequentialist theory. 
But a consequentialist theory may also be 'pluralistic' -
it may refer to several features of the consequences of 
actions when making a comparative evaluation. 	 For 
example, S.Scheffler (1982 Chapter 2) describes a form of 
pluralistic consequentialism in which the best set of 
consequences is worked out thus: maximise the well-being 
of the group which is worst off; if sets of consequences 
are identical in this respect then minimise the number in 
that group by moving them up; and so on. Thus we would 
have a 'distribution-sensitive' form of consequentialism 
in which moral evaluation requires consideration not only 
of well-being but also of the distribution of well-being. 
We could now incorporate references to other features in 
such a way that a pluralistic 'consequentialist' theory 
began to look very much like a 'non-consequentialist' 
theory. 	 For example, we could regard a set of 
consequences in which innocent people are killed as worse 
than any other set of consequences (regardless of, say, 
the overall level of well-being which is associated with 
those alternative sets of consequences). 	 Thus our 
ranking of consequences may entail a set of prohibitions 
(and duties) such that the applicability of certain 
descriptions to the consequences of an action is 
(sometimes) sufficient to determine moral appraisal of 
the action. 
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However, a ranking which entails such a set of 
prohibitions and duties may, nevertheless, fail to ensure 
that the applicability of a certain description is always 
sufficient to determine moral appraisal. 
	 If, say, we 
regard a set of consequences in which innocent people are 
killed as worse than any other set of consequences then 
we may also regard a set of consequences in which ten 
innocent people are killed as worse than one in which one 
innocent person is killed. 
Thus, if (to take a standard example) someone threatens 
to kill ten innocent people unless I kill this one 
innocent person (and if it is assumed - unrealistically -
that I know it to be the case that the threat is genuine, 
and I have no other means of preventing it from being 
carried out, and so on) then, presumably, a 
consequentialist view entails that I ought to kill an 
innocent person. 
There can be different 'non-consequentialist' responses 
to this particular example. These responses are the same 
as those given (in general terms) above: 
'one innocent person killed is better than ten 
innocent people killed' has no sense; 
one innocent person killed would be 'best' only if it 
were right in this situation (which it is not) to 
kill one innocent person; 
'one innocent person killed is better than ten 
innocent people killed' may be true but it is not 
relevant to moral appraisal of the action. 
The non-consequentialist's claim that some actions are 
just right or wrong regardless of any comparative 
evaluation of sets of consequences may involve a 
rejection of the possibility of such a comparison or a 
rejection of the relevance of such a comparison to moral 
appraisal of action. Furthermore, both of these stances 
can be adopted in general or, as we have seen in the 
Consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral theories. 
80 
example, in particular contexts. Finally, both stances 
can be adopted in response to a very wide range of 
different types of comparative evaluation. 
We have here started from a characterisation of the 
consequentialist as one who claims that the moral 
appraisal of an action involves a comparison between the 
consequences of that action and those of alternative 
actions according to some general principle of 
evaluation. 	 We then characterised the non- 
consequentialist by describing responses to a 
consequentialist position. 	 We could approach the 
contrast from the other side. However, we will begin not 
with a general stance but with a stance in response to a 
particular context. 
Consequentialism as involving no agent-relative features. 
In the context of the example (in which someone threatens 
to kill ten innocent people unless I kill one), we can 
accept that the death of ten innocents is worse than the 
death of one but deny that I ought to kill one only if we 
can point to some other feature which is relevant to 
moral judgment. 
In the example I am faced with a choice between bringing 
it about that I kill one innocent person or bringing it 
about that someone else kills ten innocent people. We 
can resist the move from 'best' to 'ought' if we insist 
that (in the context of killing innocent people) 'ought' 
is 'agent-relative': 
(x) (x ought to bring it about that x does not kill 
innocent people) 
or, more simply: 
(x) (x ought not to kill innocent people). 
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We would then be claiming that (in this context) we 
cannot derive a moral judgment about action from our 
comparative moral evaluation of sets of consequences 
since an agent-relative moral judgment already applies. 
We could follow Parfit (1984 p.27) in putting this 
response in terms of a claim that each of us ought to 
have the aim that he does not kill innocent people - as 
opposed to the claim that each of us ought to have the 
aim that there is no, or less, killing of innocent 
people. 
If our moral aims were all of this type then, in all 
contexts, comparative 'moral' evaluation of sets of 
consequences would cease to be relevant to moral 
judgments about action. Such a position would also be 
compatible with one involving a claim that 'moral' 
evaluations of that type are not possible. 	 Thus both 
responses to the consequentialist (given at the end of 
the previous section) could be expressed in terms of the 
role of agent-relative features in our moral judgment. 
If the contrast between consequentialism and non-
consequentialism is drawn in these terms then we are able 
to characterise the consequentialist theory as one which 
makes no appeal to agent-relative features (and, perhaps, 
appeals only to a ranking of sets of consequences) and 
the non-consequentialist theory as one which appeals only 
to agent-relative features (and makes no appeal to a 
ranking of sets of consequences). 	 We can also 
characterise 'hybrid' theories (to use S.Scheffler's 
expression) as those which involve appeal to some agent-
relative features but otherwise appeal to a ranking of 
sets of consequences. 
[Scheffler also points out that non-consequentialist or 
hybrid theories can incorporate agent-relative features 
which, rather than forbidding me to perform the action 
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which has the best outcome, grant me permission not to 
perform that action.] 
If we combine the contrast here with that in the previous 
section we have: 
consequentialism - 
a. makes no appeal to agent-relative features, 
b. appeals only to a ranking of sets of consequences; 
non-consequentialism - 
c. appeals only to agent-relative features, 
d. makes no appeal to a ranking of sets of 
consequences. 
Now both Scheffler (1988 p.5) and Parfit (1984 p.26/27) 
seem to claim that these features go hand in hand. 
However, it seems to me that this is not so. 
We could have a moral view according to which it is 
always wrong to bring it about that an innocent person is 
killed, someone is tortured, ten innocent people are 
killed, ten people are tortured, and so on. We could see 
each of these as wrong regardless of whether I bring 
about these consequences or I bring it about that someone 
else brings about these consequences (ie. no appeal to 
agent-relative features). We could see each of them as 
just wrong regardless of any comparison with the 
consequences of alternative actions (ie. no appeal to a 
ranking of sets of consequences). 
In the context of the example, such a view would yield 
the conclusion that my action would be morally wrong 
whatever I did. The non-consequentialist who appeals to 
agent-relative features says that I ought to not kill one 
(I thus bring it about that the other person does kill 
ten). The consequentialist who appeals to ranking says I 
ought to kill one. The moral view considered here yields 
the conclusion that I ought not to do either - but, alas, 
I must. 	 Such a view would be non-consequentialist 
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according to the characterisation in the last section and 
consequentialist according to the characterisation in 
this section. 
Such a view is, I believe, coherent. Furthermore, if we 
combine it with a view of blame (according to which to do 
wrong is not always to be worthy of blame) it yields a 
plausible interpretation of our moral intuitions - our 
"spontaneous convictions, moderately reflective but not 
yet theorized" - as Williams (1985 p.94) describes them. 
This is not an interpretation which I would support but, 
when faced with the dreadful situation in which if I do 
not kill an innocent person someone else would definitely 
kill ten, our moderately reflective convictions are not 
(I believe) so clear as to rule out such an 
interpretation. 
There are many different ways in which we can interpret 
our moral intuitions with respect to actions which we 
find repugnant. I shall offer my own interpretation in a 
later chapter but here I shall roughly describe a 
Utilitarian interpretation. 	 According to Hare, for 
example, although a Utilitarian moral theory may yield 
the conclusion that in some situations killing an 
innocent person would be morally right, it is also true, 
firstly, that such situations would be extremely rare 
(especially if wider consequences are taken into account) 
and, secondly, we could never be sure that a given 
situation was of that type and, thirdly, a Utilitarian 
theory can provide very good reasons for educating people 
to find such actions extremely repugnant. 
Scheffler (1988 p.9) claims that this leaves a gap 
between the interpretation and the intuition, and that 
most would agree that agent-relative moralities "mirror 
our everyday moral thought much more closely than 
consequentialism does". Does this 'most' and 'our' refer 
to (moderately reflective) moral philosophers? What does 
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'more closely' mean? Does it mean that an agent-relative 
interpretation of moral intuition is somehow part of that 
intuition? Or does it mean that when we try to state 
those intuitions we do so in agent-relative terms? A 
proponent of agent-relative morality will do so; but a 
Utilitarian will not. 
There are different ways of drawing the boundary between 
consequentialists and non-consequentialists - some are 
not clear, others draw the boundary in somewhat different 
places. If the boundary is meant to divide those who do 
from those who do not have difficulty with moral 
intuitions with respect to actions which we find 
repugnant (or with, say, moral intuitions about personal 
responsibility) then, I believe, the attempt to draw the 
boundary in this way may do two things. 
Firstly, it may obscure the fact that there are a range 
of coherent and plausible ways in which we may interpret 
those moral intuitions. These interpretations may fall 
on one side of the boundary, on the other, on both, or on 
neither. 
	 Monism, pluralism, ranking of sets of 
consequences, agent-relativism are all important features 
of moral theories but to draw a line through those 
features (to act as a boundary between consequentialism 
and non-consequentialism) is to make an unnecessary or a 
false contrast. 	 The contrast is unnecessary if it is 
made in terms of one feature (non-consequentialism is 
just, say, agent-relativism). The contrast is false if 
it implies that several features go hand in hand on one 
side of the boundary. 
	 Furthermore, all such features 
have something in common: they relate to an evaluation of 
what is the case given the performance of an action -
they relate to consequences. 
Secondly, it may prevent a focus upon aspects of moral 
appraisal which are at least as important as those 
relating to consequences. It may obscure the fact that 
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in some moral theories all such evaluation is derivative. 
In a 'non-consequentialist' moral theory the agent, and 
the complexity and quality of motivation which leads to 
his action, has centre-stage. 
Consequentialism and non-consequentialism redefined. 
Throughout the previous sections it was assumed that 
moral appraisal of an action was centrally concerned with 
what is the case given that an action is performed. Non-
consequentialism has so far been characterised as 
involving an insistence that agent-relative features are 
central, or as involving a rejection of certain ways of 
making comparative evaluations between consequences. But 
perhaps non-consequentialism is better seen as a demand 
for a shift of focus from the world, and the way it is 
being altered by action, to the agent and the sources and 
'springs' of his action. 
The focus on what is the case given that an action is 
performed is a focus on consequences, and the insistence 
that moral appraisal is primarily a matter of evaluating 
consequences (as good or bad, better or worse) is perhaps 
what distinguishes the consequentialist. Agent-relative 
theories require a shift of focus; but the focus is not 
shifted away from consequences, it is merely narrowed so 
that moral appraisal concerns, say, whether I bring it 
about that I kill an innocent person rather than whether 
I bring it about that I or another person kills an 
innocent person. 
All consequentialist theories may lead us to see actions 
only in terms of what is the case given the performance 
of an action but I shall, for the moment, confine my 
remarks to Hare's theory. 
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Hare's analysis centres upon consequences, possible and 
actual, which agents are interested in because those 
consequences would satisfy, or fail to satisfy, their 
preferences. 	 The agent's struggles are all with the 
world and the aim of those struggles is to make the world 
such that those preferences are satisfied. The struggle 
becomes a moral struggle when the prescriptions involved 
are not only those of the agent but also those of other 
people. 
There is little mention of the agent's struggle with 
himself or others, where that struggle is seen in terms 
of people who are (in themselves) morally imperfect and 
in need of improvement. It is then easy to be tempted 
into seeing self-improvement only as a matter of learning 
and modifying skills and principles in the light of 
changes in the world and of improvements in our knowledge 
of the world - ways of doing better in the business of 
improving the world. 
When Hare (1952 p.72-75) discusses the possibility of the 
instability of moral principles, or the appropriateness 
of passing on (unaltered) our moral principles to our 
children, the explanation of instability and the 
questioning of appropriateness is all in terms of changes 
in the world or changes in our knowledge of the world. 
What Hare sees as central are the implications of such 
changes for the way in which we can successfully bring 
about the preferred consequences: principles become 
inappropriate because, in the altered circumstances, the 
same way of behaving no longer brings about those 
preferred consequences. 
Hare does not seem to envisage the possibility that 
principles could come to be seen as inappropriate because 
of a rejection of the preferences which they are designed 
to satisfy. Or, at least, he does not seem to allow that 
the question 'What ought I to prefer?' may be central, 
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and independent of, the question 'How can I satisfy these 
preferences?'. 
Hare's later discussions (1981) of the possibility of 
altering preferences turn on answers to the question 'How 
would alteration of this preference affect the 
satisfaction of these other preferences?'. 	 The moral 
theory he outlines places no overall constraints on 
preferences, it concerns only the problem of how we must 
behave if we are to bring about those consequences which 
would maximally satisfy the preferences which people 
actually have. "The effect of universalisability is to 
compel us to find principles which impartially maximise 
the satisfaction of .. preferences. 	 It does not 
constrain the preferences themselves." (1981 p.226). 
If Hare's theory is offered as a 'complete' theory of 
moral thinking then this implies that questions about 
whether there are independent constraints upon what 
people prefer (and, if so, then what are those 
constraints) not only can not be answered by moral 
thinking but also are not moral questions at all. 
I believe that such questions may be as central to 
morality as the particular form of 'concern for others' 
which critical thinking represents. If that is so then 
moral education may have to centrally involve an effort 
to shape not merely the behaviour of the agent but the 
character of the agent. 
	 Moral education will involve 
aims which do not merely relate to what the agent 
achieves through action but also, and more importantly, 
which relate to what the agent does as a result of who he 
is. 
In this section I merely wish to suggest that we might 
characterise the consequentialist as one who (like Hare) 
sees moral appraisal as primarily a matter of evaluating 
consequences. 	 The non-consequentialist may then be 
Consequentialist and non-consequentialist moral theories. 
88 
characterised as one who insists that moral appraisal is 
primarily about agents (not primarily about what happens 
in the world as a consequence of action) - the motives, 
intentions, preferences, dispositions, capacities of the 
agent are the primary focus. 
But now we may note, with Moore (1966 p.95), that 
although it may be admitted that "it is right and proper 
that a man's motives should ... influence our judgment 
... the question is: What sort of moral judgment is it 
right and proper that they should influence? Should it 
influence our view as to whether the action in question 
is right or wrong? It seems very doubtful whether ... it 
actually does ... for we are quite accustomed to judge 
that a man sometimes acts wrongly from the best of 
motives". And again, with Mill (1863), "the motive has 
nothing to do with the morality of the action, though 
much with the worth of the agent". 
The consequentialist may in fact agree that moral 
appraisal of agents should focus on motives etc., but 
nevertheless insist that moral appraisal of actions is a 
matter of evaluating consequences. 	 However, my point 
here is that we should see the non-consequentialist as 
demanding a shift of focus away from consequences and 
that shift can be achieved by taking a certain view of 
the relationship between the two forms of appraisal. 
Thus I wish to suggest that the consequentialist may be 
usefully characterised as one who insists that: 
a. moral appraisal of actions is primary and depends 
upon an evaluation of the consequences of the 
action; 
b. moral appraisal of agents is secondary and 
derivative because the dispositions, motives, etc. 
of the agent have moral value only insofar as they 
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are conducive to (or would generally result in) 
those consequences which have value. 
The non-consequentialist may then be seen as insisting, 
on the contrary, that: 
c. moral appraisal of agents is primary and depends 
upon an evaluation of the characteristics of the 
agent; 
d. moral appraisal of actions is secondary and 
derivative because actions have moral value only 
insofar as they are such as would be performed by an 
agent with those characteristics which have value 
[or, with Aristotle perhaps, insofar as they are 
such as would be performed by an agent acting in 
those ways which would result in his acquiring those 
characteristics]. 
The non-consequentialist may see characteristics such as 
honesty, benevolence, compassion, loyalty, sympathy, 
understanding, as good in themselves; but for the 
consequentialist such virtues only have value because 
they generally lead to consequences which have value. 
In this thesis I shall offer a moral theory which sees 
benevolence, non-malevolence, understanding and humility 
as the primary focus of morality and of moral education. 
That theory will not only be a non-consequentialist 
theory, it will be a 'radically' non-consequentialist 
theory. I shall end this chapter by characterising such 
'radical non-consequentialism'. 
The characterisations of consequentialism and non-
consequentialism given above permits us to make a further 
useful distinction. 	 The characterisation of non- 
consequentialism implies (through d.) that a particular 
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action may have moral value even if it is not performed 
as a result of the characteristics which have value. 
However, one might wish to claim that if characteristics 
of the agent are the primary focus in moral appraisal 
then a particular action has moral value only if it is 
due to those characteristics. 	 That is, we replace d. 
with: 
d'. moral appraisal of actions is secondary and 
derivative because actions have moral value only 
insofar as they are performed by an agent as a 
result of those characteristics which have value. 
According to this view the moral appraisal of action is 
not a matter of what is done but may be wholly a matter 
of why it is done. The moral appraisal of actions is not 
merely secondary to, and derived from, the moral 
appraisal of agents, it is directly dependent. This view 
I shall call radical non-consequentialism. 
Non-consequentialist theories may incorporate an ideal -
the ideal agent who possesses all those characteristics 
having positive moral value and lacks all those 
characteristics having negative moral value. 	 Such an 
ideal may generate a view of right action for a given 
situation - the action which would be performed by an 
ideal agent. 	 If the theory is radically non- 
consequentialist then it will yield the view that an 
action which is right but which does not result from such 
characteristics is merely right - it lacks moral worth. 
Kant offers such a theory. For Kant the characteristic 
of the agent which has moral value is his apprehension of 
duty. An action has moral value only insofar as it is 
brought about by that apprehension of duty. An action 
which conforms to duty but does not arise from duty has 
mere 'legality'. 
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To encourage educatees to do right because, say, they 
believe it is in their own interest, or they wish to 
please their educators, or they expect reward and fear 
punishment would not only contribute nothing to their 
moral development but would also achieve nothing of moral 
worth. 	 In the context of Kant's moral theory, moral 
education must aim to reveal to educatees that 
apprehension of duty can have more power than "all 
allurements arising from enjoyments and everything which 
may be counted as happiness or from all threats of pain 
and harm" (1788 p.155). 
I too will offer a radically non-consequentialist moral 
theory. 	 That theory will generate a view of right 
action, and of the moral worth of the agent, which has 
much in common with Hare's view. The structure of the 
theory, and features which result from that structure, 
will have much in common with Kant's view. Both Hare and 
Kant offer arguments for the 'correctness' of their moral 
theories. 	 I shall consider both theories, and both 
arguments, before presenting my own. 
In the next chapter, I shall look at various features of 
Kant's moral theory and, especially, of the argument 
which gives rise to his radical non-consequentialism. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
Moral thinking, moral motivation and moral worth. 
Kant's radical non-consequentialism. 
Morality and freedom. 
Moral experience and moral education. 
Objections to Kant's theory. 
Choosing to act against inclination. 
Kant's radical non-consequentialism. 
Kant (1785 p.11-18) claims that nothing "can be called 
good without qualification, except a good will" and that 
"a good will is good not because of what it performs or 
effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some 
proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition". 
The good will is a source of action. To act from a good 
will is to act from duty (the notion of duty "includes 
that of a good will"), and that is to act not out of 
inclination but simply because of the moral law. Action 
"done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of 
inclination, and with it every object of the will, so 
that nothing remains which can determine the will except 
objectively the law". 
The moral worth of the agent is measured by the source of 
his actions - he has moral worth insofar as he acts from 
duty. But the moral worth of his actions is also, for 
Kant, measured in the same way. To have moral worth an 
action must be done from duty, and "an action done from 
duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which 
is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it 
is determined, and therefore does not depend on the 
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realisation of the object of the action, but merely on 
the principle of volition by which the action has taken 
place". 
Not only is the satisfaction of inclinations irrelevant 
but also what is in fact achieved by an action. If my 
respect for the moral law 'One must always tell the 
truth.' determines my action, then that, of itself, 
establishes the moral worth of my action. 	 Whether I 
have, in fact, told the truth cannot therefore be 
relevant to the moral appraisal of the action. 
If I choose to act out of respect for the moral law 
'Always tell the truth.' then actions which are the 
result of that choice have moral worth (if it is indeed a 
moral law). 	 Knowledge of the source of an action is 
sufficient to moral appraisal. 	 If, for example, I 
believe that my brother is in the garden and if, because 
I choose to act out of respect for moral law, I say 'My 
brother is in the garden.' then my action has moral 
worth. 	 But my belief may be mistaken (he may now be 
elsewhere) and, in that case, I have not told the truth. 
My action is determined by the law but it is not, in 
fact, according to the law. If the former is sufficient 
to moral appraisal then the latter cannot be relevant. 
Consequences, even in the broadest sense (according to 
which that I have not told the truth is here a 
consequence of my action), are not relevant to the moral 
appraisal of the action. 
The particular nature of an action (what it performs or 
effects) will depend upon the circumstances and upon my 
beliefs; the moral worth of the action depends entirely 
upon the nature of the motivation which gives rise to it. 
Kant's radical non-consequentialism can be seen clearly 
if we contrast this with his view of the 'prudential 
worth' of an action. 
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Kant (1788 p.17-19) makes a distinction between practical 
principles as maxims and as laws. A practical principle 
is "a proposition which contains a general determination 
of the will" and might be something like: 
'One should provide for one's old age.' 
It may "have under it several practical rules" (or 
precepts); and here, I take it, Kant is referring to 
principles like: 
'One should save when young in order to provide for 
old age.'; 
'One should befriend rich people in order to provide 
for old age.' 
(The first is a "correct and important practical precept 
of the will") 
A practical principle is a subjective principle (a maxim) 
when "the condition is regarded by the subject as valid 
only for his own will". This will be so, according to 
Kant, if the subject recognises that the principle is not 
valid simply of itself but rather because the end it 
specifies (provision for old age) is something the agent 
wishes to achieve. 
The maxim and the practical precepts which it 'has under 
it' yield imperatives: 
1. provide for your old age; 
2. save when young; 
3. befriend rich people. 
Insofar as reason determines the will, and given 
a. I wish to provide for my old age, 
b. I believe I will live to an old age, 
then I will choose to provide for my old age 
ie. I will recognise imperative 1. to be valid for 
me. 
Insofar as reason determines the will, and given 
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a. and b. and 
c. I believe I can save something, 
d. I believe I cannot expect much from rich friends, 
etc. 
then I will choose to save when young 
ie. I will recognise imperative 2. to be valid for 
me. 
The maxim is a subjective principle but the imperatives 
are valid 'objectively' in that they must govern my 
choice insofar as reason determines my will. 	 But the 
imperatives are 'hypothetical' because they only apply 
given various subjective conditions - viz a,b,c,d etc.. 
Provided I do not recognise other conflicting imperatives 
as valid for me then, insofar as reason determines the 
will, action will follow. 	 The resulting action is 
appropriate if in fact I am providing for my old age, if 
I am in fact saving. 	 Such an action has 'prudential 
worth' because of what it performs or effects. That is, 
the action is appropriate and has worth if I am achieving 
the end specified in the maxim or precept; if my action 
is, in fact, in accordance with the imperative. This is 
so because if it does not so accord then I will not have 
achieved what I wished to achieve; and the maxim was 
valid for me only because the end it specified was 
something I wished to achieve. 
All this is contrasted with what is the case if a 
practical principle is an objective principle (a 
practical law). In this case the principle is valid of 
itself and not given any subjective conditions. That is, 
insofar as reason determines my will then I would (if 
this principle were a law) choose to provide for my old 
age. I would recognise imperative 1. to be valid for me 
irrespective of any subjective conditions. Provided I do 
not recognise other conflicting imperatives as valid for 
me (provided subjective causes do not hinder my action) 
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then, insofar as reason determines the will, action will 
follow. 
But now, "only the volition is completely determined" by 
a moral law. 
	 The specific nature of the action that 
follows will depend upon subjective conditions. 	 If 
providing for my old age were a moral duty, and I 
recognised it as such, then what I actually did would 
depend upon such things as my belief that I cannot rely 
on rich friends. We can begin to trace the same picture 
of the recognition of other imperatives as was traced in 
the case of a subjective principle. 
	 Subjective 
conditions are, once more, relevant. 
However, although the particular nature of the action 
(what it performs or effects) will depend upon the 
circumstances and upon my beliefs; the moral worth of the 
action depends entirely upon the nature of the motivation 
which gives rise to it. The action has moral worth if 
and only if it stems from my recognition of duty. Kant's 
view is radically non-consequentialist. 
The view of prudential worth of an action, in which worth 
is dependent upon outcome, is clearly contrasted with the 
view of moral worth of an action, in which worth is 
dependent only upon motivation. That contrast rests upon 
a contrast between a will which is determined by a 
principle because of a desire to achieve the end stated 
in the principle, and a will which is determined only 
because it recognises the principle to be law. 
For Kant, the recognition of a principle as a law 
concerns the 'form' of the principle; it does not concern 
the worth of the end which is stated in the principle 
(the 'matter' of the principle). 
	 Kant (1788 p.35) 
explicitly rejects the idea (which he attributes to all 
other moral theories) that a moral law could be such 
because of the moral worth of the end stated in that law. 
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"If it were, the maxim could not be presented as giving 
universal law, because then the expectation of the 
existence of the object would be the determining cause of 
the choice, the dependence of the faculty of desire on 
the existence of some thing would have to be made basic 
to the volition, and this dependence would have to be 
sought out in empirical conditions". 
If my choice were determined by a recognition of the 
worth of the end stated in a law then, according to Kant 
(1788 p.19), that would involve it being the case that I 
conceived the end, I wanted the end, and I sought its 
realisation. 	 But, crucially, we have no grounds for 
attributing such a want to all rational beings - not even 
as rational. We would have, therefore, no grounds for 
claiming that the principle was objectively necessary or 
that the imperative was categorical. 
What we can attribute to all rational beings, as such, is 
an ability to recognise whether a maxim does or does not 
have the form of law. 	 That, says Kant, is a case of 
determining whether one can rationally will that the 
maxim of one's action "should become a universal law". 
The maxim has the form of law if we can (as rational 
beings) think of it as a law. The ability to distinguish 
maxims in this way is an ability which cannot be denied 
to any rational being. (Whether such an ability will 
serve to distinguish what is required is, of course, 
another matter.) 
[Here we can see the similarities with Hare's rejection 
of a moral theory which is based upon substantive moral 
conviction. We do not all share such convictions - not 
even as rational. We do share a use of certain words and 
concepts. What we can attribute to all rational beings, 
as such, is an ability to understand the language which 
they share. The logic of that language demands that, as 
rational, we universalise our prescriptive moral 
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judgments. Thus Hare's theory, like Kant's, rests firmly 
upon the role of universalisation in the moral thinking 
of a rational agent.] 
The central question in moral appraisal, for Kant, is 
whether the rational being has acted merely because he 
has recognised the universal validity of his maxim and 
therefore recognised its validity for him as rational 
being. 	 If choice is determined by the recognition of 
moral law, without reference to anything one might wish 
to achieve, then "the law directly determines the will; 
[and] action in accordance with it is in itself good" 
(1788 p.64). 	 "What is essential in the moral worth of 
actions is that the moral law should directly determine 
the will." (1788 p.74). 
If this is so, it cannot be the case that if the action 
does not in fact accord with the law then it does not 
have moral worth, nor can it be the case that its moral 
worth is diminished. The source of the action is all 
that matters for its moral appraisal; the achievement of 
the end stated in the principle, what is the case, what 
the action actually entails in the circumstances, what 
are the consequences of the action (in the broadest 
sense) is irrelevant. 
It has to be said that some of what Kant says does appear 
to conflict with this radical non-consequentialism. For 
example, he says that the highest worth of humans lies in 
their intentions and not in their actions only (1788 
p.74). The fact that, when discussing moral worth, he is 
willing to refer at all to what is done, as well as why 
it is done, seems to imply that actions could have moral 
worth independently of the motive which lay behind them. 
It might seem reasonable to argue that if moral worth is 
in some way due to laws which require us to promote 
certain ends, then the achievement of the end specified 
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by the law must have some moral worth. 	 But this, I 
think, would be to miss Kant's central point, which is 
that moral worth is entirely a matter of whether the will 
is determined by a maxim which is a law. If it were the 
case that the end itself (albeit derivatively) had moral 
worth then it might be argued that an action which 
achieved that end would have moral worth irrespective of 
whether it were done out of respect for moral law - but 
this Kant explicitly rejects. 	 "It is of the utmost 
importance in all moral judging to pay strictest 
attention to the subjective principle of every maxim, so 
that all the morality of actions may be placed in their 
necessity from duty and from respect for the law, and not 
from love or leaning toward that which the action is to 
produce." (1788 p.84); "there are many minds so 
sympathetically constituted that .. they find pleasure in 
spreading joy around them .. but I maintain that .. an 
action of this kind, however proper, however amiable it 
may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth" (1785 
p.16). 
This radical view is tempered somewhat by the assertion 
that such actions would be honourable and, even, 
deserving of praise and encouragement. But, says Kant, 
the inclination to act in such a way does not warrant our 
esteem and the actions have no moral worth (such actions 
have mere 'legality'). 
Thus (as was stated earlier) an action which stems from 
respect for moral law but is, in fact, not in accordance 
with moral law has undiminished moral worth; and (as 
stated here) an action which is in accordance with moral 
law but does not stem from respect for moral law has no 
moral worth. 
Now Sullivan (1989) believes that Kant simply fails to 
make proper use of the distinction between the moral 
worth of the action and the moral worth of the agent. 
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According to Sullivan, Kant could (and should) have said 
that an action has moral worth (morality) if it accords 
with a moral law (if it has legality) and that the agent 
has moral worth insofar as he is motivated by moral law. 
As Sullivan (1989 p.29) says, the two questions 'What 
makes an action morally right?' and 'What makes an agent 
morally good?' "can be considered to be logically 
distinct"; this "is shown by the fact that we can 
conceive of a morally evil person performing a morally 
acceptable action .. [and] we also can conceive of a 
morally good person mistakenly believing that he is 
acting rightly when in fact he is not". 
Sullivan maintains that Kant fails to clearly distinguish 
the two questions. That lack of clarity is, according to 
Sullivan (1989 p.30), partly due to the fact that Kant 
"often thinks of an 'action' as a person's intention 
rather than as a person's behaviour and, when he does, he 
describes actions so as to include the agent's end and 
motive". 	 Whether or not that is so, we can, surely, 
refer to the agent's motive when describing the action. 
Just as we can say: 'that action involved this 
behaviour', 'that action brought about these 
consequences'; so too we can say: 'that action arose from 
this motive'. 
	 Having said that, we can say (with the 
consequentialist): 'that action has moral worth because 
it brought about these consequences'; or (with the non-
consequentialist) 'that action has moral worth because it 
arose from this motive'. The latter statement need not 
be due to a lack of clarity. 
Kant does answer the two questions differently: an action 
is morally right (has legality) when it is according to 
law; an agent is morally good when he is motivated by 
law. But Kant explicitly denies that the moral rightness 
(legality) of an action entails (or is equivalent to) the 
moral worth of the action. There is a third question: 
'What makes an action morally good?' and the answer to 
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that question need not be the same as the answer to the 
question: 'What makes an action morally right?'. 
	 Kant 
insists that an action which is according to law but is 
not motivated by respect for the law may be morally right 
but it has no moral worth. An action which is according 
to moral law is (simply as such) not morally better than 
an action which is not according to law because the 
legality or illegality of an action has nothing to do 
with the moral worth of that action. 
Morality, for Kant, is about the quality of the agent's 
motivation. 	 Actions have moral worth, have morality, 
only derivatively: they have moral worth only insofar as 
they stem from the agent's respect for the moral law. 
Furthermore, in insisting upon a distinction between the 
moral rightness of an action and the moral worth of an 
action Kant is, I believe, expressing a moral view which 
many share. When we consider an action simply as 'the 
person's behaviour', or as bringing about such and such 
consequences, we do not consider its moral worth; in 
order to make a moral evaluation of an action we need to 
know more. 
Suppose: dentists have two types of anaesthetics - A and 
B; when A is used I still suffer some pain and I feel 
sick later. Suppose: the morally right thing to do is to 
use B when giving me dental treatment. If the dentist 
does indeed use B when treating me does his action have 
moral worth? According to the moral view now outlined, 
we need to know more. Suppose the dentist: 
a. did not know about the effects upon me of using A, 
meant to use A, but picked up B by mistake; 
b. had used A with a succession of patients, had run out 
of A, and had to use B; 
c. had obtained a special discount when purchasing B, 
and was using it with all patients in order to save 
money. 
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In each case the dentist's action is morally right; but 
in each case, according to the view outlined, the action 
has no moral worth. 
A world in which people acted unintentionally, or because 
they could not do otherwise, or simply out of greed and 
selfishness would be a world without moral worth. This 
would be true even if such people always did (or happened 
to do) the morally right thing. 
According to this view, the language of morality is used 
to mark out something distinctive and fundamentally 
important about our approach to decision making. The use 
of that language in relation to actions simply as 'the 
person's behaviour', or as bringing about such and such 
consequences, is entirely derivative. Such a view is not 
adequately expressed in terms of a distinction between 
the moral worth of actions and outcomes, and the moral 
worth of agents and motives. 	 For, according to this 
view, actions and outcomes (simply as such) do not have 
moral worth. 
[We can draw a parallel with words such as 'shrewd'. We 
may speak of a 'shrewd move' but we mean by that 
(something like) 'a move resulting from the use of 
intelligence and foresight'. If we use these expressions 
in this way then we may say of a checkmate move in chess 
that it was not a shrewd move because, say, the move was 
made accidentally or the move was made in order to make a 
pleasing pattern of pieces. Some might, alternatively, 
use the expression 'shrewd move' to refer to a very 
successful move or a move which is such as a shrewd 
person would perform. Such a person might then say to 
us: 'You are confusing the shrewdness of a move with the 
shrewdness of a person.'. But such a remark would show a 
misunderstanding of the way in which we use such 
expressions - to mark out something distinctive about our 
approach to problem solving.] 
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Radical non-consequentialism of this sort is, I believe, 
central to Kant's view of morality. Like other aspects 
of that view it stems from Kant's assessment of 'ordinary 
moral consciousness'. As Sullivan says (1989 p.19), Kant 
offers an analysis of the features and presuppositions of 
ordinary moral consciousness and ordinary moral 
reasoning. 	 But it is his response to the problem of 
'freedom' which, I believe, largely determines the 
particular nature of his approach to that analysis. 
Morality and freedom. 
Sullivan (1989 p.76) states that "because the new 
Newtonian science regarded the natural world of which 
human beings are part as completely governed by 
inexorable causal laws, it inevitably generated moral 
scepticism. In a causally determined world the notion of 
'ought' can have no meaning.". Kant (1781 p.218) himself 
maintains that "Everything that happens, ie. begins to 
be, presupposes something upon which it follows according 
to a rule.", "All alterations take place in conformity 
with the law of connection of cause and effect." and he 
goes on to offer a proof of such universal causation in 
the Second Analogy. In the context of his moral theory 
he has thus set himself the task of giving an account of 
freedom (and hence of the possibility of morality) which 
is compatible with this belief that every event (in the 
phenomenal world) has a cause. 
Walker (1978 p.136) says that Kant believes that "it is a 
condition of being morally accountable that one's will be 
free, in a sense incompatible with its being determined 
by antecedent causes. 
	 If I belonged only to the 
phenomenal world I could not therefore be free, or 
morally responsible.". We might add that, for Kant, this 
is because it is the case that as belonging to the 
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phenomenal world I am not free and cannot therefore be 
morally responsible; as an event (a wholly determined 
event) in the phenomenal world my action cannot be 
morally appraised, the question of its moral worth does 
not arise. 
Kant begins his consideration of freedom when he outlines 
the thesis and antithesis which make up the third 
conflict of the transcendental ideas. If freedom, Kant 
says (1781 p.411), were a feature of the world of 
phenomena then it would be mere lawlessness; for if 
freedom had laws and yet were a feature of the phenomenal 
world then those laws would be laws of nature and not 
laws of freedom - freedom "would simply be nature under a 
different name". 	 If, however, freedom were lawlessness 
and a feature of the world of phenomena then nature (as 
an ordered system and as thus distinguishable from 
dreams) would be "hardly thinkable; the influences of 
[lawless freedom] .. would so unceasingly alter the laws 
of [nature] .. that the appearances which in their 
natural course are regular and uniform would be reduced 
to disorder and incoherence" (1781 p.414). 	 Therefore 
there can be no freedom in the world of phenomena and 
everything in that world must take place entirely 
according to the laws of nature. 
Thus one half of the antithesis within the third antimony 
is, according to Kant, demonstrated. But this does not 
imply that there is no freedom; it may yet be the case, 
Kant claims (1781 p.466-7), that phenomena may be 
grounded in freedom even though as events in the world of 
sense they are entirely determined by the laws of nature. 
We can conceive of this possibility only if we regard 
phenomena not as having absolute reality but rather as 
the appearances of things in themselves. 
	 If phenomena 
"are not things in themselves then they must rest upon a 
transcendental object which determines them as mere 
representations"; and if this is so then there is nothing 
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to prevent our attributing to that transcendental object, 
besides the quality through which it becomes phenomenal, 
a causality which is also not phenomenal. 
There would, according to Kant, be no contradiction in 
thus viewing one and the same event as being in one 
aspect merely an effect of nature and in another aspect 
an effect due to freedom. But even if there were no 
contradiction involved in such an idea, we would not yet 
have been given any grounds for believing that there is 
such freedom, or even for believing that anyone other 
than Kant entertains such an idea of freedom. 
However we all do in fact, Kant claims (1781 p.472), 
entertain the idea that there is a form of causality 
other than that which we observe in the world of the 
senses. We know ourselves not only through our senses, 
as phenomena, but also as possessing reason and 
understanding; and we do believe that our reason 
possesses causality. When a man tells a malicious lie 
that act is entirely determined by his education, the 
society he keeps, the dispositions of his nature, and the 
occasioning causes at the time; yet he is nevertheless 
blamed. This, according to Kant (1781 p.477), is because 
we regard reason as being completely free, "we regard 
reason as a cause that irrespective of all the above-
mentioned empirical conditions could have determined, and 
ought to have determined, the agent to act otherwise". 
The act is imputed entirely to a fault (or to the 
default) of reason. 
Such an imputation implies that we imagine that reason 
does not belong to the series of sensuous conditions, it 
lies outside the phenomenal world but yet is capable of 
determining events in that world - and when it does so 
determine such events it does so according to the laws 
which it apprehends. Thus, if freedom is to be found at 
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all, it is to be found in those actions which are 
determined by the apprehension of law. 
The arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason do not, 
however, establish the reality of freedom. All that Kant 
claims to have shown thus far is that "causality through 
freedom is at least not incompatible with nature" (1781 
p.479). 
When Kant turns to his moral theory he offers a different 
type of example taken from our experience of morality. 
That example, Kant claims, not only gives grounds for 
believing in the objective reality of freedom but also 
corroborates his claims at to what the nature of that 
freedom must be. 
Moral experience and moral education. 
What we discover, when we consider our experience of 
morality, is that it is possible to choose to act in a 
certain way despite the fact that such an action would 
lead to something we wanted to avoid more than we wanted 
anything else. 	 Ask someone, for example, "whether he 
thinks it would be possible for him to overcome his love 
of life, however great it may be, if his sovereign 
threatened him with .. sudden death unless he made a 
false deposition against an honourable man whom the ruler 
wished to destroy", "that it would be possible for him he 
would certainly admit without hesitation" (1788 p.30). 
According to Kant, here we have someone recognising he is 
free because he knows he could do something simply 
because he ought, and regardless of what he wants. This 
glimpse of freedom takes us outside the phenomenal world 
of outcomes and inclinations. 	 Within the context of 
inclinations we cannot imagine deliberately choosing to 
act in a way which led to something we wanted to avoid, 
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unless it also led to something we wanted more. 	 The 
experience encapsulated in this example shows us 
something distinctive and that has to do with our 
apprehension of moral law. 
This example and Kant's interpretation of it play, I 
believe, a central role not only in his moral theory but 
in the wider theory presented in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. It is this example (and others like it) which 
shows us that pure reason can be practical - that it is 
at least possible for it to move us to action - and "with 
the pure practical faculty of reason, the reality of 
transcendental freedom is .. confirmed", and the concept 
of freedom "is the keystone of the whole architecture of 
the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason" 
(1788 p.3). 
In insisting that we can do what we do not want to do 
(even what we least want to do) and that we can resist 
doing what we want to do (even what we most want to do) 
Kant is, I believe, expressing a view of moral experience 
which many share. The belief that we can in some way 
overcome ourselves seems to me to be central to our 
experience of morality. But Kant's attempt to analyse 
and illuminate this belief is, once again, inextricably 
linked with his response to the problem of freedom. 
What Kant needs to claim is that here we have the 
possibility of a choice which is made regardless of what 
is the case in the phenomenal world - regardless of our 
circumstances, history, preferences and inclinations. It 
is a choice which has its source outside of the world of 
empirical conditions, and can therefore be free of the 
causal links which bind every aspect of that world. But 
this is not a mere negative freedom from physical 
necessity - that would simply be a lawlessness, or 
arbitrariness, which would bring us no closer to solving 
the problem of free will and moral responsibility - 
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rather the example shows a choice determined in a 
different way by laws of a peculiar kind (1785 p.63). 
Our choices can be determined simply by the laws which 
reason presents to us. 
The type of example of our moral experience which Kant 
here offers shows, he claims, not only the reality of our 
freedom but also the nature of that freedom - our freedom 
lies in our responding to the laws of morality as opposed 
to the laws of nature. 
[Or, alternatively: our freedom lies in our ability to 
respond to the laws of morality as opposed to the laws of 
nature. The difficulties in establishing which of these 
claims Kant is making, and the link with problems as to 
the role of 'blame' in Kant's theory, will be briefly 
discussed in the next section.] 
Our freedom, and hence our morality, lies in our response 
to the laws of morality. Insofar as we are motivated by 
our recognition of such laws we have moral worth; insofar 
as our actions stem from such recognition they have moral 
worth. If we and our actions are to have moral worth 
then we must acquire the ability to recognise and respond 
to those laws. To simply act according to law (to do 
right) is not enough. 	 To do right because, say, we 
believe it is in our own interest, or we wish to please 
those in authority, or we expect reward and fear 
punishment would achieve nothing of moral worth. 
Thus the moral education of an individual must involve 
two aspects. 	 First, the individual must acquire the 
ability to determine whether a maxim of action does or 
does not have the form of law; that is, the rationality 
of the individual must be developed. That ability will 
enable the individual to apprehend some maxims as law. 
The acquisition of that ability demands, as Sullivan says 
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(1989 p.287), the renunciation of dependence on external 
authority and a willingness to think for oneself. 
But that is not sufficient; for we are also subject to 
inclination and those inclinations, despite our 
apprehension of law, may determine our action. 	 So, 
secondly, as Kant says (1788 p.156) the individual must 
become receptive to a pure moral interest. 	 If this 
receptivity is developed then the apprehension of law 
will prove stronger than "all allurements arising from 
enjoyment and ... all threats of pain and harm". 	 Each 
must develop this receptivity not only to avoid acting 
wrongly but also to ensure that right action stems not 
from inclination but from apprehension of moral law. 
Such receptivity is to be developed by exposure to 
examples of a pure moral interest; examples in which we 
see actions performed with no regard to inclination. If 
we are shown such examples then we will admire them and 
wish to emulate them (1788 p.160); and through them we 
will become conscious of the possibility of freedom from 
"the impetuous importunity of inclinations" (1788 p.165). 
Moral education, therefore, involves holding the pupil's 
attention to the consciousness of freedom. There can be 
no freedom, no morality and no moral worth insofar as our 
actions are motivated by our inclinations. 
It is against this background that we can, perhaps, 
interpret Kant's analysis of a third central feature of 
morality. 	 This is the belief expressed in the second 
formula of the Categorical Imperative: "Act in such a way 
that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end." 
Kant is not, I believe, merely expressing the view that 
others have preferences which ought to be respected and 
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that we should not, therefore, treat others merely as 
means to the satisfaction of our own preferences. He is 
expressing the view that each of us can make choices and 
act not merely from inclination but against inclination; 
each of us can respond to moral law and overcome those 
inclinations; each can, as rational, be free and self-
determining; and that to ignore this is to ignore our 
humanity and to ignore our true worth (our moral worth). 
We ignore the humanity of others not only when we treat 
others merely as a means to the satisfaction of our own 
preferences but also when we treat others merely as a 
means to morally right action - that is, when we attempt 
to control and influence behaviour merely through reward, 
punishment and subjection to authority. 
An education which merely aimed to control behaviour in 
such ways, and thus ensure morally right action, would 
not be a moral education. 
I have now claimed that there are three features of 
morality and moral experience which are central to Kant's 
view: 
always treat humanity never simply as means but 
always as an end; 
nothing can be called good without qualification save 
a good will; 
each of us is capable of overcoming the impetuous 
importunity of our inclinations. 
I shall claim that a moral theory which does not give 
adequate expression to these features is unsatisfactory. 
Kant's theory illuminates those features but it does so 
by means of an analysis of freedom - our freedom as 
involving a response to our apprehension of moral law. 
But that analysis is beset with problems; both in terms 
of the means by which we are supposed to apprehend those 
laws and in terms of the notion of freedom which is 
involved in the analysis. 
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Objections to Kant's theory. 
Kant's theory ultimately rests, firstly, upon the 
coherence of the contrast between actions as stemming 
from choices made by the self as noumenon and actions 
which are simply performed by the self as phenomenon; 
and, secondly, upon its capacity to deliver substantial 
moral laws by the means described. 
A law is a moral law if one can rationally will that it 
should become a universal law. We discover which maxims 
are laws simply by attempting to conceive them as laws. 
Everything must be done by reason alone and so, 
presumably, we can make no use of any facts about the 
world. 	 Yet, as Korner says (1955 p.138), it is clear 
from Kant's examples that this test does not consist 
merely in replacing the 'I' of the maxim with 'everybody' 
and then seeing whether the result is or is not logically 
self-contradictory. 
Kant (1785 p.39) considers four possible maxims in order 
to show how the method would eliminate them. The four 
maxims are: 
1. from self-love I will shorten my life when its longer 
duration is likely to bring more evil than 
satisfaction; 
2. when I think of myself in want of money, I will 
borrow and promise to repay, although I know that I 
can never do so; 
3. I shall neglect the cultivation of my natural gifts 
whenever it agrees with my inclination to indulge in 
pleasure; 
4. I will take nothing from anyone or even envy them, 
but neither will I contribute to other's welfare or 
assist them when in distress. 
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Korner points out that if we universalise these maxims 
then we do not get logical contradictions; so, either 
Kant needs to extend the notion of contradiction to cover 
'moral absurdity', or he must use other true statements 
about the world in order to derive a contradiction from 
their conjunction with the universalised maxim. 
If he does the former then his test would be circular or 
superfluous. 	 If he does the latter then some of the 
statements used will need to be empirical statements 
whose truth might be doubtful - for example, Kant's 
discussion of the fourth seems to assume that we are none 
of us capable of deliberately depriving ourselves of all 
hope of support in times of need. Korner concludes that 
Kant's test for moral law is not adequate. 
Clearly Kant does need to appeal to something more than 
the logically self-contradictory nature of the 
universalised maxim, and clearly he is not able to appeal 
to a posteriori truths in order to yield a contradiction 
- for that would be inconsistent with his whole theory. 
However, he can, without inconsistency, appeal to a 
priori truths. 	 He could claim, for example, that the 
statements 'If people expect promises to be broken then 
they will place no reliance on any statement purporting 
to be a promise.' and 'No-one can deliberately deprive 
himself of all aid.' are not only true but also known a 
priori. 
The danger then is that Kant will judge to be a priori 
just those statements which will assist in deriving the 
moral 'laws' which he subscribes to. 
	 As Walker says 
(1978 p.158), "What he actually does is to build into the 
conception of rationality all his substantive moral 
views". 
It is also worth mentioning at this point that even if 
the required truths are known a priori, and can thus be 
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used to refute the putative moral laws derived from 
examples 1 to 4, the derivation of the contrary (eg. 
never commit suicide) does not straightforwardly follow. 
From: 
it is not possible to prescribe for all x (x do A), 
it does not follow that: 
it is necessary to prescribe for all x (x not do A); 
we can only deduce that: 
it is necessary not to prescribe for all x (x do A). 
From the fact (if it is a fact) that 'Everyone should 
break their promises.' cannot be a moral law, it does not 
straightforwardly follow that 'Everyone should keep their 
promises.' must be a law. 
It may be true that, given Kant's test, the latter can be 
a law whereas the former cannot. But are there not other 
maxims concerning promising which could survive the test? 
Suppose, as McIntyre suggests (1967 p.198), we take the 
maxim 'I may break my promises only when ...' and we fill 
the gap by a description which will apply to my present 
circumstances but to very few others (eg. the promise 
concerns some borrowed money, the borrower is a teacher, 
the amount is fifteen pounds, etc.) then such a maxim 
seems to pass the test. That test "imposes restrictions 
only on those insufficiently equipped with ingenuity". 
We could object that such a maxim would only be proposed 
and adopted by someone who wished to avoid the settling 
of this particular debt (ie. myself). As Sullivan says 
(1989 p.163) "we may not appeal to the desirability of 
the possible or probable empirical consequences of the 
(universal) adoption of a particular kind of action". 
The proposal of such a maxim as a counter-example is not 
in tune with Kant's notion that what we are seeking are 
laws which can determine the choices of rational agents, 
simply as rational. Such an objection would shift the 
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ground to Kant's claim that there can be such choices, 
and to a consideration of the coherence of Kant's 
contrast between actions as stemming from choices made by 
the self as noumenon and actions which are simply 
performed by the self as phenomenon. 
According to Kant, everything is subject to law. 	 Our 
actions are either the effect of choices made according 
to our conception of the moral law and/or they are the 
effect of empirical conditions which are subject to the 
laws of physical necessity. Insofar as we are part of 
the 'world of understanding' our actions can be caused by 
choices which are not themselves 'caused' by anything 
else; but as part of the 'world of sense' our actions are 
caused by choices made in the light of desires and 
inclinations, and those desires and inclinations are 
themselves caused by other phenomena, and so on (in an 
endless causal chain). 
We now have two systems which can explain the 
determination of choice, two systems of laws which must, 
according to Kant, apply to separate aspects of our 
nature - self as noumenon and self as phenomenon. Free 
will has reality only for the self as noumenon. If the 
self were only a noumenal self then it would always 
choose in conformity with moral law - it would always be 
free, ie. its choices would be determined by its 
apprehension of moral law (1785 p.70). 	 Insofar as the 
self is also a phenomenal self there is, presumably, a 
form of conflict between the two systems of 
determination. 
If that conflict results in a choice determined by the 
conception of law then the choice has moral worth (the 
will is a good will). If the choice is simply determined 
by desires, inclinations, and other empirical conditions 
then it has no moral worth. 
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An action has moral worth if and only if it stems from a 
choice which has moral worth. An action has worth only 
derivatively because an action is only known as a 
phenomenon and every event in the world of phenomena is 
causally determined. As an event in the world of sense 
the action is not free - and therefore the question of 
moral worth does not arise. 
But now if freedom, morality and moral worth are all 
manifested in our responding to the laws of morality, as 
opposed to the laws of nature, then a conflict which 
results in a choice determined by the laws of nature not 
only has no moral worth but also has no freedom. The 
implications of such a view would seem to present serious 
difficulties for Kant's moral theory. All wrong actions 
(and all right actions not determined by recognition of 
moral law) would lack freedom and would seem, therefore, 
not to be blameworthy and (as wholly determined) to be 
not immoral but amoral. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how there can be any 
conflict of choice. The choices of the self as noumenon 
are determined by recognition of the laws of morality, 
the choices of the self as phenomenon are determined by 
the laws of nature. If freedom is just the determination 
of choice by a recognition of moral law then there is no 
sense in which I am free to choose between duty and 
inclination. 
Walker argues (1978 p.148) that Kant, in his later works, 
does not identify freedom with obedience to law but 
rather identifies freedom with the ability to make such a 
choice between duty and inclination. Such a choice must 
be made by the self as noumenon (unless we are willing to 
take the step of suggesting that there is a more ultimate 
self behind the phenomenal-noumenal viewpoints). 
	 But 
then why would I (as noumenal self) "choose the evil 
course rather than the good one"? "If I choose the evil 
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course then I freely decide to let my inclinations have 
their way". It cannot be the case that my inclinations 
"are too strong for me and determine my decision, for 
then I should not be properly free and accountable for my 
choice." 
Both interpretations of Kant's view of freedom present 
considerable difficulties. 	 Kant's analysis of and 
response to the problem of freedom, according to 
Sullivan, may at times seem incoherent and, according to 
Walker, is a hopeless failure. Certainly that response 
seems to make it extremely difficult for him to provide, 
as he intended, an analysis of our ordinary moral views 
and moral experience. 
However, I would not wish to claim that, to paraphrase 
Williams (1985 p.65) we cannot travel far enough into 
Kant's territory to bring back central aspects of his 
moral philosophy without bringing back "the more 
extravagant metaphysical luggage of the noumenal self". 
For I would like to develop a moral theory which, like 
Kant's, is radically non-consequentialist; provides firm 
links between moral thinking, moral motivation and moral 
worth; and incorporates the three features of morality 
and moral experience which I believe to be central to 
Kant's view. 
In the final section of this chapter I would like to make 
some preliminary remarks relating to the third of those 
features: 
each of us is capable of overcoming the impetuous 
importunity of our inclinations. 
Choosing to act against inclination. 
If it were the case that we could not avoid Kant's 
interpretation of our experience of morality then the 
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temptation to subscribe to his moral theory might be 
greater; but I do not believe that this is the case. 
In his interpretation of the example in which we see the 
possibility of choosing death rather than the making of a 
false declaration, Kant eventually makes the transition 
from a claim that here is a choice made against the 
agent's own inclinations, to a claim that here is a 
choice made regardless of all empirical conditions, to a 
claim that here is a choice made by the self as noumenon. 
These transitions are themselves made in the light of his 
wider theory and are part of the quest for a freedom 
which, Kant says, can find no place in the world of 
phenomena. The second transition stands or falls with 
that wider theory but the first can, I think, be 
approached more directly. 
The first point to make about the example is that we 
could see the claim that it is possible to choose death 
rather than lying as simply a claim that it is possible 
to have an inclination not to lie which is stronger than 
the inclination to preserve one's life. Kant's response 
would presumably be that this misses the point of the 
example: the point is that every agent will admit the 
possibility of such a choice (the same choice) despite 
the fact that few agents have such a strong inclination 
against lying. That is: it is possible for me as I am 
not merely possible for me to be other than I am (and 
thus to make such a choice from inclination). There must 
therefore be a means by which each of us (as we are) 
could be brought to such a choice despite lacking that 
inclination. 
Kant sees only one possibility: we apprehend moral law 
and acknowledge that law as a duty - we have knowledge 
that such a choice would be in conformity with a moral 
law which applies to us. 
	 Such knowledge would have 
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nothing to do with what is the case, nothing to do with 
outcomes or inclinations or any other empirical 
conditions. Thus the first transition is made. But it 
relies on the claim that there is no other means by which 
we could be brought to such a choice - namely one in 
which we choose to act in a way which leads to something 
we want to avoid more than we want anything else. This 
claim seems to me to be false. 
Each of us can acquire inclinations and can discount, or 
give different weight to, the inclinations which we have. 
We can acquire inclinations through imaginative 
identification with others - I now want you to have this 
book because I know how much you want it. 
	 We can 
discount an inclination as a result of a wish to be other 
than we are (through imaginative identification with an 
'ideal self') - I now discount my desire to see you 
suffer because I wish I were not vengeful. Thus we can 
deliberate as if we had preferences other than those we 
in fact have. 
In later chapters I shall elaborate further the notions 
of imaginative identification with an ideal self and 
benevolent (or malevolent) identification with others. 
All I wish to claim here is that the process of 
deliberation can alter one's inclinations and/or can 
alter the weight which one gives to one's actual 
inclinations when making decisions. This fact is one way 
of interpreting the possibility (of choosing to act 
against my actual inclinations) in such a way that it 
becomes a genuine possiblity for each of us (as we are). 
It is possible for each of us to discount, for example, 
all our preferences save the preference not to lie. 
Kant might reject such an approach on the grounds that 
such acquisition or discounting of inclinations may alter 
my inclinations and thus determine my judgment, but not 
every agent will reflect, or see the need to reflect, in 
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this way (and each agent may not reflect in this way on 
all occasions). Kant might make the same point here as 
was made earlier: every agent will admit the possibility 
of the choice in the example, despite the fact that some 
agents do not deliberate in this way. That is: it is 
possible for me as I am not merely possible for me to 
deliberate in a way I do not (and thus to make such a 
choice from the inclinations I then have). 
For Kant, it is simply as rational agents that we 
recognise the possibility of our making choices 
regardless of our inclinations. All rational agents, 
Kant claims (1788 p.30), apprehend moral law and 
acknowledge that law as duty. The possibility of acting 
against inclination is simply the possibility of our 
choosing to act according to those laws we all do 
apprehend and acknowledge. It is a possibility for each 
of us as we are - as rational. We recognise that we can 
act against inclination because we know that we ought. 
However, if we do not presuppose Kant's metaphysics, then 
this is merely to claim that this is the only explanation 
of the possibility of our acting against inclination and 
it does apply to us all. I have denied the former claim 
and will now deny the latter. We do not all apprehend 
'moral law' in the (unsatisfactory) way which Kant 
suggests nor do we acknowledge as a duty the particular 
'moral laws' which Kant acknowledges. 
Some do simply have a very strong inclination not to lie; 
some do deliberate in a way which results in their 
acquiring or discounting, or giving altered weight to, 
inclinations; some do (perhaps) apprehend and acknowledge 
moral law as Kant suggests. Each of these offers a means 
of interpreting the claim that it is possible for each of 
us to act against our inclination. None of these applies 
to us all - not even as rational. 
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[Each of these might apply to us all as morally worthy 
agents. I shall claim that the second does. We ought to 
acquire the preferences of others through benevolent 
identification and to discount all malevolent 
preferences. Morally worthy agents will then sometimes 
act against (their own) inclination.] 
There are, I am claiming, alternative ways of 
interpreting the belief that we can deliberately act 
against our inclination - a belief which I, like Kant, 
take to be central to moral experience. 	 Furthermore, 
such an interpretation can be incorporated into an 
alternative moral theory. Kant's interpretation derives, 
I believe, from his moral theory; it is not the only 
means of doing justice to that experience. 
At the heart of Kant's theory is the claim that: 
for all 
morality gives reason to act in a certain way. 
This 'unqualified' universal quantification would enable 
Kant to answer Bradley's (1876) question 'Why should I be 
moral?' by saying that the question would not arise for 
any rational agent - no defence of morality is required. 
So too the intuitionist, and the realist, can claim that 
the question would not arise for any agent capable of 
clearly intuiting, or perceiving, moral facts - it would 
arise only for the morally 'blind'. 
However, Kant's quantification is not in fact unqualified 
- it ranges over all 'rational' agents. 	 So too, the 
intuitionist's, and realist's, quantification ranges over 
all those capable of clearly intuiting, or perceiving, 
moral facts. 
For the philosopher the interesting question will be 'How 
far can we push the range of quantification?'. But for 
the educationalist the pressing question will be 'How do 
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we ensure that an educatee falls within the range of 
quantification?'. 	 I claimed (in chapter 2) that the 
intuitionist, and the realist, fail to give an answer to 
that question. 	 It is that failure which, I believe, 
makes it reasonable for us to question whether such a 
theory has any genuine significance; or whether it merely 
ensures that the description used in the range of 
quantification picks out all, and only, those who share 
the theorist's moral judgments. 
Kant does offer an answer to the latter question. 	 In 
order to fall within Kant's range of quantification we 
will need to be 'rational'. 	 But that involves 
apprehension of moral law and acknowlegement of that law 
as duty. Once again the danger is that the ability to 
apprehend, and the disposition to acknowledge, such laws 
will be attributable only to those who share Kant's 
particular moral views. 
The educationalist's question provides a way of 
determining how far we can push the range of 
quantification without merely ensuring that the 
description used in that range picks out all, and only, 
those who share the theorist's moral judgments. 
At the heart of Hare's theory is the claim that: 
for all those willing and able to make moral 
judgments 
morality gives reason to act in a certain way. 
And Hare can, and does, give a clear answer to the 
educationalist's question. Furthermore, the link between 
morality and action is maintained. 	 But it no longer 
holds for all rational beings; the agent must be willing 
and able to make moral judgments. 
If there are, in this way, limits to how far we can push 
the range of quantification then Bradley's question 
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becomes more difficult. 	 This too is a question which 
will deeply concern, and will have a special significance 
for, the educationalist: 'Can we justify an attempt to 
ensure that our educatees fall within the range of 
quantification; that morality determines their actions?'. 
The question of justifying the imparting of a willingness 
to engage in moral judgment will be examined later. But, 
according to Hare, the ability to make moral judgments 
has certain necessary features; and it is this claim 
which will be examined now. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
Critical thinking, universalisability and impartiality. 
Hare's claims with regard to universalisability. 
Mackie's characterisation of universalisability. 
Hare's characterisation of universalisability. 
The use of universalisability. 
Hare's claims with regard to universalisability. 
Hare identifies (first level) moral thinking with 
critical thinking. His argument for that identification 
and his characterisation of critical thinking turn upon 
his views with regard to the universalisability of 
prescriptive moral judgments. Hare claims that: 
1. universalisability is a necessary feature of those 
judgments and that, therefore, a rational agent 
making such judgments should engage in a form of 
thinking which reflects that feature; 
2. the nature of universalisability is such that it 
places certain very specific constraints upon a 
rational agent which are such as to demand that 
form of thinking which he calls critical thinking; 
3. the use of the form of thinking which he describes 
yields judgments which have a content identical 
with that of a certain form of Utilitarianism. 
As stated in Chapter 2, I too will seek to argue for an 
identification between moral thinking and critical 
thinking (somewhat modified). 
	 That identification will 
also form a part of a moral theory which has features in 
common with Utilitarianism. But, although the judgments 
yielded by that form of thinking will be Utilitarian, the 
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view of moral worth will be radically non-
consequentialist. The moral theory which I shall propose 
will focus upon the agent and, as in Kant, the links 
between moral thinking, moral motivation and moral worth 
will be central. 
My route to that theory will involve an attempt to show 
that that alternative form of Utilitarianism can underpin 
and inspire those (moderately reflective) moral views 
which we share; and that it can do so more satisfactorily 
than the form which Hare proposes. 	 But if Hare's 
argument were correct then such a route would not be 
legitimate. The logic of our moral language dictates the 
form of thinking which should determine our moral 
judgments and, Hare claims, those judgments happen to 
have a content identical with that of a certain form of 
Utilitarianism. 	 If that is so then to propose an 
alternative form is to ignore the logic of our language. 
In order to reach an alternative we must reject Hare's 
claims. 	 In this chapter I shall examine Mackie's 
rejection of Hare's first and second claim (above). 	 I 
believe that Mackie's criticism fails but that an 
examination of his criticism will allow a further 
clarification of the central features of Hare's route to 
Utilitarianism. In the next chapter I shall then attempt 
to reject Hare's second and third claims (above). 
Mackie's characterisation of universalisability. 
Hare's argument has two requirements with respect to 
universalisability: 
1. the universalisation of moral judgments must be a 
logical requirement and not merely a requirement 
which is derived from a moral intuition which some 
do not share; 
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2. the nature of that requirement must be such that 
Hare's conclusions can be drawn without appeal to 
any moral intuitions (eg. intuitions relating to 
fairness or impartiality). 
Mackie (1977) claims that one of these has to be false. 
So I shall begin with a detailed look at Mackie's 
characterisation 	 of 	 possible 	 notions 	 of 
universalisability. 
Mackie argues that there are three stages in the 
universalisation of moral judgments, and that the third 
stage is necessary to the derivation of Hare's type of 
utilitarianism. He further argues (1977 p.83) that the 
thesis that universalisability is a logically necessary 
characteristic of moral judgment is progressively more 
dubious as we move through the stages, and that for the 
third stage it is "plainly false". 
He agrees (1977 p.83) with the proposition that moral 
judgments are universalisable: "Anyone who says, meaning 
it, that a certain action .. is morally right or wrong .. 
is thereby committed to taking the same view about any 
other relevantly similar action". But he says "the key 
phrase is 'relevantly similar'". 
	 "In practice no two 
cases will ever be exactly alike" so that 
"universalisability would be trivial and useless, 
therefore, if we could not rule out many of the 
inevitable differences as irrelevant". 
	 The crucial 
question, for Mackie, then becomes: 'Which features are, 
or are not, relevant?'. 
In the first stage of universalisation, as characterised 
by Mackie, it is simple numerical difference which is 
treated as being not relevant. 
	 In making our 
universalised judgment we cannot specify one individual, 
or set of individuals; the judgment must apply equally to 
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all, it cannot be made only for all those situations in 
which that individual is, or is not, involved. 
Mackie is saying that we must specify the circumstances 
in a way which will give general application (otherwise 
the universalised judgment would be trivial and useless) 
but that first stage universalisation does not permit us 
to use a specification which deliberately picks out an 
individual or set of individuals. 
The universalisation of the judgment 'You ought to look 
after your aged father.' could legitimately yield: 
for all x,y (if x is son of y and y is aged then x look 
after y) 
but it cannot legitimately yield: 
for all x,y (if x is not Jeff Wardle of Woodley and x 
is son of y and y is aged then x look 
after y) 
The test of a moral judgment is then whether we can 
subscribe to a judgment which has been universalised in a 
legitimate way. 
Such a test may be both an intuitive and a logical 
requirement. That it is an intuitive requirement could 
be argued on the basis that it is a requirement which 
conforms to the intuition that there must be impartiality 
between individuals (simply as individuals). That it is 
a logical requirement, Mackie says (1977 P.87), could be 
argued; but it is dubious "since we can understand as 
moral the view of the ascetic that something he does not 
condemn in others would be wrong for him". 
But now, this 'stage' of universalisation may require 
impartiality between individuals (as such) but it does 
not require impartiality between types of individuals 
(according to qualitative differences such as those of 
sex, race, resources, ability etc). 
	 It allows the 
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derivation of principles which can be 'unfair' in many 
different ways. For example, it does not exclude: 
for all x,y (if x is employer and y is employee and y 
is not a woman then x pay y a decent 
wage). 
There are two different responses which Mackie envisages 
(although he does not clearly separate them). The first 
is to extend the notion of what cannot be relevant, what 
cannot be specified when we specify circumstances. This 
response would require us to say not only that 
universalisation does not permit us to use a 
specification which deliberately picks out an individual 
or set of individuals but also that it does not permit us 
to use a specification which deliberately picks out a 
type of individual (according to nationality, gender, 
race, etc.). 
The problem then is that although this requirement would 
disallow principles which are unfair because they 
discriminate against certain groups, it would also 
disallow principles which (in the interests of fairness) 
discriminate in favour of certain groups. For example, 
it would allow: 
for all x (x bear the full cost of his housing and 
medical treatment); 
but it would disallow: 
for all x (if x is not poor then x bear the full cost 
of his housing and medical treatment). 
The second response is not just in terms of what is not 
relevant, but in terms of what is relevant. 
	 Mackie 
responds in this way and his second stage adds to the 
requirements of the first stage the requirement that we 
determine which principles we would subscribe to 
regardless of changes in the mental and physical 
qualities, resources, and social status of individuals. 
That is, we must envisage the alteration of those 
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features (with regard to ourselves and others) in order 
to determine what principles we can subscribe to. The 
specifications which are relevant are those which "look 
relevant from whichever side you consider them" (1977 
p.91/92). 	 The specification in the last principle 
(above) would then be relevant if I could subscribe to 
that principle after, for example, envisaging myself as 
rich and then as poor. 
"The judgments that result will not, then, take unfair 
account of one's own special abilities or resources or 
social position, or of one's interests in so far as they 
are determined by these" (1977 p.92). 
Such a test, says Mackie, may correspond with a generally 
used form of argument: 'How would you like it if .. ?'; 
but it does not seem to be a logical requirement - "it 
does not seem that moral terms are being misused if they 
are employed in judgments which are adhered to only 
because such challenges are brushed aside" (1977 p.96). 
Furthermore, this second stage may require impartiality 
between individuals (as such), and between types of 
individuals (in terms of qualitative differences), but it 
does not require impartiality between those having 
different tastes and ideals. It allows the derivation of 
principles which can be unfair, for example, to those 
groups whose interests do not coincide with our own. 
Therefore, Mackie argues, we have not yet reached a 
utilitarian view, because the utilitarian demands that we 
take equal account of all actual interests. If we are to 
achieve the sort of impartiality which utilitarianism 
demands then we must extend the second stage so that it 
requires us to determine which principles we would 
subscribe to regardless of changes in the desires, 
tastes, preferences and ideals of individuals. That is, 
we must envisage the alteration of those features (with 
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regard to ourselves and others) in order to determine 
what principles we can subscribe to. 
But now, Mackie says, such a requirement is clearly not a 
logical requirement - we are not constrained "under 
penalty of being said not to be thinking morally or 
evaluatively, to give equal weight to all ideals, or even 
to respect ideals that we do not share" (1977 p.96). Nor 
is it an intuitive requirement: moral judgments commonly 
include a claim to objectivity and it is "all too easy to 
believe that the objective validity of one's own ideals 
provides an overwhelmingly strong reason for taking no 
account at all of ideals that conflict with them" (1977 
p.97). 
Mackie concludes that only the first stage of 
universalisation (at most) could be said to be a logical 
requirement, and it falls far short of yielding the 
consequence that moral thought accords equal weight to 
the interests of all persons. 	 If Hare relies only on 
logical requirements then he cannot reach the desired 
conclusion; if he is to reach that conclusion he must 
appeal to notions of impartiality and fairness. 
Hare's characterisation of universalisability. 
Hare says (1981 p.108): "I wish to stress that there are 
not .. different stages of universalisation. Moral 
judgments are, I claim, universalisable in only one 
sense, namely that they entail identical judgments about 
all cases identical in their universal properties". 
For Hare, universalisability amounts to the claim that it 
is, for example, contradictory to say that: 
"Jack did just the same as Jim, in just the same 
circumstances, and they are just the same sort of 
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people, but Jack did what he ought and Jim did what 
he ought not." (1981 p.81) 
This requirement is similar to what others have called 
the requirement of 'moral consistency' - the principle 
that if two situations are identical in respect of their 
'non-moral' features then we have to give the same moral 
judgment in each case (see S.Blackburn 1971). 	 It also 
corresponds directly with Mackie's first-stage 
universalisation. 
However, Mackie says that universalisation would be 
"trivial and useless" if we did not replace 'identical in 
all universal properties' with 'identical in all relevant 
universal properties'. His reason for saying this is the 
fact that in practice no two cases will be exactly alike. 
This is undoubtedly true but what is its significance? 
That fact would only be relevant if we were attempting to 
reach a judgment which applied to more than one case. If 
we are merely trying to reach a moral judgment in respect 
of a particular situation then that fact is not relevant. 
Mackie's mistake (with regard to his interpretation of 
Hare's argument) is his assumption that the requirement 
of universalisalisation is being offered as a direct 
means of generating and testing general principles. If 
this were so, and if the resulting principle were not 
general (did not apply to more than one situation) then 
it would be useless. But this is not so. 
Hare (1963) does refer to 'relevant similarity' when 
discussing terms which have descriptive meaning and the 
rational constraints which apply to their use. In that 
context, similarity in relevant respects - the respects 
which govern the use of the term - is of central 
importance. But that is because we are unlikely to have 
much use for a descriptive term which does not have 
general application (although, of course, we may use such 
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terms to construct descriptive expressions which in fact 
only have application to a particular case). 
Likewise, when discussing commendation of, say, motor-
cars, he says (1952 p.129) that "the implication of the 
judgment 'That is a good motor-car' does not extend 
merely to motor-cars exactly like that one .. [since if] 
this were so , the implication would be for practical 
purposes useless; for nothing is exactly like anything 
else". The commendation extends to every motor-car that 
is like that one in the relevant respects - the respects 
for which I was commending it. But that is because in 
commending such things we are, typically, applying a 
standard for judging motor-cars in general. 
In Moral Thinking the appeal is to exact similarity (1981 
p.63). Universalisation, in conjunction with relevant or 
exact similarity, may be used to generate principles with 
general or particular application, but in critical 
thinking it is exact similarity which matters. 	 Such 
thinking is useless as a means of guiding future choices, 
but then that is not its purpose; rather it is intended 
to be a means of determining choice in a particular 
situation - the one which confronts us. 
The requirement of universalisation means that we cannot 
(logically cannot) subscribe to a moral judgment made in 
a specific situation with respect to a particular person 
unless we also subscribe to an 'equivalent' judgment 
which is quantified over agents. For example, we cannot 
subscribe to: 
in situation S, Jim ought to do A, 
unless we also subscribe to: 
for all x (in situation S, x ought to do A). 
If 'S' is a general description of a type of situation 
then the universal judgment will be a general judgment 
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which applies in all situations of that type. 	 It may 
then be useful as a general guide to behaviour. 
If 'S' refers to a particular situation (or is a 
descriptive expression such as 'a situation exactly like 
this one in all its universal properties') then the 
universal judgment will be a specific judgment which 
applies (in fact) only to that actual situation. It will 
not then be useful as a general guide to behaviour. 
But Hare's aim is not to generate and test general 
principles, it is to test specific moral judgments. So 
the fact that a universalised judgment may or may not be 
general is not a fault in the characterisation of 
universalisation requiring rectification. 	 We do not, 
therefore, have to "rule out many of the inevitable 
differences as irrelevant" and are not forced into the 
stages which Mackie describes. That is not the way the 
argument proceeds (as we shall see in the next section). 
In fact, Mackie's analysis not only misrepresents Hare's 
argument it is also misleading. 	 It implies that the 
generation of the three stages stems from the need to 
rule out as irrelevant some of the aspects of a situation 
in order to achieve generality. But this is not the way 
in which Mackie, himself, arrives at those stages. Apart 
from the initial appeal to the irrelevance of numerical 
difference (that it is this person rather than that 
person - simply as such), the appeal throughout is to 
notions of 'fairness' and 'impartiality' which supposedly 
require us to imagine ourselves with different qualities 
and different outlooks. We need to do this in order to 
avoid the generation of principles which are unfair to 
this or that group or individual. Mackie presents this 
requirement as if it were simply tacked on to the 
requirement with regard to numerical difference. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that he finds it so easy to 
unpick the stitching. 
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The use of universalisability. 
The requirement of universalisation can be used to 
generate the sort of principle which Mackie has in mind. 
For example, consider: 
Jim has an aged father, so he ought to look after 
him. 
If that 'ought' is a moral ought then: 
for all x (if x has an aged father then x ought to 
look after him). 
From this we derive: 
if I have an aged father then I ought to look after 
him. 
Universalisation can thus be used to generate a 
requirement that I consider the implications of a general 
universalised principle. 
But it can also be used, Hare believes, to generate 
requirements by means of very particular judgments, and 
it is here that critical thinking begins. 
For example: 
Jim, in his present situation S, ought to look after 
his aged father George. 
If that 'ought' is a moral ought then: 
for all x,y (if x is in a situation identical to S 
and y is the aged father of x, then x ought to look 
after y). 
From this we derive: 
if I were in a situation identical to S and George 
were my aged father, then I ought to look after 
George; 
and: 
if Jim were in a situation identical to S and I were 
his aged father, then Jim ought to look after me. 
133 
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If I judge that Jim, in his situation, ought to look 
after his father then, if that is a moral judgment, I am 
also committed to the two derived judgments. 	 These 
judgments are prescriptions for (non-actual) situations 
in which I am involved and which are identical in all 
other respects to the actual situation in which Jim and 
his father find themselves. 	 I am committed to making 
these judgments so, insofar as I am rational, I will 
(Hare argues) consider how it would be for me if those 
actions were performed in those situations. 
It is first-stage universalisation which is thus used to 
generate a requirement that I consider the implications 
of a non-general universalised principle. 	 This is the 
beginning of critical thinking. 
We have here a requirement that I consider how it would 
be for me. In form this involves just the same appeal to 
self-interest as is made in decisions of prudence. But 
this is not an appeal to self-interest in the way which 
is often intended when we say 'How would you like it 
if..?'. When this is said, we often mean to appeal to 
actual self-interest. We argue thus: one day you may be 
old and in need of care, if Sam ought not to have to look 
after his aged father, then your children ought not to 
have to look after you, and how will you feel when you 
are old and neglected? Here we are appealing to the 
universalisability of a moral judgment in order to 
generate a general principle which is likely to have 
application to our listener's circumstances. It is open 
to the listener to say: 'I won't get old.' or 'I won't 
care if I'm neglected.'. 	 It is precisely this sort of 
response which Kant is trying to avoid when he makes his 
appeal to the use of 'pure' reason - the listener's 
actual (or likely) circumstances and preferences are not 
relevant. 
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There are other arguments which use the generation of 
general principles in order to appeal to actual (or 
likely) circumstances and preferences. 	 For example: 
'What would it be like if we all did that?'. This also 
appeals to our preferences with regard to likely effects 
in the circumstances in which we live. 	 Such forms of 
argument are standard forms of moral argument and may be 
used to make an appeal in terms of actual self-interest. 
These arguments may well be widely used but, as Mackie 
points out (and Hare would agree), appeal to them is no 
part of the meanings of moral terms. 
The requirement for critical thinking is not derived in 
this way and does not involve an appeal to actual self-
interest - I will never be George's son, and I will never 
be Sam's father. In considering how it would be for me, 
I am considering how it is for them because I am 
considering how it would be for me if I were them - but 
that is not something which has any likelihood of 
happening. The aim is to reach a moral judgment only for 
this actual situation, I am not thereby committed to a 
general principle which will apply to other actual 
situations. The appeal is not therefore to actual self-
interest, it is merely an appeal to what is required of 
any rational agent who understands the logical nature of 
moral judgments. 
We can further contrast this view with that of Mackie by 
considering another example. 
Suppose a situation in which Claire, who is strong etc, 
is walking along and meets, on a narrow path, Sue, who is 
weak etc; and a proposed judgment which yields the 
prescription that Claire should push Sue aside. 
	 Now 
suppose another situation, a logically possible 
hypothetical situation, in which Sue is Claire and Claire 
is Sue. Sue, who is now strong etc, is walking along an 
identical path and meets Claire, who is now weak etc. 
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Then, assuming only first stage universalisation, the 
original judgment must, if moral, now yield the 
prescription that Sue should push Claire aside. But now, 
if the original judgment was a moral judgment and was 
proposed by Claire, then Claire is committed to the same 
judgment for that hypothetical situation which is 
identical in all its universal properties and, therefore 
(Hare argues), rationality requires that she consider the 
consequences of the proposed action in the hypothetical 
situation - a situation in which she is weak and pushed 
aside. Rationality requires that a judgment be made only 
after a full consideration of the facts, and these 
include what it would be like to be weak and pushed 
aside. 
Claire, if rational, has to consider what it would be 
like to be Sue - what it would be like to be the weak 
party in this situation. 
	
But this is not because the 
strength or weakness of the parties concerned cannot be 
relevant to a moral judgment. 	 It is not, therefore, 
because second stage universalisation demands that she 
test her judgment against a change in such qualities. 
Rather it is because first stage universalisation, 
together with the requirement of rational consideration 
of hypothetical situations, demands that she considers 
herself with these qualities. 
If such consideration leads her to abandon the proposed 
judgment, then that does not mean that it was not a 
possible 'moral' judgment (because, in Mackie's terms, it 
turns out to have been proposed on the basis of Claire's 
possession of strength). 	 Rather the assumption 
throughout is that the judgment is a moral judgment. It 
is the fact that it is a moral judgment which implies 
that it must be made with respect to all identical 
situations, including hypothetical situations; and this 
(it is claimed) implies that we must (insofar as we are 
rational) consider what such situations would be like; 
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and this hopefully ensures that (after a full 
consideration) we will abandon the judgment. 
Hare's position relies on such a judgment being a moral 
judgment, otherwise such consideration would not be 
necessary. 	 It is, for Hare, not a logical requirement 
that, for example, differences in strength be irrelevant 
to moral judgments; such irrelevance is (or may be) a 
substantial result of the sort of critical thinking which 
he is proposing - it is not built into the meaning of 
moral terms. Simple irrelevance of numerical difference, 
together with Hare's characterisation of the demands of 
rationality (and what that implies for the 
'consideration' of situations), is what is doing the 
work. 
We are required, Hare says (1981 p.221), "for the sake of 
rationality, to ascertain the facts, including facts 
about others' preferences" otherwise "our final moral 
judgment will be irrational". 
	 Such facts are made 
relevant because our prescription is universal. 
	 It 
applies to those hypothetical situations in which I 
occupy the role of the other person, and in which I have 
the qualities of that other person - it applies to all 
situations which are identical in all their universal 
descriptive properties. The 'rationality' requirement is 
the workhorse which, on the assumption of first stage 
universalisation only, eliminates 'unfairness'. 
I have here tried to expound this part of Hare's argument 
in a way which makes it clear that it turns upon his 
claims concerning rationality. Hare's claims with regard 
to the nature of universalisability are minimal and would 
be generally accepted. The substantial claim which Hare 
is making concerns the applicability of the constraints 
of rationality. 	 He is claiming that the sort of 
constraints, which apply to a rational agent considering 
the consequences of alternative actions in a situation 
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which will happen or may happen, also apply when that 
agent is considering a situation which will not happen -
for example, a situation in which I am George's son. 
This claim, I shall argue, can be rejected directly and 
without appeal to a moral theory. 
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Critical thinking is not a logical requirement. 
Hare's argument for identifying moral thinking with 
critical thinking involves an analysis of our use of 
moral language. Nagel (1982) says that Hare's analysis 
of moral language cannot be right. Firstly because "many 
people regard criticism of their moral views by this 
method as invalid" and, secondly, because even those who 
agree with Hare's moral position "would not regard those 
who reach moral views by a different method as misusing 
language". 	 But that is merely to say that Hare's 
analysis and argument are wrong because others do not 
agree with it. 
I shall argue that Hare's argument is not sound; but if 
it were sound then those who did not see the necessity 
for critical thinking as the means to making moral 
judgments would be failing to understand the implications 
of the logic of moral talk. We cannot, surely, simply 
assume that all those who have a different view as to the 
logic of moral talk have a clear and adequate grasp of 
that logic. Hare's work is an enquiry into that logic 
and an elaboration of the implications of the results of 
that enquiry. 	 It is an attempt to establish a link 
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between substantive moral views and the form of reasoning 
which, Hare believes, a careful analysis of the logic of 
moral words shows to be necessary. 
That analysis involves the claim that the sort of 
constraints which apply to a rational agent considering 
the consequences of an action in an actual situation (or 
a situation which may occur) also apply when that agent 
is considering a situation which will not occur. 	 If 
objections I shall raise to that claim are correct then 
critical thinking is not a logical requirement of moral 
thinking. 
In the chapter on universalisability I said that the 
requirement for critical thinking does not involve an 
appeal to actual self-interest - I will never be George's 
son, and I will never be Sam's father. In considering 
how it would be for me, I am indeed considering how it is 
for them; but I am doing so in terms of how it would be 
for me in a situation which will not occur. 
When I say that in this situation Sam ought (morally 
ought) to look after his father George, I am (if 
universalisability is a logical requirement of the use of 
moral expressions) committed to making the same judgment 
for all identical situations and, therefore, to saying 
that: if I were Sam then I ought to look after George. 
I am committed to a prescription for that situation which 
is like the actual situation in all respects save that I 
am Sam. 	 This much is, perhaps, incontestable. 
Universalisability in this minimal sense may be a logical 
requirement of the way in which we (happen to) use moral 
expressions. 	 As Hare says (1981 p.113) the moral 
judgment commits me to a moral principle and that 
principle applies to the hypothetical situation. 
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Hare must now go on to say not only that I am committed 
to that prescription but that I must, insofar as I am 
rational, consider what it would be like for me (as Sam) 
if that action were performed in this situation. 
Presumably I must do this because, as a rational agent, I 
do not make prescriptions without considering 'how it 
would be'. 	 I am committed to a prescription for a 
situation in which I am Sam therefore I, as rational, 
consider my preferences for the consequences of acting 
according to that prescription in that hypothetical 
situation. 
But, if I make a universalised prescription which 
logically entails prescriptions for non-actual and 
totally hypothetical situations, am I, simply as a 
rational agent, required to consider my preferences for 
the consequences of alternative actions in such 
situations and to modify or reaffirm the original 
prescription accordingly? 
If I will never be Sam then why should it matter what 
prescription I make (or implicitly make by virtue of the 
logic of my language) for the situation in which I am 
Sam? If universalisability is a feature of the logic of 
moral language then it is true that when I say that Sam 
ought to look after George I am committed to the same 
prescription for the situation in which I am Sam. But 
why should it matter what that prescription is? If the 
prescription does not matter then why should I consider 
my preferences for the consequences of acting according 
to that prescription? 
If universalisability were a logical requirement then 
that would not be sufficient to generate a requirement 
that the rational agent should engage in critical 
thinking. 
	 Mackie is, I believe, right to claim that 
first-stage universalisability is trivial. It is trivial 
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because a rational agent may take no interest in the 
prescriptions made for totally hypothetical situations. 
In claiming that a rational agent may "refuse to consider 
the application of his moral principle" (Hare 1981 p.113) 
to totally hypothetical situations, I am not claiming 
that one may refuse to apply that principle to those 
situations - if universalisability is a feature of moral 
talk then that principle does apply to those situations 
and I have not disputed Hare's claims with regard to 
universalisability. 	 Rather I am claiming that the 
rational agent may accept that application, he may accept 
that he is committed to a prescription for that 
situation, but he may, nevertheless, rationally decline 
to take into account how it would be if that prescription 
were acted upon. 
It may be that the process of discovering how it would be 
for others is central to moral thinking; but that cannot 
be because moral thinking requires a rational agent to 
consider how it would be for him if he were those others. 
The rational agent may not be interested. He may say: 'I 
will not be those others so I do not mind what 
prescription I make (or have implicitly made) for those 
situations in which I am those others'. 
However, Hare might claim that a 'rational' agent cannot 
sincerely make a prescription (even implicitly) for any 
situation (even a totally hypothetical situation) unless 
he knows what his preferences are for the consequences of 
acting according to that prescription in that situation. 
If we accept a notion of 'rationality' which makes this 
the case then we cannot so easily combine an acceptance 
of the universalisability of moral judgments with a 
denial of the relevance of totally hypothetical 
situations. We shall have to examine whether in gaining 
knowledge of such situations the rational agent need find 
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any reason to revise a (universalised) prescription for 
the actual situation. 
The fanatic and the amoralist. 
Hare argues that critical thinking will yield conclusions 
which are the same as those of a certain type of 
utilitarianism. 	 He claims that the only way that a 
rational agent can avoid such conclusions is to decline 
to engage in critical thinking and/or to decline to make 
moral judgments (ie. to be an 'amoralist'). But that may 
not be the only way in which we can, as rational agents, 
avoid reaching the conclusions which a certain type of 
utilitarian would reach. 
Suppose that, in the example of Sam and George, I am 
disposed to judge that Sam ought to look after George. 
But suppose also that the utilitarian conclusion would be 
that Sam ought not to look after George - because, for 
example, George is such a terrible old fellow that he 
would completely disrupt Sam's life, Sam wants very much 
not to have his life disrupted, George could be quite 
content elsewhere, and so on. 	 If I make the judgment 
that Sam ought to look after his father, and it is a 
moral judgment, then I am also committed to the same 
judgment for those situations in which I am Sam and in 
which I am George. 
In the hypothetical situation in which I am Sam, I want 
what Sam actually wants. 
	 If I am committed to a 
prescription for this situation then, Hare argues, I must 
(as rational) attempt to discover just what it would be 
like for me. 
The first way in which I may avoid reaching the 
utilitarian conclusion is to deny (as I did in the last 
section) that I have to discover this. I do not need to 
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do this because it does not matter what prescription I 
make (or have made implicitly) for a situation which will 
not occur. I am, it is true, logically committed to the 
prescription that I ought to look after George in that 
situation, but I do not really mind what I am committed 
to because that situation will not happen. 
Thus someone who has a strong 'moral intuition' about 
this case (someone who is 'fanatical' in Hare's sense), 
and held that Sam ought to look after his aged father 
(however awful it would be for Sam and however little 
difference it would make to George), could rationally 
hold on to his judgement. 	 The rational 'fanatic' can 
remain unmoved. 
If this is correct then Hare's 'rationalist' project 
fails: reason, alone, cannot provide a route to agreement 
in moral judgments because rational agents may be 
'fanatics'. But if the notion of rationality, given at 
the end of the last section and attributed to Hare, were 
appealed to then the project may remain intact. 
The second way in which I may avoid reaching the 
utilitarian conclusion is described by Hare. 	 In this 
case I do engage in critical thinking - I discover what 
it would be like for me to be Sam in this situation. In 
order to do this I gain knowledge of the preferences 
which Sam in fact has (the preferences I would have if I 
were Sam) and consider the consequences in the light of 
those preferences. In order to gain such knowledge (Hare 
claims) I must acquire preferences for the situation in 
which I am Sam which are identical to the preferences 
which Sam has for the actual situation. 
This last claim is referred to, by Williams, as Hare's 
'epistemological premiss' and I shall return to it later. 
It is the claim (Hare 1981 p.95) that I cannot know: 
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if I were Sam in this situation I would prefer with 
strength S that x should happen; 
unless: 
I now prefer with strength S that if I were Sam in 
this situation x should happen. 
If I acquire preferences in this way then it will be the 
case that: I do not want, say, to suffer my father's 
dreadful habits, to put up with his disregard for the 
feelings of the rest of my family, and so on. 
	 I have 
(after critical thinking) a very strong desire not to 
look after George. 
But note, it is not (according to the argument) that I do 
not want Sam to suffer in the way in which I now know he 
would suffer. 	 My preference does not concern Sam's 
actual situation, it concerns my hypothetical situation. 
It is this preference which (according to the argument) 
may lead me to revise my (universalised) prescription for 
the actual situation. 
However, I have still not reached the utilitarian 
judgment. In order to do that I must be willing to weigh 
the preferences I have for the hypothetical situation in 
which I am Sam against those I have for the hypothetical 
situation in which I am George and, as a result, make the 
same prescription for the actual and for the two 
hypothetical situations: 'Sam not look after George' in 
the actual situation, 'I not look after George' in the 
one hypothetical situation, 'Sam not look after me' in 
the other hypothetical situation. 
But the rational agent can refuse, as Hare says (1981 
p.183) to take this step; he can, for example, prescribe: 
'I not look after George' in the one hypothetical 
situation, Sam look after me' in the other hypothetical 
situation, 'Sam look after George' in the actual 
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situation (this last being the prescription which was 
entailed by his original judgment). 
As Hare puts it: the amoralist may, rationally, not 
accept any universal prescription for this situation, he 
may decline to make a moral judgment. He can no longer 
prescribe 'Sam ought to look after George'; but neither 
is it the case that he has to reach the utilitarian 
conclusion. Even after engaging in critical thinking the 
rational agent may prescribe 'Sam look after George'. 
But now I wish to claim that, even after engaging in 
critical thinking, the rational agent can prescribe 'Sam 
ought to look after George'. Or, more precisely, I wish 
to claim that, even after gaining knowledge of the 
preferences I would have if I were Sam, I can, as 
rational agent, make that universalised prescription. 
This claim will involve challenging the role of the 
epistemological premiss in the context of deliberations 
about totally hypothetical situations. 
Hare's epistemological premiss. 
Hare's premiss implies that I cannot know: 
a) if my house were on fire I would prefer, with the 
greatest possible intensity, that I should get out of 
it; 
unless it is the case that: 
b) I now prefer, with the greatest possible 
intensity, that if my house were on fire I should get 
out of it. 
Williams (1985 p.90) gives this application and argues 
that it reveals the implausibility of the epistemological 
premiss. 	 If I am making a prudential decision (for 
example, I am deciding whether to install smoke alarms) 
then, Williams says, there is no sense at all in which my 
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present preference is of the same strength as the 
preference I would have if the house were actually on 
fire, and it is not rational that it should be. 
I do not agree with Williams as to the force of this 
example. 	 In making prudential decisions of this sort, 
the rational agent does not require knowledge of a). I 
do not need to know the intensity of my preference for 
avoiding being trapped in a burning house; I merely need 
to know that that preference is much greater than the 
preference for saving the cost of a smoke alarm. The 
rational agent does not need to make an imaginative leap 
into such a situation because a decision such as this can 
be made without the knowledge which such a leap would 
yield. This application of the premiss will, however, be 
helpful in making clear my own challenge to Hare's use of 
that premiss. 
Suppose that I claim to know a) but that I deny b) and 
claim instead that I do not now mind in the least if my 
house catches fire and I fail to get out. 
	 Given the 
epistemological premiss then it seems to be the case that 
either my claim to know a) is false, or my denial of b) 
is insincere. As Hare might say (1981 p.94): would not 
my lack of knowledge, or else my insincerity, be exposed 
if somebody said 'All right, if you don't mind, let's 
lock you in and set fire to the house'? If I protested 
then I would begin to reveal my insincerity; if I 
acquiesced but tried to break down the door when the 
flames spread then I would reveal my (previous) lack of 
knowledge. 
However, suppose that I know my house will not catch 
fire. First, if my denial of b) is insincere then I also 
know that my insincerity need never be exposed. I have 
no need to protest against the threat since I know that 
it will not be carried out - I will not be locked into my 
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burning house. 	 But, second, could I not, given this 
knowledge, sincerely deny b)? Thus: 
even though I know that if the house were on fire I 
would want to get out, 
I do not now mind in the least if my house were to 
catch fire and I failed to get out, 
because I know that my house will not catch fire. 
Is there an inconsistency here? Are we failing to take 
account of the sense of 'know' which, Hare claims, 
entails the epistemological premiss; or does the further 
knowledge that my house will not catch fire make a 
difference? Here it is difficult to ignore the fact that 
I do not know that my house will not catch fire. 
However, things may be clearer if we consider the case 
involved in our example of critical thinking. Thus: 
even though I know that if I were Sam I would not 
want to look after my father, 
I do not now mind in the least if I were to be Sam 
and had to look after my father, 
because I know that I will not be Sam. 
Despite knowledge of my preferences in the hypothetical 
situation, I have no preference for that hypothetical 
situation precisely because it is hypothetical - it will 
not happen. 
If we are not here flouting a conceptual truth then such 
examples may be used to cast doubt upon the application 
of the epistemological premiss in the context of totally 
hypothetical situations. But there may be an alternative 
approach in which we preserve a form of that premiss. 
In this approach we accept that knowledge of preferences 
in a given situation involves imaginative acquisition of 
preferences for that situation but maintain that one can 
then, rationally, take no account of or discount those 
preferences in one's deliberations eg. the deliberations 
involved in deciding upon a (universalised) moral 
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judgment for a particular situation. One can discount a 
preference for a totally hypothetical situation because 
that situation will not happen. 
To discount a preference is to deliberate as if one did 
not have that preference. Deliberating as if one did not 
have a preference which one does have is not the same as 
deliberating as if one did not have knowledge which one 
does have. The latter may be irrational, but the ability 
to do the former is (I shall claim in a later chapter) a 
fundamental feature of human nature and to deliberate in 
that way may be rational. 
The notion of rationality to which Hare appeals was 
outlined in chapter 3 and at the end of an earlier 
section in this chapter. 	 It entails that an agent is 
irrational insofar as he fails to gain and take account 
of knowledge which may affect his judgment - in this case 
his (universalised) prescription for a particular 
situation. 	 But that notion of rationality does not 
entail that an agent is irrational insofar as he fails to 
count a preference which may affect that judgment. 
As a rational agent one may, for example, discount a 
preference for a cigarette because one is attempting to 
give up smoking; one may discount a preference for 
running away because one is ashamed of one's timidity; 
and one may discount a preference one has for a totally 
hypothetical situation because one makes (or prefers to 
make) universalised prescriptions on the basis of the 
preferences one has for situations which will happen or 
may happen. 
In the next chapter I shall look more closely at the 
grounds which a rational agent might give for discounting 
preferences. 	 Here I wish to maintain that, when 
considering a universalised prescription, a rational 
agent may decide to give no weight at all to the 
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preferences which he has for totally hypothetical 
situations and give as grounds for that decision the fact 
that such situations have no probability of occurring. 
A rational agent may say: Perhaps (given the logic of 
moral language) my moral judgments are universalisable. 
Perhaps (given the nature of rationality) I need to know 
what my preferences are for the consequences of acting 
according to prescriptions which I, thus, implicitly make 
for totally hypothetical situations. Perhaps (given the 
epistemological premiss) in gaining such knowledge I 
shall acquire preferences for those totally hypothetical 
situations. But I do not need to count such preferences 
when deliberating upon a (universalised) moral judgment 
for a particular situation. 	 Having discounted those 
preferences I can, when deliberating, sincerely claim 
that I do not now mind in the least if I were Sam and had 
to look after my father. 
A rational agent adopting this stance can then point out 
that gaining knowledge of preferences and consequences in 
hypothetical situations in which I am those other persons 
involved in the actual situation turns out to be (given 
that stance) pointless. That agent can then say (as at 
the end of the first section): I am not interested in how 
it would be if I were those others; I will not be those 
others and so I don't mind what prescription I make (or 
have implicitly made) for those situations in which I am 
those others. 
If this is so, then the second way of reaching a decision 
which does not agree with that of the utilitarian is open 
to the moralist as well as the amoralist. I can, despite 
the preferences I acquire when I envisage myself as Sam 
(ie. I want it to be the case that if I were Sam then I 
would not look after George), rationally prescribe for 
the situation in which I am Sam 'I look after George'. I 
do so because my prescription for the totally 
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hypothetical situation is not determined by my 
preferences for that situation (which are discounted) but 
is determined by the universalisation of my prescription 
for the actual situation. I can thus maintain the moral 
judgment 'Sam ought to look after George'. In gaining 
knowledge of totally hypothetical situations the rational 
agent need find no reason to revise a (universalised) 
prescription for the actual situation. 
Even if we grant Hare's claims with regard to the logic 
of moral language, the nature of rationality and the 
epistemological premiss (each of which might be 
challenged directly), we can still claim that the moral 
judgments of a rational agent need not be determined by 
critical thinking. 
Hare's rationalist project fails, I believe, because a 
rational agent may see totally hypothetical situations as 
being simply not relevant to deliberation about what to 
do or what one ought to do. I would not wish to claim 
that it is irrational to gain knowledge of totally 
hypothetical situations or to count our preferences for 
such situations. We might do the former as a means to 
acquiring preferences for the actual situation. We might 
do the latter because, like Hare, we are so inclined. 
But if we are not so inclined, and if our moral judgments 
are to reflect the preferences of others involved in the 
actual situation, then the link between our preferences 
and the preferences of those others must be forged in a 
different way. 
If the possible suffering of Sam is to affect my 
deliberations then that will not be because I have an 
aversion to my suffering (in the totally hypothetical 
situation) as he would suffer (in the actual situation). 
If that possibility is to affect my decision as to what 
ought to be done then imaginative identification with Sam 
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must result in my having an aversion to Sam suffering as 
he would suffer in the actual situation. 
My aversion to your suffering. 
The first modification of the characterisation of 
'critical thinking' which I am proposing stipulates that 
the imaginative identification involved in such thinking 
concerns, say, my aversion to your suffering and not my 
aversion to my suffering were I you. 
Here it will be useful to clarify just what sort of 
'identification' I shall be discussing later. 
	 Suppose 
that, in a particular situation 'S', Sue wants to eat an 
apple. Expressed in terms of phrastics and neustics (see 
Hare 1952 ch.2), we have: 
Sue assents to, 
'In S, Sue eats an apple, please'; 
The sort of identification, which Hare requires, relates 
to a hypothetical situation 'HS' in which, say, I am the 
person whom I am identifying with - eg. Sue. Thus: 
I now assent to, 
'In HS, I eat an apple, please' 
The sort of identification, which I shall stipulate is 
part of critical thinking, relates to the actual 
situation and requires me to have the preferences which 
Sue has for that situation. Thus: 
I now assent to, 
'In S, Sue eats an apple, please'; 
Thus if I identify, in this way, with Sue when she faces 
the possibility of suffering then, given she assents to 
'Sue not suffer, please', I will also assent to the very 
same statement. I want Sue not to suffer, just as she 
wants not to suffer. 
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Hare's argument with regard to the necessity of his sort 
of identification is based on the claim that I need to 
know how much Sue wants not to suffer (because I am 
prescribing for the situation in which I am Sue) and I 
cannot, Hare says (1981 p.95), know how much Sue wants 
not to suffer unless I now have an equal aversion to my 
suffering were I Sue. As I said above, Williams disputes 
the epistemological premiss which is employed here. 
Williams (1985 p.91) gives a further argument for 
rejecting that premiss; an argument which was not 
mentioned above. The cruel person, he says, knows very 
well just how much Sue does not want to suffer and yet he 
has no preference to give help, to alleviate the 
suffering - on the contrary he is encouraged by his 
knowledge to act in just the way which will ensure the 
suffering. He certainly knows; but he does not assent to 
'Sue not suffer, please'. 
This objection clearly misses the point of Hare's 
argument. That argument does not rest upon a claim that 
knowledge of Sue's aversion to suffering requires assent 
to 'Sue not suffer, please' - it merely requires that I 
(with a vigour equal to that of Sue) assent to 'I not 
suffer, if I were Sue, please'. 	 But that, as I have 
argued, is precisely why the argument does not succeed. 
The employment of the epistemological premiss is 
fruitless in the context of totally hypothetical 
situations. My aversion to my suffering were I Sue need 
not figure in my moral (or any other form of) thinking. 
I shall argue for an identification between moral 
thinking and critical thinking; but that form of thinking 
will (as modified) involve my acquiring an aversion to 
your suffering. Furthermore, that aversion will derive 
not from the rational agent's acknowledgment of logic, 
facts and the universalisation of moral judgment but from 
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the quality of the agent's motivation. The agent is such 
that knowledge of your suffering 
does yield a preference that the suffering be 
prevented or alleviated 
and (unlike that of the cruel person) 
does not yield a preference that the suffering be 
ensured or heightened. 
The inadequacy of Hare's appeal to 'moral' language. 
Thus far I have not questioned Hare's claims with regard 
to universalisation, rationality and the epistemological 
premiss. 	 But we might cast further doubt upon Hare's 
argument if we raise questions about the scope of the 
concepts to which Hare's analysis applies. Specifically: 
to which creatures does the 'ought' of morality (and 
hence universalisation) apply? 
Hare says (1981 p.90) that he is happy to accept a scope 
which ensures inclusion not only of all people but also 
of other sentient beings. 	 He adopts this position in 
deference to vegetarians who, he says, will wish to 
include other animals within the scope of morality. 
But, surely, given his argument Hare should not defer to 
those vegetarians unless the scope which they desire is 
required by the logic of our moral language. If it were 
legitimate to defer to the wishes of the vegetarian then 
would it not be legitimate to defer to the wishes of, 
say, the racist who will wish to exclude other races from 
the scope of morality? The legitimacy of either response 
rests, given the argument, upon the nature of moral 
language. Hare claims that we all share a use of certain 
words and concepts. 	 But is it the case that the 
vegetarian and the racist use those words and concepts in 
the same way; and, if they do not, is it clear that one 
or both of them is misusing those words and concepts? 
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Hare insists that the logic of our moral language does 
not permit us to make different moral judgments about 
cases which are identical in their universal properties 
(1981 p.115). 	 The properties of a situation which are 
not 'universal' are, he says, the identity of those 
involved, the place, the time, and the 'actuality' (if 
that is a property). We cannot, logically cannot, make 
different moral judgments for two situations on the basis 
that one involves x and the other y, one is here and the 
other is there, one is on Tuesday and the other on 
Wednesday, one is actual and the other hypothetical. 
We can, logically can, make different moral judgments on 
the basis of the species or race of those involved. 
However, our rationality then demands, given the 
argument, that we consider the consequences of acting 
according to those judgments and affirm, revise or reject 
those judgments in the light of the preferences of all 
those involved. 
Presumably 'all those involved' includes all those having 
preferences - regardless of, say, species or race. The 
universalisability of moral judgments entails that any 
such judgment does not only apply to the actual situation 
involving this member of the species or race but also 
applies to the hypothetical situation in which I am that 
member. 	 The nature of rationality and the 
epistemological premiss then, given the argument, ensure 
that my judgment reflects the preferences of that member. 
But those who wish to exclude another species or race 
from the scope of morality may now reject this use of 
universability on the basis that judgments relating to 
members of that species or race are not moral judgments 
at all. We might (and I think Hare would - at least with 
regard to race) then argue that the logic of moral 
language does not permit such a move. But what force 
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would such an argument have? As Singer (1988 p.155) says 
the response might then be: 
"If you tell us that our concepts imply equal 
consideration for the preferences of animals, we 
shall simply adopt a new set of concepts, which 
implies universalisability up to, but not beyond, the 
boundary of our own species." 
Hare (1981 p.18) admits this possibility and points out 
that "if we were to alter the meanings of our words, we 
should be altering the questions we were asking". 	 He 
then goes on to insist that if we are going to ask new 
questions then we ought to be satisfied both that the new 
questions are important and that the old questions are 
unimportant. 
However, as Singer (1988 p.156) points out: 
"If members of a society simply do not care about the 
welfare of outsiders, whether of another nationality, 
race, or species, they will easily accept that some 
appropriately restricted set of concepts captures 
everything important about the questions asked by the 
set of concepts Hare has analysed, and leaves out 
only some unimportant matters with which they do not 
wish to be bothered." 
Hare must offer reasons why such a group of people should 
not adopt such a set of concepts. If he does not then, 
once again, the rationalist project fails - a rational 
agent can, say, be a racist. 
It may be possible to argue that the welfare of such a 
group is reduced, or not improved, by their lack of 
concern for outsiders. 	 Hare (1988 p.273) claims, in 
response to Singer, that the maltreatment of (certain 
types of) outsiders is not necessary for, or even 
conducive to, the happiness of those in such a group. 
But, firstly, this claim is not sufficient to ensure 
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equal concern across the boundary; it requires only that 
members of the group consider the consequences of 
maltreatment of the outsiders for the satisfaction of the 
preferences of those in the group; the preferences and 
degree of suffering of the outsiders has importance only 
insofar as it leads to undesirable consequences. 
Secondly, it is very doubtful whether such a claim would 
hold in all circumstances. 
Singer (1988 p.157-8) offers a different argument. If we 
adopt a set of concepts which imply universalisability up 
to the boundary of our own nation, race or species then, 
he says, can we not be criticised for arbitrariness? "At 
whatever point universalisability stops, one can raise 
the question: 'Why stop there?' ... Only the boundary of 
sentience 	 seems to avoid this kind of 
arbitrariness.". The response may now be that a 'closer' 
boundary is not at all arbitrary if it corresponds to the 
boundary of our concern. But then, Singer claims, such a 
response to the charge of arbitrariness has a 
considerable cost. Those responding in this way have no 
defence against those who say: 'I don't care for all 
those who are within your sphere of concern. I care only 
for a smaller group'. There is then "no logical stopping 
place short of individual egoism". 
Singer concludes that, since we all have reason to defend 
our sphere of concern against those who do not share it, 
then we have reason to avoid arbitrariness not by drawing 
the boundary at the boundary of concern but by drawing it 
at the boundary of sentience - beyond which there are no 
preferences. 
This argument rests upon the claim that the only 
boundaries which are not arbitrary are those which mark 
the boundary of concern or which mark the boundary of all 
preferences. If our rational desire to defend our sphere 
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of concern provides reason not to appeal to the first 
then we are left with the second. 
It seems to me that this is merely to say that there is 
no way in which we can defend our own particular sphere 
of concern against those who do not share it (with which 
I can agree) and, having ceased to defend that concern, 
we must (to avoid arbitrariness) appeal instead to the 
'relevant similarity' between those who have preferences 
as opposed to those who do not. But in what way is that 
similarity any more or less relevant than the similarity 
between, say, those who belong to a particular race? 
Setting the boundary at the boundary of concern is not 
arbitrary; setting the boundary according to some other 
feature (any other feature: sentience, or species, or 
race, or nation) is also not arbitrary. Neither means of 
setting the boundary will help in settling differences 
between rational agents. 
I would argue that the only reasons we can offer for 
insisting upon a certain set of concepts (and the 
concerns which can be expressed by means of those 
concepts) are moral reasons. 	 Given Hare's rationalist 
approach this would be to argue in a circle; but, 
perhaps, we should not adopt that approach. 
Hare wishes to start from an analysis of language and end 
with a choice between amoralism and a certain form of 
Utilitarianism. 
	 In earlier sections I argued that his 
analysis does not yield that choice. In this section I 
have argued that, even if it did yield that choice, it 
would not determine whose preferences the 'Utilitarian' 
should consider. 
We can add that neither would it adequately determine 
which preferences the 'Utilitarian' should consider. As 
Harsanyi (1988 p.90) points out: "even if we accepted 
Hare's argument at its face value, prescriptivity and 
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universalisability would be of very little help in 
deciding the specific form our utilitarianism should 
take". Should it disregard uninformed preferences, anti-
social preferences, the preferences of the unborn? Sen 
(1980 p.80) adds to the list: past preferences which one 
no longer has, the preferences of the dead, preferences 
where one is not aware of their satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction. 
Hare (1988 p.242) claims that such questions can all be 
answered. But I do not believe that those answers are 
adequate and (in the next chapter) I shall argue that 
this is so - at least with respect to 'anti-social' 
preferences. If any of the questions concerning whose 
preferences and which preferences cannot be answered on 
the basis (direct or indirect) of an appeal to Hare's 
analysis of the logic of moral language then that appeal 
is not adequate. 
Hare's response to the central educational question. 
In the last section I attempted to give support to the 
view that Hare's analysis (even if it yields 
Utilitarianism) will not yield a specific form of 
Utilitarianism. But now we can ask a broader question: 
even if that analysis did yield a choice between 
amoralism and a specific form of Utilitarianism, what 
would that show? As Brandt (1988 p.36) says: "there is a 
further problem of showing why anyone should be 
interested in whether one ought or ought not in that 
sense". 
Brandt's exposition confuses this question with a 
different question: 'If I grant that I ought to do A then 
why should I act accordingly?'. 	 Hare responds by 
pointing out that the prescriptivism which is part of his 
analysis provides the link between a sincere assent to 
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'ought' and an inclination to act. But this leaves the 
first question unanswered. 
It it were the case that our use of moral language had 
the features which Hare describes, and if it were also 
the case that reflection upon those features revealed 
certain canons of moral thinking, then Hare would 
conclude that the thinking of rational agents must be 
governed by those canons when moral judgments are being 
made. But what is the force of that 'must'? 
Suppose there are those who use moral language in the way 
Hare describes, but whose 'moral' thinking is not 
governed by those canons. 
	 If there are not many such 
people then either Hare's analysis of moral language is 
wrong or his efforts to make clear the implications of 
that use of language are unnecessary. Hare's efforts now 
reveal to those people that the form of thinking which 
they have engaged in, and which they thought was moral 
thinking, is not, given their use of language, moral 
thinking at all. 
	 Must such people, as rational, now 
adjust their mode of thinking? 
Clearly they have a choice: if they wish to keep intact 
their use of language (the implications of which were 
unclear to them) then they must adjust their moral 
thinking; if they wish to keep intact their form of 
thinking (which may have been very clear to them) then 
they must adjust their use of language. 
	 The rational 
choice will, presumably, be the one which reflects the 
relative importance of the two aims. It may be the case 
that certain features of the way in which moral language 
has been used would prove (on reflection) to be less 
important than the way in which they have been accustomed 
to arrive at, and reach agreement upon, 'moral' 
judgments. 
	 If this were so then the rational course 
would be to alter the use of moral language. 
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Such considerations may lead us to doubt whether we 
should begin with an investigation of our use of moral 
language. It may be more fruitful to enquire into the 
nature of a particular way of thinking and the role which 
it plays in our lives. In particular, it may be best to 
focus upon variants of the questions given in chapter 2: 
'Why engage in this particular form of thinking?' and 
'Why educate ourselves and others to be inclined to 
engage in this particular form of thinking?'. As Hare 
points out, such questions remain central even if the 
particular form of thinking we choose to consider is 
determined by an analysis of language. 
However, there is a crucial difference between the two 
approaches. 	 If we set out to clarify and justify the 
role which a particular form of thinking has in our lives 
then we may well end up enquiring whether a different 
form of thinking might be more easily clarified or 
justified. 	 If, on the other hand, we insist that an 
analysis of language reveals the form of 'moral' thinking 
then we will not stray from the task of attempting to 
clarify and justify that (and only that) form of 
thinking. 	 The latter approach may lead us to ignore 
possible modifications to that form of thinking which -
given the manner of our response to the two questions 
above - would be sensible. 
For example, Hare asks how should we best educate our 
children. 	 His discussion (1981 ch.11) contrasts two 
possibilities, educate our children to be: 
1. disposed to act according to moral principles and 
able to think morally; 
or 
2. disposed to act according to prudential principles 
and able to think prudentially. 
The choice is between morality and prudent self-interest. 
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Hare argues that an education aimed at 1. would "be best 
in the child's own interest" (1981 p.195) and, given this 
is so, he claims to have provided "an adequate defence of 
morality" (1981 p.191). 
Now, firstly, I find Hare's argument unconvincing. His 
argument closely resembles that of, say, Foot (1958 final 
section) and Mackie (1977 p.191-2). 
	 The main points 
relate to the consequences of acting, and being seen to 
act, according to principles of self-interest and to the 
difficulties of concealing the fact that one is disposed 
to act in this way. 	 But as Plato (Republic Book 1) 
points out those consequences and difficulties may well 
depend upon the strength and wit which one possesses. 
Hare seems to claim that his argument applies even to 
those having a large measure of such strength and wit. 
He says, for example, that if it is alleged "that in the 
past people have amassed large fortunes in business 
careers which were far from unspotted, I reply that the 
money did not on the whole bring them happiness, and that 
with their talents they could have done better for 
themselves by making less money in a more socially 
beneficial career." (1981 p.196 - my emboldening). This 
seems to me to be wishful thinking. It would be nice to 
believe that "in the world as it is" (1981 p.194) good 
people on the whole do better for themselves than purely 
self-interested, unscrupulous or corrupt people, but I 
find it very difficult to convince myself that this is 
SO. 
Hare's answer to our earlier question 'Why educate our 
children to be inclined to think morally?' is in terms of 
the child's own interest. But now, secondly, if that is 
what matters and if that is what is involved in providing 
an 'adequate defence of morality' then why compare only 
two possibilities - morality and prudent self-interest? 
Hare compares and contrasts only these two possibilities 
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because he is concerned to defend the form of moral 
thinking - as revealed by his analysis of moral language. 
Morality, for Hare, is about maximising satisfaction of 
all the informed preferences of all those involved in 
each situation. But perhaps the child's interest would 
be best served by an education which encouraged 
dispositions to act according to principles conducive to 
maximising satisfaction of only some of the preferences 
of only some of the people. For example, it may well be 
the case that the interests of a child born to the rich 
and powerful would be best served by an upbringing which 
ensured consideration in dealings with other rich and 
powerful people but the pursuit of prudent self-interest 
in dealings with others. 
	 A 'morality' which extended 
only to members of the child's own group may be the best 
'morality' from the point of view of the interests of 
such a child. 
I do not believe that 'morality' can be adequately 
defended by an appeal to the interests of those whom we 
educate in the world as it is. But my point here is 
that, even in terms of the aim of promoting the interests 
of the child, Hare's analysis has led him to consider a 
limited range of options. Hare does not consider other 
options because his analysis has provided very tight 
characterisations of moral, and prudential, thinking and 
his answers to questions relating to education and the 
child's 	 interests 	 are 	 in 	 terms 	 of 	 those 
characterisations. 
If we are concerned to answer questions about why we do 
engage in this or that form of thinking, and what form of 
thinking we should engage in or educate others to engage 
in, then we should not be constrained by an analysis of 
our 'moral' language. Why should various features of the 
way in which we happen to use moral language have any 
special significance? Our use of moral language may not 
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exactly reflect the way we in fact think, and it may not 
provide any clue as to how we should think. 
Now there are, of course, those who believe that moral 
language has a special significance because it relates to 
certain special 'facts'. A moral realist, for example, 
will say that answers to questions about the interests of 
our children, or of society in general, are simply not 
relevant, or not directly relevant, to questions in moral 
philosophy. 	 For the realist, moral language has an 
'extension' and it must relate to and be determined by 
moral facts. 	 Thus 'analysis' of our use of moral 
language may play a central role and be seen to be an 
essential starting point. 
To take an example from a different area of philosophy: 
the problem of the nature of causation. Here we might 
look closely at the features of paradigmatic examples of 
causation - striking a match, throwing a ball which 
breaks a window, and so on. We might also look at the 
ways in which we describe such examples and attempt, say, 
to discover the sorts of statements which we would see as 
warranting a description in terms of cause and effect. 
That is, we could engage in what Mackie (1974 p.ix) calls 
'factual' analysis and 'conceptual' analysis. Whether or 
not a clear distinction can be made in this way, it is 
true to say that if we are realists about the world (and 
the 'role' of causation in that world) then we will 
maintain that the beliefs we have, and the meanings of 
our descriptive expressions, ought to reflect the way 
things are. 	 The refinement of our concepts and the 
modification of our beliefs about the world will proceed 
hand in hand, but both will be constrained by the nature 
of the things to which the terms in our language refer. 
Here questions about why we should think and speak in a 
particular way, about cause and effect, would have a 
straightforward answer: because that is the way the world 
is (and that is the way causes and effects are). The aim 
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of philosophical analysis would be to bring conformity 
between the way we think and speak and the way things 
are. 
If, similarly, we believe that there are moral 'facts' 
then analysis of our moral language would have a purpose: 
namely to refine and correct the meanings of our moral 
expressions so as to bring conformity with the nature of 
that to which it refers. If the use of language which 
resulted from such a process of analysis entailed 
constraints upon the way in which we reach moral 
judgments (as it presumably would) then that way of 
reaching judgments would have a special significance. 
Questions like 'why educate our children so that they 
reach judgments in this way?' would, again, have a 
straightforward answer: because that is how moral 
judgments are made. It would still make sense to ask 
whether we had any reason for bringing up our children to 
make moral judgments, but the point is that there would 
be a substantial difference between the two questions. 
But if one rejects, as Hare does, any form of realism in 
morality then it is difficult to see how these questions 
can be separated in any significant way. For Hare, the 
relationship between a particular way in which we reach 
judgments and the fact that those judgments are 'moral' 
is simply a consequence of the way in which we happen to 
use language. 	 To ask whether we should bring up our 
children to make moral judgments is just to ask whether 
we should bring them up to reach judgments in that way 
and, more importantly, that way has no special 
significance over and above its being (according to Hare) 
the way which we happen to have enshrined in a particular 
form of language. 
Now it may be the case that a particular way of reaching 
judgments has become enshrined in our language because, 
as the realist claims, it relates to a special sort of 
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'fact'. But if we reject realism then we have to look 
elsewhere for an explanation of such features of our 
language. We might then claim that a particular way of 
reaching judgments has become enshrined in our language 
because it relates to certain of our aims and purposes 
and to distinctive features of human agency. But if this 
were the case then it would be sensible to ask not 'what 
way of reaching judgments would conform to our use of 
language?' but, rather, 'what way of reaching judgments 
would achieve those aims and purposes and reflect those 
features?'. It would be sensible to go straight to the 
'main business' of investigating, firstly, some of our 
ways of reaching judgments about people, actions, and 
states of affairs and, secondly, the relationship between 
those ways of reaching judgments and the aims and 
purposes which we share. 
Furthermore, such a line of investigation would have 
interest even if the realist were right. It may be that 
the realist with his analysis of 'moral' language (and 
Hare with his) will claim that the form of thinking which 
we describe at the end of the investigation has nothing 
to do with 'morality'. But if it turns out that this 
form of thinking does play a central role in our lives, 
and that it does promote some of the aims and purposes 
which we share, then it may not matter overmuch whether 
it also turns out to be 'moral' thinking. 
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Objections to Utilitarianism. 
Recapitulation. 
Consequentialism as indirectly self-defeating. 
Malevolent preferences. 
Recapitulation. 
Hare's aim is to show that rational agents must reach 
their 'moral' judgments by means of a certain method. He 
also aims to show that if two agents fail to agree in 
their moral judgments, and are thus not disposed to act 
in the same way, then that must be because one (or both) 
lacks the knowledge which the method requires him to gain 
- the method is such that if it is fully undertaken then 
it will yield a unique judgment and the deliberator will 
be disposed to act accordingly. 	 Unless I am an 
'amoralist' (and according to Hare I have good reasons 
not to be) then my failure to want to act in the right 
way is always the result of my not being fully rational. 
Hare is thus a moral rationalist. Not in the sense that 
he believes 'reason' alone can yield the answers to moral 
questions. But rather in the sense that he believes that 
if our reasoning makes use of the facts, and is in 
accordance with the logical requirements generated by 
[our] concepts, then that will be sufficient to settle 
moral questions. This is not, as Hare points out (1985 
p.48), merely to claim that "we can rationally decide 
what to do"; it is to claim that rationality places 
constraints on the form of our practical reasoning and, 
in particular, these constraints relate to the logic of 
our moral language 	 logic requires that we 
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'universalize' our moral judgments. 	 It is from this 
perspective that we can understand Hare's claimed 
affinity with Kant. 
Hume (1888 p.414) says that our impulses do not arise 
from reason; reason merely discovers the means to the 
object of our impulse and thus 'directs' those impulses 
to their object. But, for Hare, reason not only directs 
our impulses it also demands that we share the impulses 
of others when making moral judgments. For Hare, as for 
Hume, reason may be in some sense "the slave of the 
passions" but, Hare believes, it is not merely the slave 
of my passion - it can demand (through the logic of our 
moral language) that I have the passions of others. In 
making this demand it does give rise to an impulse - the 
impulse to satisfy (as much as possible) the preferences 
of all concerned - and that impulse will be shared by 
other rational agents insofar as they make moral 
judgments. Each such rational agent will share the same 
impulses and reason will then direct those impulses to 
the same object. 
Hare's archangel has "superhuman powers of thought, 
superhuman knowledge and no human weaknesses" (1981 
p.44). 	 Each archangel would therefore be able to scan 
all the properties of a situation, including the 
consequences of alternative actions, imaginatively 
identify with each person involved, and each would, by 
means of critical thinking, arrive at the same universal 
principle prescribing action for all situations similar 
to the one considered. Only those lacking the ability of 
the archangel could arrive at a different universal 
principle; the ability to form a judgment in the light of 
all the facts would be sufficient to ensure agreement and 
a disposition to act in the same way. If it could be 
shown that such a method of forming a judgment was 
(necessarily) appropriate to moral thinking then, as Hare 
says (1981 p.46), this would be "a highly rationalist 
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thesis". 	 The links between facts, 'rationality', moral 
judgment and disposition to act would be firm. 
If this were Hare's position, and if the arguments 
offered were sound, then the requirements for a moral 
education, of the type we are considering, would be 
clear: to ensure that educatees became as rational as 
possible and had those dispositions which reflected the 
principles they would adopt if they were fully rational. 
However, I have already argued that critical thinking is 
not a logical requirement of moral thinking; so that even 
if, "at the end of their critical thinking, [archangels] 
will all say the same thing" (1981 p.46) and act 
accordingly, Hare has not produced an argument which 
allows us to conclude that the result of such thinking is 
a 'moral' judgment and that the resulting action (if 
performed successfully) would be 'morally right'. 	 So 
that, I believe, Hare has not succeeded in establishing 
the link between facts, 'rationality' and moral judgment 
in a way required by a highly rationalist thesis. 
As Hare points out (1981 p.190), there is a further gap, 
in his account, between factual beliefs and moral 
judgment. 	 Someone may simply decline to make moral 
judgments. We need, at least, the 'impulse' to engage in 
moral thinking. This gap is, I believe, more important 
than the 'logical' gap which opens up if Hare's analysis 
of our moral language is incorrect - for this gap would 
be just as significant even if Hare's analysis were 
correct. The correctness of the analysis would simply 
mean that we could speak of the impulse to 'moral' 
thinking rather than, merely, the impulse to critical 
thinking. Hare offers "reasons of a non-moral sort" why 
'amoralism' (a refusal to make judgments based on 
critical thinking) should not be chosen (as a future goal 
for ourselves or as an educational aim) but, I have 
argued, these are not convincing. The gap now seems to 
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be very large. 	 We have a description of a form of 
thinking but apparently no good reasons for engaging in 
such thinking, nor for encouraging educatees to engage in 
such thinking, nor for believing that such thinking has 
anything to do with 'morality'. 
It may well be, and I believe it is, the case that it is 
not possible to find grounds for a moral theory which 
establishes the link between rationality and morality as 
firmly as Hare or Kant would wish. 	 We may, however, 
still have good reasons for combining some elements from 
both moral viewpoints in order to formulate a moral 
'theory' which is acceptable to us - which entails a 
morality which we have reason to let into our lives and, 
especially, into the lives of those we educate. 
Leaving aside the "highly rationalist thesis", Hare's 
work does give us a very clear description of a form of 
thinking which (if in this respect Hare and others are 
correct) can be shown to be capable of underpinning the 
('intuitive') general moral principles which most of us 
would assent to. It also offers a means of resolving the 
inevitable conflicts between such principles. 
	 Hare's 
account, in Moral Thinking and earlier works, also 
attempts to make clear how the traditional attack upon 
this form of thinking, in terms of highly unusual cases, 
can be seen to miss its mark. 	 The rebuttal of such 
attacks was seen by Hare, especially in earlier works (eg 
1976 p.36), as "the main move" in his defence of "this 
sort of Utilitarianism". 
Hare's description of the form of thinking involved in 
his version of Utilitarianism allows us to see, in a new 
light, the relationship between a way of arriving at 
moral judgments and our possession of certain moral 
'intuitions' - our "spontaneous convictions, moderately 
reflective but not yet theorized" - as Williams describes 
them (1985 p.94). 	 This relationship rests on the 
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implications which Hare's account of moral thinking has 
for the aims of moral education. 
We are not archangels and therefore there will be many 
occasions on which we will not be capable of full 
critical thinking, we "will not have the time, or the 
information, or the self-mastery to avoid self-deception 
prompted by self-interest" (Hare 1976 p.32). 
	 We will, 
therefore, wish to educate our children (and ourselves) 
in such a way that we "implant" those general principles 
which will lead to actions in accord with critical 
thinking in "most situations that are actually 
encountered". 	 Hare (1976 p.32) says "implant" because 
they will need to be "not rules of thumb, but principles 
which they will not be able to break without the greatest 
repugnance, and whose breach by others will arouse the 
greatest indignation". 
If we address our critical thinking to highly unusual, or 
fantastic, cases then, of course, it will be a fairly 
easy matter to generate a conflict with such general 
principles because they are designed to be "in accord 
with critical thinking in most situations that are 
actually encountered". The morally well-educated person 
(as well as the intuitionist) would find that it would go 
"very much against the grain" to fail to act in 
accordance with those principles in order to act 
according to archangelic thinking (even his own). 
This approach contrasts with that of Sidgwick. According 
to Sidgwick, the distinction (in the context of unusual 
cases) between what is right to do in theory and what one 
is disposed to do in practice is a distinction which 
determines two groups of people. 
	 The first group is 
capable of Utilitarian thinking in each situation and 
capable of determining which general principles ought to 
be adopted; the second group consists of those whose 
actions and thinking are guided only by those principles. 
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Whilst agreeing that Hare's "main move" may allow one to 
offer a more defensible form of Utilitarianism, I now 
wish to pursue a line of argument which will (if 
successful) lead to a substantial modification of that 
form of Utilitarianism. This is initially based upon two 
standard objections. 
Consequentialism as indirectly self-defeating. 
The first objection concerns the issues just raised. It 
relates to the way in which consequentialist theories in 
general (and Utilitarianism in particular) tend to be -
to use expressions introduced by Parfit (1984) -
indirectly 'self-defeating' and also, perhaps, 'self-
effacing'. 
In the context of a consequentialist theory along the 
lines of Hare's Utilitarianism, the maximisation of 
satisfaction of informed preferences in each situation is 
what makes outcomes better, critical thinking is the way 
in which one determines the best outcome in each 
situation, and one is disposed to act according to 
general prima-facie moral principles because they will 
result in the best outcome in "most situations that are 
actually encountered". 	 Thus far the disposition to 
maximise preference satisfaction and the dispositions to 
act according to principles conducive to maximisation of 
preference satisfaction seem compatible and clearly 
directed towards the same end. 
But (to adapt the argument of Parfit, and others, to this 
context) most of our preference satisfaction comes from 
having, and acting upon, certain strong desires - these 
"include the desires that are involved in loving certain 
other people, the desire to work well, and many of the 
strong desires on which we act when we are not working" 
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(Parfit 1984 p.27). If we were disposed to always try to 
do whatever would make the outcome as good as possible 
then "we would have to act against or even suppress most 
of these desires". 
Parfit's point is about what would be required in order 
to have such a disposition. For example: according to a 
Utilitarian theory it may be morally better at this 
moment if I were to stop work and telephone my family; 
but, perhaps, I would be disposed to act in this way in 
this type of situation only if my desire to work were 
much weaker; and, if it were, then this might generally 
make the outcome worse. In this way, Parfit would claim, 
it is likely that such a disposition would enormously 
reduce the sum of preference satisfaction. 
	 The moral 
theory may be 'indirectly self-defeating': trying to 
achieve the aims given by the theory may mean that those 
aims will be worse achieved. A disposition to maximise 
preference satisfaction may presuppose a weakening of 
'self-regarding' dispositions in a way which reduces 
overall preference satisfaction. 
Hare would not, I think, disagree with this; and would 
certainly not disagree with Parfit's further point that 
if we were disposed to always (or often) try to 
determine, and to do, whatever would make the outcome as 
good as possible then we would be likely to deceive 
ourselves about the effects of our acts. According to 
any consequentialist theory we should have (and should 
educate others to have) those motives and dispositions 
which will result in the best consequences. It is likely 
then that most of us should not, according to the theory, 
be always disposed to engage in critical thinking, and 
some of us should be disposed never to engage in critical 
thinking. 	 A disposition to maximise preference 
satisfaction may, through self-deception, tempt us to 
stray from principles and thus reduce overall preference 
satisfaction. 
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Parfit's point is that our 'self-regarding' dispositions 
and our dispositions to obey principles may need to be 
strong enough to ensure that we act accordingly even when 
we know that an alternative action would maximise 
preference satisfaction. 
If we believe the moral theory in question, and if it is 
indirectly self-defeating then, as Parfit (1984 p.49) 
points out, "we shall sometimes knowingly act wrongly 
according to our own theory" but "we can believe these to 
be cases of blameless wrongdoing" because "we are acting 
on a set of motives that it would be wrong for us to 
cause ourselves" [and others] "to lose". 	 However, he 
goes on to say (1984 p.40), it may then be the case that 
"we would not in fact continue to regard morality with 
sufficient seriousness" and "our desire to avoid 
wrongdoing might be undermined if we believed that other 
desires should often be stronger". If this were so, it 
might then be claimed that it would make the outcome 
better if we did not believe the moral theory. 	 The 
theory "would tell us to believe, not itself, but some 
other theory"; it would be 'self-effacing'. 
From an educational perspective, a consequentialist 
Utilitarian theory may thus be seen to require the 
educator to regard the developing dispositions, desires, 
beliefs and emotions of the educatee as simply 
instrumental and to aim that they should be divorced, to 
varying degrees, from the aims given by the moral theory. 
The extent of this separation, and the proportion of 
educatees to which it applied, would depend upon the 
possibility of development of abilities to ascertain the 
full facts of a situation and consequences of action, to 
avoid self-delusion, to step out of projects without 
reduction in commitment, to overcome repugnance on some 
occasions without losing it on others, and so on. 
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Many philosophers have pointed out these, and similar, 
features of Utilitarianism and have believed that the 
presence of such features renders the theory 
unacceptable. 	 Williams (1985 p.108) argues that the 
theory requires us to have dispositions, feelings and 
judgments which are at odds with the theory and are 
purely instrumental, but that the agent cannot see them 
in this way - "there is thus a deeply uneasy gap or 
dislocation between the spirit of the theory itself and 
the spirit it supposedly justifies". Mackie (1977 p.130) 
argues that the theory is unrealistically demanding: we 
cannot expect people to have the happiness of all as 
their goal and "it is too much to expect that the efforts 
of all members [of a community] should be wholly directed 
towards promoting the well-being of all" - it is either a 
fantasy morality or (again) it has to sanction and 
recommend goals which are not those given by the theory. 
Parfit does not believe that if a theory were indirectly 
self-defeating or partly self-effacing then that would, 
in itself, render the theory unacceptable. 
	 Sidgwick 
would certainly agree and makes the distinction between 
the two groups of people on the basis of such 
considerations. 	 But whether we agree with that will 
depend, as Parfit says (1984 p.29), on our views as to 
the nature of morality and of the criteria for 
determining the best moral theory. 
When Williams (1985 p.108) criticises the "deeply uneasy 
gap" between the spirit of the theory and the spirit it 
justifies, he claims that the latter does not merely 
involve strong dispositions to act in certain ways (eg. 
to tell the truth). Such dispositions will "do the job" 
(ie. ensure action in accordance with the principles) 
only if they are associated with dispositions "of feeling 
and judgment" and these dispositions "are expressed 
precisely in ascribing intrinsic and not instrumental 
value to such things as truth telling, loyalty, and so 
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on". Thus the motives which give rise to action do not 
relate to the outcomes which the theory claims have 
intrinsic value. 
Hare responds to this type of objection by claiming that 
it is psychologically possible to take on board the two-
level approach to moral thinking which is outlined in his 
theory. We can have strong dispositions (strong enough 
to 'do the job') even though we see those dispositions as 
purely instrumental. We can, Hare says (1981 p.52), take 
this attitude to our dispositions in just the same way as 
a good general can be strongly disposed to, say, 
concentrate his forces whilst seeing that disposition as 
good only because it is generally conducive to the 
overall aim of victory. 
This may be an adequate response to the criticism above 
but it is not adequate as a response to the deeper 
objection which may lie behind it. It may be wrong to 
claim (as Williams does) that it is always the case that 
the required dispositions will have sufficient influence 
only if we see truth telling etc. as having intrinsic 
value; but we could plausibly claim that this is true of 
most (or many, or some) people. 	 If it turns out that 
most (or many, or some) people are not able to be like 
Hare (or a good general) then the theory requires that we 
educate such people in a way which ensures that their 
motives for action are entirely divorced from the 
outcomes which the theory claims have intrinsic value. 
The objection here is not just about whether it is, in 
fact, the case that we are required by the theory to 
educate significant numbers of people in this way. If it 
were then Hare's claim that we can (all?) be like the 
good general may be reassuring. The objection is that 
the theory requires us to consider such facts when 
deciding how to educate. 	 It requires us to consider 
whether people would best achieve the outcome of 
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maximising preference satisfaction if they were educated 
so as to be motivated entirely by other considerations. 
To consider such facts is to see the moral worth of the 
individual as entirely a matter of how conducive each is 
to that end. It is to see the capacities, dispositions, 
beliefs, desires, emotions and motives of the individual 
entirely as means and as having no intrinsic moral worth. 
I wish to investigate the possibility of elaborating a 
theory which (like Hare's) implies that there are two 
levels of moral thinking and that the right action in 
each situation is that which maximises the preference 
satisfaction of those involved, but which also implies 
that certain ways of responding to those preferences have 
intrinsic moral worth. 
Malevolent preferences. 
The second objection concerns the way in which Hare's 
moral theory "makes us give weight to bad desires (such 
as the desire of a sadist to torture his victim) solely 
in proportion to their intensity". 
Hare (1976 p.30) responds to such objections by claiming 
that they are based upon intuitive principles which deal 
with cases likely to be encountered and that we are most 
unlikely to encounter a case in which utility will be 
maximised by letting the sadist have his way. This for 
three reasons: "the suffering of the victim will normally 
be more intense than the pleasure of the sadist"; 
"sadists can often be given substitute pleasures or even 
actually cured"; "the side-effects of allowing the sadist 
to have what he wants are enormous". 
In a response to Harsanyi, Hare again emphasises the 
claim that there will always be, in actual cases, a 
better alternative then that which panders to the 
Objections to Utilitarianism. 
178 
preferences of sadists. Harsanyi (1988 p.96) claims that 
if, in a given society, the number of Nazis is large 
enough in relation to the number of Jews then we would, 
according to Hare's moral theory, "have to conclude that 
the social-utility maximizing policy will be to kill all 
Jews". Hare (1988 p.245-6) responds by insisting that in 
order to make the situation such that the conclusion 
would follow we would have to "adjust the case in a way 
bordering on fantasy"; that, in Germany as it was, in 
order to carry out the massacre "the whole apparatus of 
totalitarian dictatorship .. was a precondition, and that 
was certainly not optimific"; and that, in all actual 
cases, "there will be a better alternative policy .. 
namely to push our institutions in the direction of the 
abandonment of harmful pleasures and desires, and hope 
that those who now indulge in them will soon change their 
ways". 
But the objection is not just about the possibility of it 
being, according to the moral theory, morally right to 
perform a sadistic act in certain circumstances. If it 
were then Hare's claim (which, I believe, rests on an 
over-optimistic view of the prevalence of sadistic 
inclinations and our ability to redirect them) that this 
is not at all likely to happen may be reassuring. The 
objection is about the fact that the theory requires us 
to give weight to such desires when deciding what is 
morally right. 	 As Williams says (1985 p.87), the fact 
that "racists get some satisfaction out of the sufferings 
of Jews ... cannot be a consideration at all". 
Harsanyi (1988 p.96) also claims that 'anti-social' 
preferences should be given zero weight and that to give 
them weight is, in fact, at odds with a Utilitarian moral 
theory. He claims that "a Utilitarian is presumably a 
Utilitarian out of benevolence to other people; and, 
being a benevolent person, he can no doubt rationally 
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refuse to cooperate with anybody's malevolent 
preferences". 
If, however, the Utilitarian, for whatever motive, aims 
to maximise preference satisfaction and if that outcome 
is what, according to the theory, determines the morally 
right action in each situation then this will not do. If 
this is the nature of the moral theory and if, on some 
occasions, the 'best outcome' requires the satisfaction 
of malevolent desires then that is the right thing to do 
- if our benevolent motive stands in the way of our 
counting the malevolent preference then, according to the 
theory, it ought not to do so. 
Harsanyi (1988 p.97-98) goes on to offer, what he regards 
as, a more fundamental argument. 
	 In effect he claims 
that the aim is not to maximise preference satisfaction 
but to maximise the satisfaction of 'personal' 
preferences (as contrasted with 'external preferences'). 
He argues that not only should socially undesirable 
malevolent preferences be given zero weight but the same 
is true of socially desirable supportive preferences. 
This because "Utilitarian morality requires us to respect 
people's preferences about how they themselves ought to 
be treated .. it should not require us to respect their 
preferences about how other people ought to be treated". 
And because "the fundamental Utilitarian principle that 
our social utility function must give the same weight to 
every individual's interests" would be defeated if the 
preferences of those with many well-wishers were thereby 
given greater weight. 
Dworkin (1977 p.105) also expresses a belief that 
external preferences would represent a threat to 
egalitarianism and claims that this represents a major 
difficulty for Utilitarianism which "owes much of its 
popularity to the assumption that it embodies the right 
of citizens to be treated as equals". 
	 He goes on to 
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claim that this is a difficulty which is not easily 
resolved since personal and external preferences are 
inextricably linked together. 
In response to Dworkin I shall argue later that 
malevolent preferences can be discriminated. In response 
to Harsanyi I would suggest that the question whether the 
fundamental principles he identifies are part of "the 
very nature of Utilitarian ethics" is not very 
interesting. We could equally claim that it is the 'very 
nature of Utilitarian ethics' to aim for maximisation of 
non-malevolent preferences. The interesting question is 
whether a moral theory which incorporates such an aim is 
acceptable. In answering this, I think, the question of 
motive does become central. Perhaps we should look more 
closely at the claim that the Utilitarian is a 
Utilitarian out of benevolence. 
As I said at the end of the previous section, I wish to 
investigate the possibility of elaborating a moral theory 
which retains a Utilitarian view of the rightness of 
actions but which implies that certain ways of responding 
to preferences have intrinsic moral worth. It may then 
be the case that those responses involve a rejection of 
malevolent preferences. Perhaps we can see primary moral 
worth as lying in our achieving certain forms of 
benevolence. 
The route to that theory requires a consideration of 
'second-order' preferences and their implications for 
Hare's account of critical thinking. 
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Second-order preferences. 
Each of us has many desires - to have a rest, to eat an 
apple, to be better at our work - which we may call 
'first-order desires; but we may also have desires about 
those first-order desires - that we should lack a desire 
to smoke cigarettes, that we should have a stronger 
desire to practise playing the piano, that we should have 
a weaker desire to retaliate when hurt - which we may 
call 'second-order' desires. Frankfurt (1971) makes this 
distinction and goes on to claim that the possession of 
such desires is a peculiar characteristic of humans and 
is a manifestation of our capacity for self-evaluation. 
The notion that self-evaluation is a distinctive feature 
of human agency is explored again by Taylor. 
	 He 
considers a further distinction between "two broad kinds 
of evaluation of desire" 
	 (Taylor 1985a p.16). In the 
first, which he calls 'weak' evaluation, we are concerned 
primarily with outcomes; for example, considering which 
of two desired objects attracts us most, or which is the 
most convenient of two desired actions, or how to make 
different desires compossible, or how to get the most 
overall satisfaction. 	 In the second, which he calls 
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'strong' evaluation, we are concerned with the quality of 
our motivation; for example, classifying desires and 
motives (as higher or lower, noble or base), or judging 
them as belonging to qualitatively different modes of 
life (fragmented or integrated, courageous or 
pusillanimous). 
But weak evaluation may also be concerned with desires; 
as, for instance, when I want to lose my desire for 
cigarettes so that my health will improve. In such cases 
we are not making a "qualitative distinction of the worth 
of motivations" (1985a p.18). Where weak evaluation is 
concerned with desires that is only on the grounds that 
one desire (to smoke) is 'contingently incompatible' with 
a more desired alternative (to be healthy). 
We may be tempted into redefining issues involving strong 
evaluation so that we see them as, instead, involving 
this sort of contingent incompatibility. For example, it 
may be that I wish to lose my desire for cigarettes 
because I believe that an addiction to nicotine is 
unworthy, base and degrading (Taylor's example is cream 
cakes). I may then be talked around to seeing this in 
terms of my desire for health and as a question of 
quantity of satisfaction (1985a p.22). Someone who had a 
'reductionist' Utilitarian perspective, based upon the 
view that all that matters is the quantity of 
satisfaction of the desires 
to talk us around in some 
evaluation was groundless. 
we in fact have, would have 
such way, or claim that our 
Taylor wishes (as do I) to 
reject this reductionist Utilitarian perspective. 
Taylor rejects that perspective because, he claims, it 
either leaves out of account a dimension which is 
essential to the notion of human agency; or because it 
implicitly appeals to such a dimension. 	 Strong 
evaluation involves characterizing desires as higher or 
lower, more noble or base, etc. To characterize a desire 
Preferences about preferences and ideal selves. 
183 
in this way "is to speak of it in terms of the kind of 
quality of life which it expresses and sustains. 	 I 
eschew the cowardly act because I want to be a courageous 
and honourable being." (1985a p.25). 	 The strong 
evaluator examines the different possible modes of being 
of an agent; he is not simply concerned with satisfaction 
of the desires he in fact has, he is also concerned to be 
a certain type of person. If the Utilitarian leaves this 
dimension of human agency out of account then he gives a 
hopelessly shallow account of what it is to be human. 
Perhaps, also, "we might hold that the most hard-bitten 
Utilitarians are themselves moved by qualitative 
distinctions which remain unadmitted, that they admire 
the mode of life in which one calculates consciously and 
clairvoyantly as something higher" (1985a p.23). In this 
case there is an implicit appeal to a dimension of strong 
evaluation which is not acknowledged. 	 Such a person 
would be suffering from an illusion as well as from 
shallowness. 
However, Taylor does not consider the possibility that 
the Utilitarian might acknowledge the fact that as humans 
we may yearn to be other than we are, but yet insist 
(explicitly and in the language of strong evaluation) 
that nothing is more noble or worthy than to strive to be 
a person who endeavours to ascertain the consequences of 
his actions in order to act in the best interests of all 
concerned. 	 In acknowledging such a dimension the 
Utilitarian would have to take (as we shall see) a very 
different approach to the evaluation of consequences but 
he would not be any less 'deep' than someone whose strong 
evaluations closely reflected Taylor's. 
Taylor goes on to claim (and, again, with this I can 
agree) that those who make 'strong' evaluations are 
concerned not only with the satisfaction of those desires 
which they in fact have "but also with what kind of life, 
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what quality of agent they are to be". Furthermore, "our 
identity is defined by [such] fundamental evaluations .. 
shorn of these we would lose the very possibility of 
being an agent who evaluates .. we would break down as 
persons, be incapable of being persons in the full sense" 
(1985a p.34). A moral theory which took no account of 
the fact that we can and do strive to be other than we 
are, or which tried to insist that this should always be 
seen only in terms of the struggle to satisfy the desires 
we in fact have, would indeed be shallow. 
The question then arises as to what sort of person we 
should strive to be. 	 Taylor (1985a p.36-38) speaks of 
our struggle to give form to our sense of "what we hold 
important" and of "what is of decisive importance". He 
believes that such a struggle can reveal a self which is 
authentic. He claims that I can define an identity for 
myself that is not trivial only against a background of 
things which matter in a way which transcends the self 
(1991 p.40), that I can find genuine fulfilment only in 
something which has significance independently of me and 
my desires (1991 p.82). An authentic self, according to 
Taylor, arises out of a sense of such significance and is 
thereby able to achieve genuine, not merely personal 
fulfilment. 
Taylor's view involves an evaluation not merely of my own 
preferences but of the preferences of all. It rests upon 
a contrast between those preferences I have and those 
preferences which are important, rather than upon a 
contrast between those preferences I have and those 
preferences which are important to me. But we do not 
need to appeal to universal authenticity in order to make 
space for the struggle to be other than we are. That 
struggle can be based upon a sense of what each of us, 
personally, hold to be important. We need to begin, I 
believe, by making a distinction between second-order 
preferences which involve evaluation of personal 
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preferences and those which involve evaluation of the 
preferences of everybody. 
Personal second-order preferences. 
Each of us may wish to be other than we are - more 
courageous, more cautious, more steadfast, more 
spontaneous, less malevolent, less scrupulous - and we 
may have such desires without having any desire that 
everybody should be that way. We have personal second-
order preferences. We may wish that we lacked some of 
our preferences, or that some of our preferences were 
weaker or stronger than they, in fact, are. 	 We can 
imagine ourselves with these altered preferences and 
prefer, in fact, to be that way. 
We may prefer to be other than we are because we believe 
that would result in our achieving greater preference 
satisfaction overall - the smoker who sees the preference 
for cigarettes as an obstacle to good health. But we may 
also prefer to be other than we are simply because that 
is the way we are - the smoker who would prefer not to 
have a preference which was due to addiction and who 
would prefer not to have that preference even if smoking 
was not conducive to ill health. We may have second-
order preferences which, like many of our first-order 
preferences, are not grounded in further reasons. 
Such preferences may, of course, be irrational. Brandt 
(1979) uses 'rational' to refer to "actions, desires, or 
moral systems which survive maximal criticism by facts 
and logic". 	 Hare (1981 p.215) adds that we might use 
'irrational' to refer to judgments which would have 
become different had they been more exposed to facts and 
logic. If we take this line then we might say that a 
second-order preference is rational if we retain it 
having considered all the facts - including those which 
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relate to overall preference satisfaction (insofar as it 
is possible to discover them). But one may then still 
(after such consideration) prefer to have a preference 
even regardless of a likely lessening of overall 
preference satisfaction. 	 Rationality does not require 
that we ground our second-order preferences in further 
reasons nor does it require reasons which relate 
exclusively to greater overall preference satisfaction. 
One just does prefer, say, to be a person who does not 
have a preference to flee at the first sign of danger 
rather than to be a person who has those preferences 
which are likely to result in greater (first-order) 
preference satisfaction. 
[Choices between actions may, perhaps, be represented as 
choices between sets of consequences. To choose one set 
is to have a stronger preference for that act as a 
against the others, and is to have greater preference 
satisfaction if that act is performed. The reductionist 
Utilitarian perspective will aim to see choices between 
preferences in the same way - as between the sets of 
consequences of having alternative sets of preferences. 
To choose one set of consequences is to have a stronger 
preference for the possession of that set of preferences, 
and is to have greater preference satisfaction if that 
set of preferences is possessed. The position outlined 
above would then be incoherent. But this is to leave out 
of account that we may choose not just between sets of 
consequences but also between the sets of preferences 
themselves. The notion of a preference is not exhausted 
by the consequences of having that preference in the way 
that the notion of an action may, perhaps, be exhausted 
by the consequences of performing that action. To have 
or lack a preference is to be a certain sort of person, 
to be motivated in a certain way - eg. not driven by 
timidity.] 
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Possession of preferences is not something which we, as 
rational, must subject to a decision procedure involving 
an assessment of consequences and of overall 
satisfaction. To assess in this way is already to make 
an (implicit or explicit) appeal to a second-order 
preference - namely, that one should have those 
preferences which are most likely to give the greatest 
preference satisfaction overall. 	 I may have such a 
preference but also have a preference that, say, my 
preferences should not include those relating to timidity 
- and the latter preference may be stronger than the 
former. 	 We may here speak of a comparison of the 
strength of such preferences; but this is not to compare 
the strengths of my preferences for this or that set of 
consequences, but rather to compare strengths of my 
preference for being this or that sort of person. 
Each of us may have a view as to the sort of preferences 
we prefer to have, the sort of person we wish to be. In 
this context it may be appropriate to speak, as 
Kierkegaard speaks (1843 Vol II p.263), of one's 'ideal 
self'. Such an ideal self is a goal towards which one 
may strive, it is "a picture in likeness to which [one] 
has to form [oneself]". We may have a 'personal ideal 
self' and we do not, as rational agents, have to justify 
that ideal by means of a determination of the 
consequences (for satisfaction of our first-order 
preferences) of becoming that ideal self. Such an ideal 
may be (as Taylor would claim) fundamental to our 
personal identity. 
[One might also have a view as to the sort of preferences 
everyone should have and claim, as I shall, that such a 
'universal' ideal self may be fundamental to morality.] 
But given that one has a personal ideal self involving 
second-order preferences then in what way does that 
affect decisions about actions? Can we describe those 
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decisions in terms of strengths of preferences and 
awareness of consequences; and can we apply similiar 
criteria of rationality (in terms of degree of exposure 
to facts and logic) to such decisions as we have applied 
to decisions involving only first-order preferences? 
Decisions involving second-order prefernces. 
If one is striving towards a personal ideal self, if one 
does not now have the preferences which one's ideal self 
would have, then one will wish to deliberate and to act 
as would one's ideal self. However, those preferences, 
say, which one prefers not to have will be present and 
will sometimes have great strength. 
Suppose I have a preference that A should happen (I smoke 
a cigarette), call it P(A), and a preference that I 
should not prefer A, call it P(notP(A)); and that, in 
general, P(notP(A)) is greater than P(A). 	 But suppose 
that, in a particular situation S (I am having a drink 
and my favourite brand of cigarette is available), P(A) 
would be greater than P(notP(A)). 	 It is certainly 
possible for me to intentionally not bring about A in S -
for example, by avoiding S. But would that be rational? 
I avoid S because I know that in S P(A) is greater than 
P(notP(A)), I would therefore bring about A in S 
(assuming greater preferences do, by definition, outweigh 
lesser), I would therefore act as a result of having 
P(A), I do not want to do that, and so I avoid S. 	 Is 
that rational? 
Compare this with a conflict between two first-order 
preferences. 	 Suppose I have P(A); A (watching 
television) always has further consequences not B (not 
studying); I have P(B); and, in general, P(B) is greater 
than P(A). But suppose that, in a particular situation S 
(an especially entertaining TV programme is broadcast, I 
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know about it, a TV is available), P(A) would be greater 
than P(B). Should I, as rational, avoid S? I know that 
in S P(A) is greater than P(B), I would therefore bring 
about A in S, I would therefore bring about not B, I do 
not want to do that, and so I avoid S. This surely is 
not rational. 
If I know that, in S, P(A) is greater than P(B) then 
(using Hare's epistemological premiss) I now have 
preferences P(in S,A) and P(in S,B) and the former is 
greater than the latter. 	 I therefore now 
prefer/prescribe 'in S,A' and, if this were the whole 
picture, then I would have no reason to avoid S. I will, 
in S, bring about A and, therefore, not B but this is 
what I now prefer and what I will prefer in S. 
However, given such a conflict, there may well be reasons 
either for not having such a preference for S or for 
avoiding S. It may be that I do not know that, in S, 
P(A) would be greater than P(B); I believe this to be the 
case (and it is here assumed to be the case) but believe 
that my judgment is not wholly reliable; I do know that 
P(B) is, in general, greater than P(A); and I, therefore, 
base my preference for S upon that knowledge and 
prefer/prescribe 'in S,notA'. 	 If this were the whole 
picture then I would not yet have a reason to avoid S. 
But it may be that, although I now prefer 'in S,notA', I 
believe that in S P(A) would be greater than P(B) - this 
because, for example, the possibility of immediately 
satisfying P(A) would blind me to the consequences of not 
satisfying P(B) and my preferences would be worse 
informed in the actual situation. I now have reason to 
avoid S; I prefer/prescribe 'notS'. 
If, for simplicity, we leave out of account other 
possible consequences of avoiding S and also 
possibilities other than S and notS then I, rationally, 
do not avoid S if I believe that I can act and will act, 
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in S, in a way which will, overall, satisfy my best 
informed preferences. 	 I, rationally, avoid S if I 
believe that I will, in S, act contrary to my best 
informed preferences. 
If the conflict between a preference and an ideal self 
involving a second-order preference were entirely 
parallel and I was fully informed (both now and in S) 
then I would have no reason to prefer 'in S,notA' or to 
prefer 'notS'. 
	 In S P(A) is greater than P(notP(A)); I 
know that and it is therefore now the case that P(inS,A) 
is greater than P(inS,notP(A)); I therefore now 
prefer/prescribe 'inS,A'. I will in S bring about A; and 
I will therefore act in a way which will overall satisfy 
my best informed preferences. 
Yet, surely, if I wish to lose my desire for cigarettes 
because I believe that an addiction to nicotine is 
unworthy, base and degrading then I will prefer that 'not 
S' precisely because I know that in S P(I smoke a 
cigarette) is greater than P(notP(I smoke a cigarette)). 
I do not want my actions to be motivated by that 
preference, my actions would be so motivated in S, 
therefore I wish to avoid S. But this will not do for it 
is just to repeat that P(in S,notP(A)) gives me reason to 
avoid S (as would P(B) in the alternative example) and we 
have assumed that P(inS,A) is greater. 
We could at this point simply state, with J.White (1990 
p.30), that second-order preferences are 'more important' 
and 'count more' or, with Raz (1975 p.132) that they 
'always prevail'. 
	 But why should they count more or 
prevail? White says that they count more because they 
regulate other desires. 	 But that is just to say that 
second-order preferences count more because they are 
second-order preferences. 	 Do they always count more; 
should very weak second-order preferences always prevail 
even when in conflict with very strong first-order 
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preferences? Can we not find a way of describing the 
conflict between second and first-order preferences, 
which like the description of conflicts between first-
order preferences, appeals only to comparisons of 
strength and the satisfaction (or frustration) which 
results from alternative actions? 
Fortunately we can point to a further preference which 
has not, thus far, been mentioned and which does, I 
believe, offer such a way of describing the manner in 
which we can rationally avoid S (and will if fully 
informed). If, given all the above, I bring about (or do 
not avoid) S then I do so because I believe that I can 
and will act, in S, in a way which will overall satisfy 
my preferences - because P(A) will be stronger and will 
be satisfied. To bring about S for this reason is to now 
fail to satisfy P(notP(A)). The preferences which in S 
affect my decision with regard to bringing about A are 
P(A) and P(notP(A)) but the preferences which now affect 
my decision with regard to bringing about S are P(inS,A), 
P(inS,notP(A)) and P(now,notP(A)). 
Furthermore, at each step in which there is a possible 
action which would bring S closer I will (if fully 
informed) have a similar additional preference: 
P(now,notP(A)),P(inS',notP(A)),P(inS",notP(A)), 	  
P(inS,notP(A)). 	 In order to smoke a cigarette after 
dinner tonight (when the satisfaction would be very 
great) I must fail to throw away my cigarettes now and 
later (S'), I must fetch them after dinner (S"), etc.; 
and each such action or deliberate inaction, which is a 
mere step towards the overall satisfaction of P(inS,A) as 
against P(inS,notP(A)), is a failure to then satisfy 
P(notP(A)) and frustrates that preference. Each failure 
is a betrayal of my preference to become my ideal self, 
it is a failure to overcome my actual self. 
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[Of course it may be the case that by preventing S' or 
S" or ... I will not succeed in preventing S - later 
steps in the sequence of situations in which there is a 
possible action which will bring S closer may still occur 
(friends with cigarettes may arrive). If this is so (if 
I know that they will occur despite my action) then 
keeping my cigarettes was not a necessary condition of S, 
it need not then be motivated by a preference to bring 
about S (in which I gain overall satisfaction of P(inS,A) 
as against P(inS,notP(A))), I do not therefore satisfy 
P(now,notP(A)) by throwing away the cigarettes. In order 
to overcome the fully informed preferences of my actual 
self and satisfy P(now,notP(A)) I will need to prevent a 
situation which is (together with my possible action) a 
sufficient and a necessary condition of S - I may need to 
prevent all contact with cigarettes until the moment of 
temptation (in which P(A) would be greater than 
P(notP(A))) has passed.] 
To take a different example: suppose I have a desire to 
purchase sexual gratification and in order to do that I 
must leave my house, take out the car, drive to the town, 
cruise the streets, stop the car, roll down the window 
etc.; and further suppose that I wished that I lacked 
that desire; if the latter is the case then each step I 
take is a failure to satisfy P(now,notP(A)); each step is 
taken in order to satisfy P(A). 	 If I, nevertheless, 
bring about S and A then the inability to stop and think, 
or the strength of P(A), must be great indeed. It is not 
sufficient that P(inS,A) is greater than P(inS,notP(A)). 
A second-order preference should not merely be balanced 
against a first-order preference in each situation in 
which the latter may be satisfied; the second-order 
preference should affect my decision whenever it is 
possible to act towards bringing about or preventing such 
a situation. 
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Furthermore, some of the conditions which are necessary 
to bringing about such a situation are cognitive: in S I 
reach out, pick up and light the cigarette because I know 
that it is here and because I know that P(A) is greater 
than P(notP(A)). I can prevent S by failing to have that 
knowledge. 	 I may refuse to possess such knowledge, 
refuse to acknowledge that the cigarette is here or that 
P(A) is the greater preference. 	 If such knowledge is 
necessary to S and possession of such knowledge is 
motivated by P(A) then to 'refuse to face facts' may be a 
means to the satisfaction of P(now,notP(A)). I gain and 
accept such knowledge because it is relevant to P(A) -
"look the cigarette is here, you do want to smoke it more 
than you want not to want to smoke it". 	 I rationally 
refuse to acknowledge the facts because their 
acknowledgement would be motivated by P(A). 	 This may, 
when all other conditions are met, be the only way in 
which I can satisfy P(now,notP(A)). 
The tempter helps me to bring about the opportunity to 
gain overall satisfaction from my unwanted desire and, 
having brought me thus far, bids me to consider the 
facts. From the perspective of the person I in fact am, 
I am irrational if I do not succumb. 	 But from the 
perspective which includes my second-order preferences, I 
will want to resist at every step and, finally, I may 
close my eyes to facts which would be irrelevant or false 
if I were the person I wish to be. The rational agent 
who has an ideal self will strive to imaginatively 
identify with that self - to deliberate as if he had the 
preferences of that ideal self - and he may acknowledge 
in his deliberations only those facts which would be 
relevant to those preferences. 
This analysis would equally apply to second-order 
preferences which are not based upon an ideal self - ie. 
which relate to overall satisfaction of first-order 
preferences. If, in general, P(B) is greater than P(A) 
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then possession, and knowledge, of P(notP(A)) might make 
it possible and rational to avoid all situations in which 
A was possible (and P(A) was strong enough to make 
temptation likely). 	 Furthermore, avoiding all such 
situations might, in fact, result in my losing P(A) and 
thus remove the dissatisfaction which is now associated 
with situations in which P(B) is greater than P(A) and I 
do not bring about A. [This is a further reason for 
avoiding such situations which was not mentioned above.] 
But, alas, it does not appear to be the case that we can 
'adopt' a second-order preference simply because it would 
be rational to prefer to have such a preference - 
P(P(notP(A))) does not entail P(notP(A)). 	 The 
acquisition of such a preference is not likely to result 
from deliberation, it is more likely to be the result of 
a fundamental change (revelatory or traumatic) in one's 
identity; as when the alcoholic suddenly sees himself for 
what he is - driven by addiction - and, seeing this, 
recoils from himself. 
This may also be true of second-order preferences which 
are a feature of an ideal self. An ideal self may be the 
result of upbringing or education, or of traumatic 
change, or - as Taylor might claim (1985a p.42) - of a 
radical shift in identity which stems not from a mere 
radical 'choice' but from self-reflection which brings 
form to "those inchoate evaluations which are sensed to 
be essential to our identity". 
Critical thinking and a personal ideal self. 
The presence of personal second-order preferences as a 
central feature of (some of) our lives has clear 
implications for a moral theory which attempts to 
incorporate some commitment to critical thinking. 	 If 
critical thinking involves imaginative identification 
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with the preferences of others then it involves 
identification with first-order and personal second-order 
preferences. 
Let us assume that the person possessing a second-order 
preference is rational and has, therefore, considered 
what it would be like to have the preference he wishes to 
have (including consideration of the likely consequences 
for preference satisfaction), ie. the second-order 
preference is an 'informed' preference. 	 If the person 
then retains that second-order preference (even despite a 
possible lessening of overall preference satisfaction) we 
may conclude that that preference is as important to him 
as the reductionist Utilitarian perspective is to one who 
is, or wishes to be, such that only maximisation of 
first-order preference satisfaction matters. 	 Its 
importance lies in the fact that it is about being a 
certain type of person; it is not just about the 
decisions made on this or that occasion. 
Thus, if there are, on certain occasions, desires (I want 
to hit him so much) and beliefs (he is over there) which 
from a first-order perspective would move that person to 
act in a way contrary to the way he would act if he were 
the person he wishes to be, then those desires and 
beliefs are obstacles to him. Insofar as I imaginatively 
identify with him they should be obstacles to me too. 
But I have a real practical advantage: by identifying 
with his ideal self (ie. with the first-order preferences 
he wishes to have) I can avoid those obstacles (the 
desire is absent and the belief is irrelevant). I do not 
have to overcome temptation in my deliberation. I can 
identify with the self he would be if he were to overcome 
his actual self. 
[I may go further and refuse to acknowledge that he has 
not yet achieved his ideal self. I rationally refuse to 
help him 'face the facts': "no, that is not a cigarette", 
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"you do not want it, you would not enjoy it". In this 
way I can help him to raise obstacles to his actual self 
and to satisfy his preference to be other than he is.] 
It is practically easier to imaginatively identify with 
the first-order preferences of someone's ideal self -
rather than to identify with the first-order and second- 
order preferences of his actual self. 	 Second-order 
preferences are a feature of our lives and the simplest 
way in which to take account of them when engaging in 
critical thinking is to imaginatively identify with the 
personal ideal self of each person. 
Critical thinking, thus modified, does not merely require 
that we take account of the preferences of others for 
these or those consequences, it also requires that we 
take account of their views as to what preferences they 
prefer to have. It incorporates a tolerance and respect 
for the personal ideals of others. We can accomodate the 
fact that such views may be fundamental to our identity 
without 	 abandoning 	 an 	 essentially 	 Utilitarian 
perspective. 
Taylor, however, would seem to equate having second-order 
preferences (involving strong evaluation) with having a 
view as to what preferences others should prefer to have. 
Taylor says (1985b p.237): "some ways of living have a 
special status, they stand out above others"; to 
recognise the "higher value" of, say, integrity is an 
essential part of our .. having integrity"; the 
"aspiration to achieve [such a] good is also an 
aspiration to be motivated in a certain way"; such an 
aspiration involves a second-order motivation. 	 If 
'higher value' were to mean 'higher value to me' then 
this could be interpreted as referring to personal 
second-order preferences. 
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But Taylor also says (1985b p.237-8): "an essential part 
of achieving liberation is sensing the greatness of 
liberated humanity"; "ordinary goals, for instance for 
wealth and comfort, are goals that a person may have or 
not ..[but] it is in the nature of what I have called a 
higher goal that it is one we should have"; "for those 
who subscribe to integrity, the person who cares not a 
whit for it is morally insensitive, or lacks courage, or 
is morally coarse". 
To subscribe to such an ideal is, for Taylor, to 
subscribe to it as an ideal for all mankind. It is to 
feel admiration for those who either strive for or 
achieve that ideal and contempt for those who do not 
(Taylor 1985b p.239). 	 In resisting the reductionist 
Utilitarian perspective (according to which such ideals 
must be construed in terms of degree of attainment of 
first-order preference satisfaction) Taylor makes the 
very strong claim that such ideals must be construed in 
terms of ideals for humanity as a whole. Taylor may have 
other reasons for making that claim but, I have argued, 
we can resist the reductionist Utilitarian perspective 
without also insisting that ideals relating to, say, 
liberation or integrity (or - with Aristotle - courage, 
temperance, liberality, gentleness, wittiness, modesty, 
etc.) have to be such that we may legitimately impose 
them upon all. 
This is not to deny the significance, or possible 
legitimacy, of ideals for humanity as a whole. Indeed I 
hope to found a version of Utilitarianism upon such an 
ideal. 	 But that ideal will not require that we sweep 
aside all those personal ideals of others which differ 
from ours, rather it will underpin a demand for that 
critical thinking which incorporates a tolerance and 
respect for the personal ideals of others. 
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I have thus far tried to show how one could use the 
method of critical thinking to arrive at judgments as to 
how to act in a given situation, and yet accommodate the 
fact that personal second-order preferences are an 
important feature in our lives. 
	 Critical thinking, as 
thus modified, represents the Utilitarian view that the 
preferences of each person matter, but it extends that 
view to incorporate not only preferences for what happens 
in the world but also preferences about the sort of 
person each of us prefers to become. 
The fundamental idea behind this accomodation has been 
that judgments of action need not be made on the basis of 
what would maximise satisfaction of our actual 
preferences but, rather, can be made on the basis of what 
would maximise satisfaction of the preferences of our 
ideal selves. 
But now it may be that a first-order preference which 
someone has (either as a preference of their ideal self 
or - if ideal and actual selves are the same - as a 
preference of their actual self) is a preference which I 
would prefer them not to have. I may wish others to be 
other than they are - more courageous, more cautious, 
more steadfast, more spontaneous, less malevolent, less 
scrupulous. 	 I may prefer that all lacked malevolent 
preferences, or that no-one had an overwhelming desire to 
avoid danger, or that each had no pity. 
	 I may have 
universal second-order preferences. 
[I may also, because of a first-order Utilitarian 
perspective, prefer that all had those preferences which 
would be most conducive to the maximisation of their 
preference satisfaction or to the maximisation of 
preference satisfaction of all - ie. I may have a 
'reductionist' universal second-order preference.] 
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Taylor's concept of 'strong' evaluation (as resisting 
reduction to a first-order Utilitarian perspective) 
applies equally to personal and universal second-order 
preferences. 	 But we are indeed more likely to have 
recourse to the language of strong evaluation in the 
context of universal second-order preferences - words 
like 'noble', 'base', 'worthy', 'unworthy' are generally 
used to imply a universality of judgment. 
Unless we rule out such preferences (and I shall shortly 
look at some of the ways in which this may be attempted) 
then one's views as to what type of person each of us 
should strive to be may affect one's critical thinking. 
I have, thus far, merely described a form of thinking 
('critical' thinking) which involves imaginative 
identification with the preferences of others, and have 
discussed the implications (for that form of thinking) of 
our taking account of second-order preferences. I have 
not yet offered any reasons why one should engage in such 
thinking and I have certainly not offered any reasons why 
someone engaging in such thinking should leave out of 
account their own universal second-order preferences. 
Critical thinking would enable us to make judgments, as 
to how to act in a given situation, in the light of 
consequences and in the light of what others want; but my 
universal second-order preferences may form part of the 
process of reaching those judgments. 
	 Hare's archangel 
acquires the wants of each of us by imaginative 
identification, has a complete knowledge of consequences 
and reaches a decision; but such an archangel may (like 
Taylor) have universal second-order preferences. 
	 A 
willingness and ability to make judgments by means of 
critical thinking is not, in itself, inconsistent with 
such preferences. 
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If I prefer that others lack malevolence then I may (as 
rational) not count your desire to see others suffer; if 
I reject timidity in others then I may not give the same 
weight to your desire to avoid danger as you do; if I 
reject pity then I may not give weight to your desire to 
alleviate the suffering of others. Our judgments as to 
how to act in a given situation would then differ 
greatly. 	 Having opened up our 
strong evaluations, and refused a 
order Utilitarian perspective, we 
critical thinking to 
reduction to a first- 
now appear to have no 
means of preventing the application to critical thinking 
of a whole range of universal second-order preferences. 
Whether there is a means of resisting this application 
will depend upon our reasons for engaging in critical 
thinking. It may be that there are particular universal 
second-order preferences which would underpin a 
commitment to critical thinking and which would still 
enable us to shape a version of Utilitarianism that also 
addresses the objections discussed earlier. 
Utilitarianism and a universal ideal self. 
I now wish to investigate ways in which Utilitarianism 
may respond to universal second-order preferences. 	 I 
shall begin by considering two different kinds of 
strategies - both of which aim to maintain the link with 
an essentially Utilitarian theory. 	 The first strategy 
insists on a reduction to a first-order Utilitarian 
perspective; the second founds the moral theory on a 
particular set of universal second-order preferences. 
The first approach could argue that a failure to 'reduce' 
universal second-order preferences was irrational (I have 
already argued that this is not the case), or that it is 
question-begging. 
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Hare (1981 p.179) argues that none of the preferences 
which we acquire by imaginative identification "has 
greater dignity or authority than another"; and he goes 
on to argue that we cannot therefore 'boost' some 
preferences on the grounds that they are 'moral 
convictions'. To do so would be "simply to refuse to 
think critically". 	 The point here is that if we are 
using critical thinking in order to make a judgment as to 
what should be done in a particular situation then 
boosting a preference preempts that process. To boost a 
preference (so that "it has to prevail") is, effectively, 
to insist that what should be done is whatever satisfies 
that preference - the judgment is already made, the 
process of reaching that judgment is otiose, we have 
begged the question. 
I have suggested ways in which having universal second-
order preferences may lead us to discount or not give 
'proper' weight to the preferences of others when we are 
engaged in critical thinking. Thus we might expect a 
similar argument with regard to the discounting of 
preferences: 'none has less dignity or authority', so we 
cannot discount some preferences. 
But it is important to note that the discounting of a 
preference, unlike the boosting (in Hare's sense) of a 
preference, does not preempt the process of critical 
thinking. If one were to boost a preference so that it 
always overrode other preferences in one's deliberations 
then that would have the result that all actions which 
satisfied that preference would be deemed right. But if 
one were to discount a preference in one's deliberations 
then that would not have the result that all actions 
which satisfied that preference would be deemed wrong -
all the other preferences would still have to be 
considered. 'Boosting' is incompatible with a commitment 
to critical thinking in a way in which discounting, or 
giving altered weight to, a preference is not. 
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The fact that one would discount someone's preference for 
hurting people would not mean that critical thinking must 
yield the result that actions which hurt people are 
always wrong, or even that actions which result from 
someone's desire to hurt people are always wrong. The 
consequences of such an action in a particular situation 
may be such as to satisfy other preferences. 	 The 
sadistic dentist may (in some circumstances) be doing the 
right thing when he extracts a tooth without anaesthetic. 
What is true is that the dentists's sadism, his desire to 
inflict pain, is not relevant to determining whether it 
is the right thing. Critical thinking is not preempted, 
judgments about actions are not ruled out in advance. It 
is just that the facts and preferences which determine 
the results of critical thinking are not all the facts 
and not all the preferences of those involved. 
Equally, when we give more, or less, weight to a 
preference than would the person who had that preference 
then the judgment is not already made. 	 We have not 
begged the question in the way in which boosting a 
preference so that it "had to prevail" would beg the 
question. 
Some universal second-order preferences may, perhaps, 
involve boosting (in Hare's sense) one particular 
preference, or discounting all but one preference (which 
would have the same effect). But the universal second-
order preferences which I shall be considering will not 
do either of these things. They will not, therefore, beg 
the question in a way which would render critical 
thinking irrelevant; they will simply introduce a further 
element into the process of decision-making which uses 
critical thinking. 
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I conclude that a failure to 'reduce' universal second-
order preferences is neither irrational nor begs the 
question - even when it is a feature of a moral theory 
which implies that the making of certain types of moral 
judgments involves the use of critical thinking. 
The second approach, in which the moral theory is founded 
upon a particular set of universal second-order 
preferences, could take two forms (where the aim is to 
maintain an essentially Utilitarian theory). The first 
insists on a 'reduction' not because that is rational or 
avoids begging the question but because that is to be 
part of the basis of the moral theory. The universal 
second-order preference which would form part of the 
basis of the theory would be to the effect that: each of 
us should strive to have just those preferences which 
would be most conducive to the maximisation of preference 
satisfaction of all. 	 A less demanding version could 
involve a preference that: each of us should strive to 
have different preferences only when that would lead to 
greater preference satisfaction for all. Such a theory 
would be coherent but would take us no closer to 
answering the objections to Utilitarianism which I 
outlined in the previous chapter. 
An alternative is to found our Utilitarian theory upon a 
universal second-order preference relating to 
benevolence: the 'benevolent archangel' as a universal 
ideal self. 
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CHAPTER 9. 
Two types of Archangel. 
The benevolent archangel and the malevolent archangel. 
The benevolent archangel as ideal self. 
Non-consequentialist 'Utilitarianism'. 
The benevolent archangel and the malevolent archangel. 
As we saw in an earlier chapter, Hare's 'epistemological' 
premiss is central to his project of appealing to logic 
and reason rather than to a shared sentiment of universal 
benevolence. 
If we grant that premiss then it is the case that: 
if I know a preference which x has for a situation S then 
I now have that same preference for a hypothetical 
situation HS - where HS is identical to S in all respects 
save that I am x. 
This premiss relates equally to one's own preferences. 
Thus we have: 
if 
1. x knows(inS,xP(A)) 
then (given the epistemological premiss) 
2. now xP(inS,A) 
if 
3. inS,xP(A) 
then (given HS is identical to S save that y is x) 
4. inHS,yP(A) 
if 
5. y knows(inHS,yP(A)) 
then (given the epistemological premiss) 
6. now yP(inHS,A) 
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If y knows 3. then he also knows 4. and, therefore, 6. is 
true. This link between knowledge of the preferences of 
others and acquisition of those preferences is at the 
heart of Hare's position. 	 As Hare makes clear (1981 
p.99), the premiss does not involve a link between my 
knowledge of your preference, say, to avoid suffering and 
my preference that you do not suffer; rather the link is 
with my preferring that I would not suffer if I were you. 
It is such preferences as these which, according to Hare, 
do the work and lead to a prescription which takes 
account of the preferences of all. It is this use of the 
epistemological premiss which would ensure that (first-
stage) universalisability is not trivial. If it were to 
achieve this then it would ensure that an appeal to 
benevolence was unnecessary - all that would be required 
is that people be willing and able to make moral 
judgments in the light of logic and the facts. 
I have argued (in chapter 6) that this will not do: an 
appeal to the epistemological premiss in the context of a 
totally hypothetical situation is fruitless. If critical 
thinking is to be a form of thinking that, in some way, 
ensures judgment which responds to the preferences of 
others as a result of acquisition of those preferences 
then this cannot be through the acquisition of 
preferences for totally hypothetical situations. 	 We 
shall have to take a more 'traditional' utilitarian 
approach and look towards a form of critical thinking 
which rests upon preferences for the actual situation 
acquired through 	 'benevolent' identification with 
others. 
Let us begin then by clarifying what it means to say that 
'x acquires a preference P(in S,A) through benevolent 
identification with y'. 	 There are three requirements 
here: y has the preference P(in S,A); x knows that yP(in 
S,A); x has the preference P(in S,A) as a result of that 
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knowledge. The last requirement amounts to claiming that 
x's knowledge of y's preference is a necessary condition 
of x having that preference: x would not P(in S,A) were 
it not for x knowing that yP(in S,A). 	 We may call a 
preference resulting from such identification a 
'benevolent' preference. 
Although benevolent identification, thus defined, occurs 
when such knowledge is a necessary condition of the 
preference acquired, that knowledge may not be a 
sufficient condition. 	 If, for example, x acquires a 
preference of y's as a result of knowledge of y's 
preference and knowledge that y is a Frenchman (the 
latter also being in this case a necessary condition of 
acquisition of the preference) then we nevertheless have 
a case of benevolent identification - x benevolently 
identifies with y because y is a Frenchman. There may be 
many other different conditions which, in a given 
situation, are necessary conditions of x acquiring a 
preference through benevolent identification with y (y is 
a child, x is not under stress, it is Sunday, the 
preference relates to food, and so on) but benevolent 
identification has taken place whenever x's knowledge of 
yP(in S,A) is a necessary condition of xP(in S,A). 
We may now adopt a similar approach to clarifying what 
might be meant by saying that 'x acquires a preference 
P(in S,A) through malevolent identification with y'. 
Thus: malevolent identification has taken place whenever 
x's knowledge of yP(in S,A) is a necessary condition of 
xP(in S,not A). We may call a preference resulting from 
such identification a 'malevolent' preference; and the 
above initial remarks will help us in clarifying what is 
to count as such a preference. If we intend to discover 
grounds for excluding such preferences (as I hope to do) 
then we must be clear about what is to count as a 
malevolent preference. 	 As Sen and Williams (1982 p.9) 
point out when discussing Harsanyi's exclusion of 'anti- 
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social' preferences, we shall need to consider whether we 
are thus excluding "preferences the satisfaction of which 
will as a matter of fact exclude the satisfaction of 
others, as in competition, .. preferences which refer 
negatively to other preferences", preferences based upon 
envy, etc. 
In a competition involving x and y, x may prefer that y 
did not win. If x's knowledge of y's desire to win is a 
necessary condition of x's preference then that 
preference is malevolent. If, however, x would have that 
preference even if x did not know that y wanted to win, 
or even if y did not in fact want to win, then that 
preference is not malevolent. 	 Similarly, whether a 
preference based upon envy is malevolent will depend upon 
whether x is envious of y having what x wants (but cannot 
have) or whether x is envious of y having what y wants. 
In the former case, it may be that x will still prefer y 
not to have the thing in question even if y did not want 
it (or would not miss it if he did not have it); such a 
preference is not malevolent (as here defined). In the 
latter case, it may be that x prefers y not to have the 
thing in question because, say, y has so much more of 
what he wants than x. If, in this case, y's preference 
for that thing and x's knowledge of it is a necessary 
condition of x's preference that y not have it then x's 
preference is malevolent - x malevolently identifies with 
y because y has so much more of what he wants. As with 
benevolent identification there may be many different 
conditions which, in a given situation, are a necessary 
condition of x acquiring a preference through malevolent 
identification with y (y has more of what he wants, y is 
a Frenchman, x is under stress, it is Sunday, the 
preference relates to food, and so on). 
Malevolent preferences do not simply refer negatively to 
other preferences, they involve a certain motive: I want 
you to not have what you want because you want it; I want 
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you to have what you do not want because you do not want 
it. I want you to be frustrated and to suffer. 
Hare's archangel has complete knowledge of all the 
consequences of alternative actions and of the 
preferences of everybody. 	 I shall define a benevolent 
archangel as one who has such knowledge and acquires all 
the preferences of all those involved in each situation 
as a result of knowledge of those preferences - he is 
wholly benevolent. 	 Likewise, the malevolent archangel 
has such knowledge and acquires preferences which oppose 
the preferences of all those involved in each situation 
as a result of knowledge of those preferences - he is 
wholly malevolent. 
Hare's archangel universalises his moral judgment over 
all those hypothetical situations in which he is x, he is 
y, etc., he thus (according to Hare) acquires the same 
preferences for those hypothetical situations as x, y, 
etc. have for the actual situation, he then balances 
those preferences (in the light of knowledge of 
consequences) in order to make the same judgment for the 
actual situation and for each of the hypothetical 
situations, and thereby makes a judgment (and is disposed 
to act) in a way which takes account of the preferences 
of others. 
The benevolent archangel does not need to universalise 
judgments over hypothetical situations. 	 He already 
shares the preferences of others for the actual 
situation. 	 His benevolence ensures that he makes a 
judgment and is disposed to act in a way which would 
maximise the preference satisfaction of those involved in 
that situation. Likewise the malevolent archangel makes 
a judgment and is disposed to act in a way which 
maximises the frustration and suffering of those 
involved. Or rather, this would be the case if we could 
assume that the benevolent archangel was wholly non- 
Two types of Archangel. 
209 
malevolent and that the malevolent archangel was wholly 
non-benevolent. 
However, the benevolence of the benevolent archangel is 
not logically inconsistent with malevolence. 	 It is 
logically possible, as a result of knowledge of y's 
preference P(in S,A), for x to acquire a preference P(in 
S,A) and a preference P(in Snot A). If, for example, x 
were benevolent to all children but malevolent to all 
those born in France then x would have such opposing 
preferences when considering a situation which involved a 
French child. But there may be a sense in which we can 
say that such opposing standpoints are not in the end 
equivalent to benevolence conjoined with malevolence. 
Since the two preferences are equal but opposing they 
must, rationally, result in a form of indifference 
(albeit under strain) 	 the result of benevolent 
identification and malevolent identification with one and 
the same preference is (rationally) no preference at all. 
We could define benevolence in such a way as to require 
that the end result of knowledge of a preference is the 
acquisition of that preference and thereby ensure that 
the benevolent archangel is not only wholly benevolent 
but is thus also wholly non-malevolent. 	 However, this 
may not be necessary once we focus upon the benevolent 
archangel as ideal self. 	 To adopt as ideal self an 
archangel who was wholly benevolent but who was also 
wholly (or partly) malevolent would surely be bizarre. 
The end result of achieving such an ideal would be 
indifference to the preferences of all (or some). 	 To 
adopt such an ideal rather than to directly adopt an 
ideal of indifference would require a preference for 
bringing into one's life a greater degree of 
psychological strain than one already 'enjoyed'. 
If we can thus set aside the ambivalent (or 
schizophrenic) benevolent archangel as an ideal then the 
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benevolent archangel as ideal self is not only wholly 
benevolent but is also wholly non-malevolent. Likewise 
the malevolent archangel as ideal self is not only wholly 
malevolent but is also wholly non-benevolent. Both are 
images of perfection: complete knowledge entirely at the 
service of perfect sympathy or perfect spite. 
[This is not to say that these two are the only possible 
rational ideals based upon benevolent or malevolent 
identification with the preferences of others. We can 
have such an ideal which is partial in the sense of 
extending only to some people, situations or preferences. 
We can also have such an ideal which is partial in the 
sense of not matching in strength the preferences which 
are the object of identification. In the former case we 
can imagine, for example, that those aspiring to 
malevolence (not being all-powerful) might wish to have 
associates who assisted in bringing about the maximum 
frustration and suffering but who were not themselves 
regarded malevolently. 	 In the latter case we can 
describe a spectrum of benevolent identification such 
that responses to a preference of given strength could 
range from an acquired preference of the same strength to 
one with strength which was some small fraction of that 
strength. 	 We might then describe malevolent 
identification in terms of acquiring the same preference 
but with negative strength and as thus continuous on a 
spectrum with benevolent identification - so that 
indifference (zero strength) lies in the middle. In what 
follows I shall be considering an ideal of benevolence 
which is not partial in either of these senses.] 
The benevolent archangel as ideal self. 
The benevolent archangel considered here has, as an 
essential characteristic, complete benevolence and it is 
that characteristic which I wish, for now, to focus upon. 
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This in order to determine the implications for our 
critical thinking of adopting such an archangel as an 
ideal. Furthermore, in the moral theory which I wish to 
elaborate, it will not only be the case that the judgment 
of a benevolent archangel determines what we should do 
but also, and more importantly, that the judging of a 
benevolent archangel offers an ideal as to how we should 
be. 
If I wished to be a benevolent archangel (if this were my 
personal ideal self) then I would wish to be wholly 
benevolent, to lack all malevolence, to have knowledge of 
the consequences of alternative actions, and to judge 
accordingly. I would wish to have the abilities of an 
archangel and to be motivated by a sentiment of universal 
benevolence. 
However, the attempt to deliberate as if this were so is 
not inconsistent with my counting your malevolence. 
Indeed my benevolence to you, and to all your 
preferences, requires that I count your malevolent 
preference. My benevolence towards the victim of your 
malevolence will ensure that I wish him not to suffer 
(just as he wishes not to suffer) but my benevolence 
towards you will ensure that I wish the suffering to take 
place (just as you wish it to take place). A reluctance 
to see the victim suffer is not the same as a reluctance 
to count your desire that the suffering should take 
place. 
As a benevolent archangel I would lack malevolent 
preferences; but to have the benevolent archangel as a 
personal ideal self gives no reason to discount the 
malevolence of others. I would claim, contra Harsanyi, 
that to be motivated by benevolence does not give a 
reason to "refuse to cooperate with anybody's malevolent 
preferences" (Harsanyi 1988 p.96). 
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In order to have grounds for discounting the malevolence 
of others I must subscribe to the benevolent archangel as 
a universal ideal. 	 Such an ideal, and the consequent 
desire that all lack malevolence, gives grounds for 
discounting the malevolent preferences of others. Let us 
then take the benevolent archangel to be a universal 
ideal self and use this as the starting point for our 
moral theory. 	 The fundamental principle of the moral 
theory which I shall outline is a universal second-order 
preference that: 
we ought all to be (more like) a benevolent archangel. 
If I were to subscribe to this universal ideal self then 
I would wish all to be wholly benevolent, to lack all 
malevolence, to have knowledge of the consequences of 
alternative actions, and to judge accordingly. If I were 
to deliberate as if this were so then I would deliberate 
as if I were a member of a community of benevolent 
archangels. 	 Such deliberation is inconsistent with my 
counting the malevolence of others. Each member of such 
a community would (when considering alternative actions) 
share the preferences of all others and would lack all 
malevolence. 	 The benevolent archangel as a universal 
ideal self gives reason to discount the malevolence of 
others. 	 My subscribing to that ideal gives reason to 
benevolently identify with all but the malevolent 
preferences of others. 
[Note: Deliberations based upon benevolent identification 
may result in what we have called a 'malevolent' 
preference. I may, as a result of deliberation in the 
light of the universal ideal of the benevolent archangel, 
acquire a preference that x not achieve something which 
he wants and that because I know that x wants it. I may, 
for example, believe that by depriving x, who is a thief, 
of something which he wants he will be encouraged not to 
steal in future. 	 In this example it is a necessary 
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condition of my preference that x wants the thing in 
question and my preference is therefore a 'malevolent' 
preference. But such a preference does not count in my 
deliberation, it is the result of my deliberation. 	 A 
malevolent preference here results from benevolent 
identification with all concerned; I want x to suffer or 
be frustrated because I have considered all alternative 
actions and their consequences and have benevolently 
identified with the preferences of all concerned. 	 But 
such a process of deliberation will take no account of 
malevolent preferences such as my desire that the thief 
should suffer simply because he is a thief or because he 
has taken something of value to you (towards whom I am 
benevolent).] 
The benevolent archangel as universal ideal not only 
gives grounds for discounting malevolent preferences it 
also gives grounds for an approach which rests upon fully 
informed preferences. 	 Each member of a community of 
benevolent archangels would know the consequences of 
alternative actions and would thus have what Hare calls 
'perfectly prudent' preferences (and what Harsanyi call 
'true' preferences). To deliberate in the light of this 
ideal is to deliberate as if this were so. Subscribing 
to that ideal gives reason to benevolently identify with 
the 'true' preferences of others. 
The process of thus idealising the preferences of all 
agents through appeal to a universal ideal self can also 
be used to shed light upon the problem of 'double-
counting' referred to by Dworkin (1977 p.103-6) and 
others. 	 Suppose x is benevolent towards y; z is 
attempting to make a judgment which (by means of 
benevolent identification) takes account of the 
preferences of all; and xP(A), yP(B), zP(C). 
	 Given the 
benevolence of x towards y, then xP(B) just because 
yP(B). If z now makes a judgment he will acquire P(B) by 
means of benevolent identification with y and, again, by 
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means of benevolent identification with x; z will 
'double-count' that preference and may, thereby, make a 
judgment which favours y. Such a judgment will have been 
influenced by the mere fact that y is fortunate enough to 
have a well-wisher, whereas x and z do not. 	 This, 
Dworkin claims, cannot be right. 
Hart (1979 p.108-110) claims that the preferences of 
'disinterested' supporters should be included. 	 He 
supports that claim by offering an example: if the issue 
is freedom for homosexual relationships, and if liberal 
heterosexuals prefer homosexuals to have that freedom, 
then not counting those preferences would be 
'undercounting'. 	 The views of supporters (and 
detractors) should be counted; and if, as a result, the 
judgment is wrong then that will be because those 
supporters (or detractors) are not willing or not able to 
listen to the issues - their preferences are not 
informed. 
However, Hart's position relies on the assumption that 
the supportive preference is not 'merely' a benevolent 
preference. 	 The liberal does not prefer freedom for 
homosexual relationships because it is what x prefers; he 
supports that preference because of the nature of what is 
preferred not because it is preferred by x. The fact 
that, as Hart says, the issues should be relevant makes 
this clear. 
Dworkin's distinction (1977 p.104) between 'external' and 
'personal' preferences is not helpful here. 	 The 
liberal's preference is (presumably) an external 
preference (it does not relate to the liberal's 
"enjoyment of some goods or opportunities"); and Hart is 
right, I believe, to insist that it should be counted. 
At least, it is not clear that a moral theory which 
requires that we count such a preference is in need of 
modification. 
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However, once we distinguish between a supportive 
preference which derives from the nature of what is 
preferred and a supportive preference which derives from 
the identity of the person supported then it may well 
seem more difficult to defend a theory which implies that 
we should count the latter. 
As Harsanyi says (1988 p.98), "the interests of persons 
with many well-wishers and friends would obtain much 
greater weight than the interests of persons without such 
supporters". Harsanyi claims that this is objectionable 
because it means that we do not "give the same weight to 
every individual's interests" and that contradicts a 
"fundamental utilitarian principle". 
However, as I claimed in the previous chapter, the 
question whether such a principle is fundamental to 
'utilitarianism' is not very interesting. 	 The 
interesting question is whether moral theories which have 
amongst their consequences the ruling out of double-
counting are acceptable. The moral theory which appeals 
to the benevolent archangel as universal ideal self has 
that consequence. Against the background of that ideal 
double-counting is objectionable because it involves our 
deliberating in the light of the actual preferences of 
others rather than in the light of those preferences we 
all would have if we all were to live up to that ideal. 
Each member of a community of benevolent archangels would 
share the preferences of all others and would not merely 
share the preferences of some others - there can be no 
double-counting in such a community. 
[Or, more precisely, there can be no 'partial' double-
counting (in which I, having benevolent preferences on 
behalf of all others, acquire your benevolent preferences 
on behalf of some others). 	 There can be 'complete' 
double-counting (in which I, having benevolent 
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preferences on behalf of all others, acquire your 
benevolent preferences on behalf of all others) but this 
would be pointless since it would not result in a 
different judgment.] 
If we subscribe to the universal ideal of the benevolent 
archangel then an attempt to deliberate as if that ideal 
were realised should involve neither double-counting nor 
the counting of malevolent preferences. If someone were 
to live up to that ideal then that person would 
prescribe, in each situation, that action which would 
maximise satisfaction of all the fully informed non-
malevolent (and non-benevolent) preferences of the 
personal ideal selves of each of the people involved. 
Such a person would deliberate and be disposed to act in 
the way in which a utilitarian (who took account of 
personal ideal selves, who discounted malevolent 
preferences, and who did not 'double count' preferences) 
would wish to deliberate and act. 
However, in thus idealising the preferences of those to 
whom we are benevolent we abandon a consequentialist 
position. We count the preferences of each individual's 
personal ideal self not because they are a means to 
greater overall preference satisfaction, but because we 
believe that all ought to be benevolent towards the 
(second-order as well as first-order) preferences of 
others. We count the 'true' preferences and discount the 
malevolent preferences of others not because we believe 
that satisfaction of 'manifest' and malevolent 
preferences 	 always 	 reduces 	 overall 	 preference 
satisfaction, but because we believe that all ought to be 
well-informed and non-malevolent. 	 The principle which 
gives rise to these views underpins a fundamentally non-
consequentialist position. 
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Non-consequentialist 'utilitarianism'. 
A moral theory which is based upon the benevolent 
archangel as universal ideal is a theory which relates to 
those characteristics which determine our prescriptions 
rather than to the consequences of acting accordingly. 
If we start from the principle that 'we ought all to be 
(more like) a benevolent archangel' then we begin with a 
view which measures moral worth in terms of what we are 
rather than what we do. Such a theory is (according to 
distinctions made in chapter 3) a non-consequentialist 
theory but it is also a theory which yields a view of 
what would be the right action to perform in each 
situation. 
As in Kant's theory the focus is upon a form of judgment 
which is intimately linked with action. 	 Furthermore, 
moral worth resides not in the performance of the action 
but in the exercising of that form of judgment (and thus 
being disposed to act). 	 If we appeal only to our 
principle then an action which conforms to such judgment 
but yet does not arise from such judgment has no moral 
worth (it has mere 'legality'). 
To respond to preferences in the way in which a 
benevolent archangel would respond is to have intrinsic 
moral worth. 	 That response involves a rejection of 
malevolent preferences, a respect for the fully-informed 
first-order and second-order preferences of all, a view 
of what is the right action which is essentially 
utilitarian, and a disposition to act accordingly. But, 
alas, it also involves a requirement that in each 
situation we know the consequences of all alternative 
actions, and that we know and share the preferences of 
all involved. This we cannot (or can seldom) do. 
If we, who cannot be benevolent archangels, nevertheless 
subscribe to the universal ideal of the benevolent 
217 
Two types of Archangel. 
218 
archangel then how ought we to strive to live up to that 
ideal? How ought we to educate ourselves and others in 
the light of that ideal? 
The consequentialist utilitarian (when faced with the 
problem of our imperfection) can point out that, although 
weighing preferences and consequences in each situation 
is the only way of always ensuring right action, we can 
at least behave in accordance with principles which are 
generally conducive to that end. This response, however, 
leads us into the problems associated with a self-
effacing theory - the possibility that the way in which 
some of us can best achieve that end is to be educated so 
as to believe that morality is not about that end but is 
rather about conforming to principles. We may thus be 
educated in such a way as to be unaware of the aims of 
the educator. 	 The capacities, dispositions, beliefs, 
desires, emotions and motives of the educatee may be seen 
entirely as means and as having no intrinsic moral worth. 
Our central question is now whether, starting from a non-
consequentialist position based upon the universal ideal 
of the benevolent archangel, we can find a way of 
responding to the problem of our imperfection which is 
both coherent and does not have similar implications. 
Two types of Archangel. 
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Morality and education in the light of our imperfection. 
Hare's two levels of moral thinking. 
The benevolent archangel as ideal for imperfect agents. 
The role of cognitive humility. 
Partiality to self. 
Decisive preferences and general moral principles. 
Hare's two levels of moral thinking. 
I shall begin by looking again at Hare's two-level 
approach to utilitarianism. The right action (the action 
which ought to be performed) in a given situation is that 
which maximises preference satisfaction in that 
situation. 	 We cannot (or can seldom) determine which 
action will have that consequence but we can ensure that 
our actions (and those of others) are, in general, likely 
to have that consequence. 	 This we do by educating 
ourselves and others in a way which ensures the 
possession of "a set of dispositions, motivations, 
intuitions, prima facie principles (call them what we 
will) which will have this effect" (Hare 1981 p.46). 
Those principles will need to be selected by ourselves or 
others. At the 'critical' level of thinking we select 
such principles for action (which may be very particular 
or very general); at the 'intuitive' level our action is 
guided by such principles. 
We select moral principles by balancing "the size of the 
good and bad effects in cases which we consider against 
the probability or improbability of such cases occurring 
in our actual experience" (Hare 1981 p.48). The good and 
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bad effects are, presumably, balanced by determining the 
strengths of those preferences which would be satisfied 
by acting according to the principle and comparing these 
with the strengths of those preferences which would be 
satisfied by acting in an alternative way. 
If, for the moment, we consider examples from the 
prudential field then the probabilities and preferences 
will presumably be balanced in much the same way as, say, 
Skyrms (1975 p.153-155) outlines the 
probabilities and values of consequences. 
which he outlines is one in which: you 
whether someone (in his example the queen) 
not, if you guess correctly then you will 
balancing of 
The situation 
are to guess 
is over 40 or 
be given 1000 
dollars, if you guess that she is 40 or younger and she 
is over 40 then you will win nothing, if you guess that 
she is over 40 and she is 40 or younger then she will 
have your tongue cut out, you value your tongue at 
1000000 dollars, and the probability that she is 
is (on the basis of all the evidence available 
0.9. 	 In the model offered, a decision is then 
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The expected values are determined by taking the product 
of the probability and the value of the consequence (or, 
we might say, the strength of the preference). As Skyrms 
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(1975 p.154) says, "by guessing that .. [she] is 40 or 
under, you have a smaller chance of winning money, but 
you eliminate the possibility of losing your tongue" and 
(we need to add) the preference for winning the money is 
quite strong but the preference for not losing your 
tongue is much stronger. If prudent choices are those 
which are based upon knowledge of the probabilities and 
values of consequences then the prudent choice will be to 
act in a way which maximises expected value ie. to guess 
that she is under 40. 
In the context of establishing a general principle the 
assigned probabilities will reflect our estimate of the 
frequency of different consequences given a choice of 
action in that type of situation. They will be based 
upon, using Ayer's terminology (1972 p.27-28), 
'statistical judgments' which apply to sets of persons or 
situations, and not upon 'judgments of credibility' which 
apply to individual persons or situations. For example, 
if members of the royal family (wholly disguised) often 
ask me to guess their ages, then the assigned 
probabilities which determine my derived preferences 
might, say, be based upon my knowledge of the proportion 
of royals who are over 40. 
In such a model the choice of principle is based upon 
maximising expected value. 	 This is the sort of model 
which Hare seems to recommend (1981 p.156): "the method 
to be employed is one which will select moral principles 
for use at the intuitive level .. on the score of their 
acceptance utility, ie. on the ground that they are the 
set of principles whose general acceptance .. will do the 
best, all told, for the interests" of all. 
However, elsewhere Hare talks of selecting those moral 
principles which will yield actions having the "greatest 
possible conformity to" (1981 p.46), or "most nearly 
approximating to" (1981 p.50,61) those which would be 
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performed if we were able to use critical thinking all 
the time. It is not clear what this might mean. If we 
were capable of such thinking then, in the prudential 
example above, we would presumably act differently upon 
different occasions - sometimes guessing over 40 and 
sometimes under 40 depending upon what we knew the age to 
be. In what way would actions guided by principle (such 
that we always guessed under 40) 'approximate' to those 
guided by critical thinking? On some occasions they 
would be the same, on others they would be different. 
Perhaps Hare intends to claim that moral principles 
selected by such a method will yield actions which are 
more likely (when compared with those selected by other 
methods) to be like those which would be performed if we 
were able to use critical thinking all the time. As Hare 
says (1981 p.137), if an "intuition is one which ought to 
be inculcated .. [then] the most likely way of doing the 
right thing .. will be to follow the intuition". 
But, in the prudential example above, acting according to 
principle is not the most likely way of doing the 'right 
thing'. If the right thing to do in each situation is 
what one would do if one knew all the consequences then, 
in the example, the right thing to do will more often be 
to guess over 40. Following the principle, in this case, 
ensures that the probability of doing the right thing on 
each occasion is less than one would achieve if one 
guessed at random. 
Other principles which involve a concern for the 
preferences of others will have a similar result. 	 If, 
for example, I am considering preference satisfaction in 
order to decide whether I should, in general, put away 
sharp tools after use then I will, say, balance the 
inconvenience of putting them away against the 
probability of injury to my children. Consideration of 
overall preference satisfaction will yield the principle 
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'put away sharp tools' but (if the probability of injury 
is less than half) the balance of preference satisfaction 
on each occasion will more often be in favour of not 
putting away the tools. 
We have here two models for the selection of moral 
principles. 	 The first model is based upon maximising 
overall preference satisfaction (or acceptance utility, 
or expected value) over a range of situations. 	 The 
second model is based upon maximising the number of 
situations in which preference satisfaction is maximised 
(ie. maximising the number of occasions on which we 'do 
right'). 
Others have, in a Utilitarian context, spoken as if 
principles or rules are to be arrived at by means of the 
second model. For example, Rawls (1955 p.18) says that 
according to the summary conception of rules (which 
applies to those rules not embedded in a practice) "One 
is pictured as estimating on what percentage of cases 
likely to arise a given rule may be relied upon to 
express the correct decision, that is, the decision that 
would be arrived at if one were to correctly apply the 
utilitarian principle case by case.". 	 But rules not 
embedded in a practice can be arrived at in different 
ways: we can use our knowledge of a range of situations 
to ground rules which may be relied upon to maximise 
'correct' decisions, or to ground rules which may be 
relied upon to maximise overall preference satisfaction. 
However, to adopt a principle based upon maximising 
correct decisions over a range of situations is to ignore 
the strength of our preference for the action which 
maximises preference satisfaction in each situation. It 
is to ignore, for example, the fact that I have a very 
strong preference that the tools be put away in those 
situations where an injury will occur if they are left 
out and I have only a very weak preference that they be 
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left out in other situations. To ignore this fact is to 
treat the maximisation of preference satisfaction in each 
situation as if it always had the same value. To do this 
would be to adopt a theory in which moral rightness in 
each situation is measured by maximisation of preference 
satisfaction, but in which the aim is to maximise 
occurrences of morally right action. 
We could attempt to ensure the rejection of such a theory 
by requiring acceptance of the proposition that we should 
use the same form of thinking when selecting a principle 
for a given range of situations as we would use in making 
a judgment for a particular situation. 	 That is, we 
should adopt a form of thinking in which we acquire 
preferences for different types of case within the range 
(the frequency of situations of each case corresponding 
to the probability of occurrence) and form a judgment on 
the basis of the strengths (and frequencies) of those 
preferences in the same way as we would do on the basis 
of preferences relating to one situation. 
This proposition is implicit in Hare's theory. It is in 
fact essential to his characterisation of the form of 
thinking used in making moral judgments for a particular 
situation. For that involves acquiring preferences for a 
range of hypothetical situations identical to the actual 
situation. 
However, this proposition will not be sufficient. 	 We 
could use just such a form of thinking in selecting 
principles but use it to select principles for those 
ranges of situations corresponding to the different types 
of case on which our judgments of probability are based. 
Thus, in the sharp tools example, we could select a 
principle for the range of situations in which an injury 
will not occur and select a different principle for the 
range of situations in which an injury will occur. We 
may then use our judgments of probability as a guide to 
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the application of a principle in each particular 
situation. 	 If we then always apply the principle for 
that type of case which has the highest probability 
within the wider range of situations we will (once again) 
prescribe in a way which maximises correct decisions. In 
the example, we will always prescribe 'leave out the 
sharp tools'. 
The rejection of a theory which was (in this way) based 
upon maximising right action would require the acceptance 
of the further proposition that we should select 
principles only for those ranges of situations which are 
such that we can identify particular instances. 	 We 
cannot identify those situations in which injury will not 
occur but we can identify situations in which sharp tools 
have been used. 	 This second proposition concerns the 
role of our judgments of probability. It insists that 
those judgments are used in the selection of the 
principle for action rather than in its application. 
It seems to me that this second proposition cannot be 
derived from Hare's analysis of our moral language. That 
analysis points to a requirement that we universalise our 
moral prescriptions and in so doing take account of what 
those prescriptions mean through determining consequences 
and strengths of preferences for those consequences. It 
does not place any constraints upon the range of 
situations over which we universalise when selecting 
general principles. 
Both propositions are, perhaps, implicit in a 
'traditional' Utilitarian approach. That approach has as 
its starting point the value of maximising preference 
satisfaction. An action, principle, institution etc. is 
good insofar as it is conducive to that end. A principle 
which is selected on the basis of the two propositions 
will be conducive to that end. 
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Hare's 'rationalist thesis' is, however, an attempt to 
avoid such a starting point and to ground a moral theory 
in an analysis of the logic of our moral language. Hare 
attempts to show that the logic of that language 
generates a view of right action which requires that we 
ought to maximise preference satisfaction on each 
occasion. 	 But the theory cannot (by its very nature) 
provide grounds for a 'traditional' response to the fact 
of our imperfection. The theory cannot, it seems to me, 
tell us whether we as imperfect ought to try to maximise 
preference satisfaction overall or whether we ought 
rather to try to maximise preference satisfaction as 
often as possible. 
Aiming to maximise the frequency of right action is one 
way of approximating to consistent right action, and such 
an aim seems to be entirely compatible with Hare's 
theory. That aim will, however, sometimes generate very 
different principles to those generated by aiming to 
maximise preference satisfaction overall. 	 Hare is, of 
course, able to interpret the theory (in the light of our 
imperfection) in either way but that interpretation 
cannot appeal to the logic of our moral language. We 
have here a further (and, I believe, significant) gap in 
Hare's "highly rationalist thesis". 
The benevolent archangel as ideal for imperfect agents. 
A moral theory based upon the ideal of the benevolent 
archangel attaches value to a form of thinking involving 
knowledge and acquisition of preferences (through 
benevolent identification) and knowledge of consequences. 
There may be different ways in which we could attempt to 
live up to that ideal; that is, different ways in which 
we could interpret the ideal in the light of our 
unavoidable imperfection. 
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We could, for example, try to know and acquire as many 
preferences as possible, and to know as many consequences 
as possible, in each situation that presents itself. 
That is, we could make our best attempt to live up to the 
ideal in each situation. But, in almost all situations, 
our knowledge of consequences and preferences will be 
woefully inadequate; and, even where it appears adequate, 
we may always have taken wrong account of (or left out of 
account) some crucial factor which would reverse our 
judgment. The first step in interpreting the ideal, in 
the context of our imperfection, is to reject this route 
on the basis that the knowledge we are able to acquire 
would seldom be adequate. 
We could, alternatively, try to respond to the features 
of certain types of situation in a way which resembled 
the benevolent archangel's response to the features of 
each particular situation. That is, we could attempt to 
use a form of thinking based upon acquisition of 
preferences and knowledge of consequences relating to 
actions within a range of situations. But the discussion 
in the previous section has shown that there are 
different ways in which we could do this. 
In the previous section two propositions were given 
stipulating that: 
in selecting moral principles for a range of 
situations one should 
1. consider a range of situations which is such that 
one can know whether a particular situation is 
within that range (one may thus include several 
types of case and therefore need to make use of 
judgments of probability); 
2. consider the strengths (and frequencies based upon 
judgments of probability) of preferences for 
situations across that range in the same way as one 
considers those for one situation. 
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These two propositions ensure an approach to the 
selection of principles which takes account both of 
strengths of preferences and of probabilities. They are 
therefore consistent with an approach which aims to yield 
principles conducive to the overall maximisation of 
preference satisfaction. This is not, of course, an aim 
which is directly entailed by a theory founded upon the 
universal ideal of the benevolent archangel but it will 
be the case that I shall incorporate those two 
propositions within the interpretation offered of that 
ideal. 
However, before offering that more detailed 
interpretation, I wish to clarify the relationship 
between the two propositions and the two models of 
selecting principles - aiming to maximise overall 
preference satisfaction and aiming to maximise 'right' 
action. Such clarification will, I hope, be of help when 
I attempt to justify the incorporation of the two 
propositions. 
It is possible to pursue the aim of maximising overall 
preference satisfaction in a manner which goes against 
the two propositions. Those propositions require that we 
use knowledge of probabilities in the selection of 
principles. 	 Suppose, contrary to that proposition, we 
select different principles for different types of case 
within a given range of situations and then use knowledge 
of probabilities as a guide to the application of those 
principles. 	 We may then adopt one of the following 
strategies: 
a. always apply the principle for that type of case 
which has the highest probability within the wider 
range of situations (as in the previous section); 
b. attempt to apply the principle for each type of 
case with a frequency which approximates to the 
proportion given by the probability within the wider 
range of situations. 
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If we adopt the second strategy and achieve a good match 
then we may not only increase the occurrence of right 
action but we may also increase overall preference 
satisfaction. To adopt the second strategy and simply 
apply at random principles for each type of case would, 
presumably, be irrational. But it may be that, although 
I do not know the type of case in each situation, I can 
make a 'good guess' and, in this way, attempt to 
correctly match a high proportion of cases. 
For example, I may believe that when I cannot hear 
children in the house then this is a situation in which 
injury will not occur if I leave out the sharp tools. I 
may then apply the principle 'leave out the tools' when I 
cannot hear children and otherwise apply the principle 
'put away the tools'. If, as a result, cases in which 
children pick up the sharp tools which have been left out 
are extremely rare then I will have succeeded in 
increasing right action (as compared with always leaving 
out the tools) and I may also have succeeded in 
increasing overall preference satisfaction (as compared 
with always putting away the tools). 
I shall call someone who adopts such a strategy a 'moral 
gambler'. A moral gambler is willing to use a guide to 
application of principles before he knows whether it is a 
reliable guide. If he is a good gambler then he will in 
fact succeed in increasing overall preference 
satisfaction. Given a consequentialist approach then the 
principles selected by a moral gambler are good 
principles if action guided by those principles does 
increase overall preference satisfaction. The principles 
will achieve this if it turns out to be the case that the 
gambler's method of applying those principles achieves a 
sufficiently good match. 
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But the point is that the moral gambler is willing to 
take a chance on this being so. 	 The moral gambler's 
approach to applying principles may outstrip his 
knowledge. 
Any approach in which knowledge of the probabilities (of 
different types of case within a range of situations) is 
used in the application, rather than the selection, of 
principles makes no use of our knowledge of the strength 
of preferences for the actions prescribed for each type 
of case. 	 An approach of the sort which I have just 
described not only makes no use of that knowledge of 
preferences but also is not based upon knowledge of the 
type of case which a given situation represents (it is, 
at best, based upon successful speculation or guess-
work). 
The two propositions given earlier would ensure that 
knowledge of strengths of preferences for, and 
probabilities of, different types of case within a range 
of situations is used in the selection of principles. 
They would also ensure that application of such 
principles, in each situation, is based upon knowledge of 
the type of case which that situation represents. Our 
approach to the application of principles could not then 
outstrip our knowledge. 	 For these reasons I shall 
incorporate those propositions into the interpretation of 
the universal ideal of the benevolent archangel in the 
context of our imperfection. 
However, the moral gambler may reappear despite the 
constraints which this interpretation places upon our 
thinking. The moral gambler is willing to try out guides 
to the application of principles and see how they go. He 
may also be willing to try out different principles. 
That is, he may be willing to select and adopt principles 
for a range of situations even though he lacks sufficient 
knowledge of the strengths of preferences for, and 
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probabilities of, the different types of case within that 
range. 	 The moral gambler's approach to selecting 
principles may outstrip his knowledge. 	 I shall, 
therefore, incorporate a third proposition so that we now 
have: 
in selecting moral principles for a range of 
situations one should 
1. consider a range of situations which is such that 
the knowledge one has of preferences and 
probabilities is sufficient as a basis for 
judgment; 
2. consider a range of situations which is such that 
one can know whether a particular situation is 
within that range (one may thus include several 
types of case and therefore need to make use of 
judgments of probability); 
3. consider the strengths (and frequencies based upon 
judgments of probability) of preferences for 
situations across that range in the same way as one 
considers those for one situation. 
The ideal thus interpreted requires that moral judgments 
are based only upon knowledge of consequences, 
preferences and probabilities. Someone whose judgments 
outstrip such knowledge lacks moral worth even if those 
judgments lead to action which increases overall 
preference satisfaction. The moral gambler who selects 
principles, and uses guides to application of those 
principles, which turn out to be 'best' in 
consequentialist terms, nevertheless lacks moral worth. 
The moral gambler is not irrational; his judgments are 
based upon his knowledge but they outstrip that 
knowledge; he relies upon speculation or guess-work and 
is, for that reason, immoral. 
If we are not constrained in a way which conforms to the 
three propositions then our judgment (when selecting or 
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applying principles) may outstrip our knowledge - we then 
lack (what I shall call) 'cognitive humility'. The ideal 
thus interpreted requires that our moral judgment be 
constrained by such cognitive humility. 
Before going further, I wish to emphasise that I am not 
claiming that the features of this interpretation are 
entailed by the adoption of that ideal. 	 Just as the 
concept of right action which is embodied in Hare's 
theory does not (I have claimed) entail a particular 
account of a 'good principle' of action, so too the 
concept of an ideal agent which is embodied in the theory 
here outlined does not entail a particular account of the 
'imperfectly good' agent. 
The theory here outlined has offered a concept of an 
ideal agent and a (so far) partial interpretation of that 
ideal in the context of our imperfection. But the nature 
of the argument I shall offer for adoption of the ideal 
given by the theory will not be such as to require a 
relationship of entailment between the ideal and its 
interpretation. Hare's rationalist approach does require 
a relationship of entailment since the aim is to ground 
the theory in an appeal to logic and the facts. 	 He 
cannot ground the theory in such an appeal and then 
elaborate the theory in a way which requires appeal to a 
new element - for example, to the value of overall 
maximisation of preference satisfaction. 
The approach which I shall take to providing 'grounds' 
for the theory will be of a far less ambitious nature. 
Both the ideal and the interpretation will be argued for 
in the next chapter but I shall merely try to argue that 
the ideal as interpreted entails a morality which we have 
reason to let into our lives and, especially, into the 
lives of those we educate. 
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The role of cognitive humility. 
So far the interpretation of the ideal of the benevolent 
archangel describes a form of thinking which will result 
in the selection of principles for action; that is, 
prescriptions for a range of situations which may be very 
wide or very narrow. I shall continue to refer to all 
such forms of thinking as 'critical thinking'. The ideal 
draws us towards thinking which would result in 
prescriptions for ranges which are less wide (ultimately 
to prescriptions for particular situations) but cognitive 
humility restrains us in such a way as to ensure that 
those ranges are not so narrow that our thinking 
outstrips our knowledge. 
However, we are still at (what Hare would call) the 
'critical' level in which we deliberate in order to 
select moral principles. We have not yet discussed the 
'intuitive' level in which we act (without such 
deliberation) in accordance with such principles. 	 For 
Hare, if an action is thus in accordance with principle 
then it has moral worth. In the theory here outlined, 
this cannot be sufficient and is not necessary. 	 An 
action has moral worth if it arises from a form of 
thinking which in some way resembles that of the 
benevolent archangel. An action which is in accordance 
with principle but does not arise from such 'critical 
thinking' has mere 'legality'. 
We might propose that an action has moral worth if: 
the action arises from a disposition to act according 
to principle and that disposition, in turn, arises 
from critical thinking. 
This would be sufficient to ensure that we had a theory 
which was not self-effacing. Anyone whose actions thus 
had moral worth would not believe that action according 
to principle was morally right simply as such. He would 
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believe it was morally right because the prescription is 
given by a principle which results from critical 
thinking. 
However, such a person may well be tempted to question 
the results of such thinking when faced by a particular 
situation. He may attempt to prescribe for a narrower 
range of situations than that covered by the principle 
and, in so doing, to act against the principle. 
From a consequentialist perspective, we would need a 
disposition which is strong enough to prevent this 
because without such a disposition overall preference 
satisfaction may be reduced. From that perspective, the 
foundation of that disposition does not matter so long as 
it is effective. 	 Williams claims that in order to be 
effective it must be based upon 'moral repugnance' - we 
will be (sufficiently) strongly disposed to act according 
to principle only if we believe that such actions are 
morally right (simply as such) and if we recoil from 
actions which are morally wrong. It is this claim which 
leads him to refer to the 'deeply uneasy gap' between 
theory and action which may be characteristic of a two-
level consequentialist theory. 
From the perspective of our theory we ought to be 
restrained by cognitive humility. 
	 We ought to be 
restrained in this way not because a lack of such 
restraint would reduce overall preference satisfaction 
but, rather, because such humility is intrinsic to the 
view of moral worth outlined by the theory. 
If, as a result of critical thinking, I am (for example) 
disposed to always tell the truth then I may be inclined 
to use critical thinking in order to determine whether 
that prescription is appropriate in a particular 
situation (or less general type of situation). 
	 I may 
then ask myself, say, whether in this situation (or type 
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of situation) x would not mind being deceived, y would 
derive some large benefit which cannot be achieved 
another way, and no other harm would result. If I ask 
this then cognitive humility ought to ensure that I also 
ask 'Do I know?' and, if the answer is 'No', it ought 
also to ensure that I retreat to the prescription for the 
more general type of situation. 
Cognitive humility is a feature which is central to our 
interpretation of the ideal of the benevolent archangel. 
We fail to have cognitive humility insofar as we permit 
our moral thinking to outstrip our knowledge. To fail to 
have cognitive humility is to fail to live up to the 
ideal for it is to engage in deliberations which are not 
based only upon knowledge - they are also based upon 
speculation or guess-work. The ideal requires that we 
recoil from this. 
Partiality to self. 
In the last section I said that we might propose the 
following criterion for the moral worth of an action: 
the action arises from a disposition to act according 
to principle and that disposition, in turn, arises 
from critical thinking. 
But there is an alternative disposition which I wish to 
discuss at some length because, I believe, it may involve 
features which would significantly affect the 'strength' 
and persistence of the disposition. My initial approach 
to that alternative will be based upon an attempt to take 
some account of such human weaknesses as partiality to 
self. 
Such weaknesses may mean that even if we were able to 
engage in perfect critical thinking (that is, thinking 
which was identical to that of a benevolent archangel and 
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was thus aimed at prescribing for one particular 
situation), we might nevertheless not act in a way which 
conformed to the results of such thinking. 
	 It may be 
that at the moment of such deliberation we could not but 
be disposed to act in such a way, but the moment of 
deliberation may not be the moment of action. 
	 The 
opportunity for action may not be immediate and/or the 
performance of the action may take time. In that time 
our weakness may assert itself. 
Such a weakness may consist, in part, of our inability to 
reaffirm such a deliberation through time. 
	 We may be 
disposed to exercise our ability to deliberate in this 
way but we may also be disposed to deliberate in a way 
which, say, takes account only of our own preferences. 
We may be unable to sustain the former deliberation, and 
the resulting prescription, through the time required for 
completion of the action. 
One response to such a weakness might be for us to 
attempt to sustain some of the features which gave rise 
to the prescription. In arriving at such a prescription 
we will have acquired (through benevolent identification) 
those significant positive preferences the satisfaction 
of which represents the advantages of acting according to 
the prescription and those significant negative 
preferences the satisfaction of which represents the 
disadvantages of acting otherwise. 
	 On the assumption 
that the prescription is correct, such preferences (or 
some subsets of them) will jointly outweigh those 
preferences which relate to the disadvantages of acting 
according to the prescription and the advantages of 
acting otherwise. 	 I shall call such preferences the 
'decisive' preferences in relation to the prescription 
for a particular situation. 
For example, suppose that I am capable of perfect 
critical thinking and that my attempt to decide whether 
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we (myself and spouse) ought to invite an aged parent to 
share our home is based upon knowledge that: our children 
love being with him; he generally prefers his own 
company, is indifferent to our company but enjoys being 
with our children; we find his presence disruptive and 
his company irksome; we, nevertheless, worry about his 
living alone; he would dislike the rules and restrictions 
involved in alternative accomodation; and so on. Suppose 
the strengths of significant preferences are as follows: 
our home 	 parents own 	 alternative 
(distant) 	 (closer) 
parent 	 company 	 1 independence 	 2 rules etc 	 -4 
children 	 company 	 5 occasional visits 1 	 frequent visits 3 
myself+spouse disruption -5 worry 	 -4 cost 	 -2 
total 	 1 	 -1 	 -3 
The result of a deliberation which involved acquiring all 
such preferences through benevolent identification would 
be the prescription 'invite the parent'. 
	 The decisive 
preferences are those relating to the (smallest set of) 
advantages of the prescription and the (smallest set of) 
disadvantages of each alternative such that, when we 
compare the prescription with each alternative in turn, 
these jointly outweigh all the disadvantages of the 
prescription and all the advantages of that alternative. 
Thus, the decisive preferences are those relating to 
company for our children if he were to come to our home, 
our worry if he were to stay in his own home, and his 
feelings if he were to go to alternative accommodation. 
The suggested response to our weakness involves our 
attempting to maintain our benevolent identification with 
the decisive preferences, and to discount all other 
preferences, through the time required for completion of 
the action prescribed in a particular situation. Such a 
Morality and education in the light of our imperfection. 
238 
response may enhance the ability to maintain a 
disposition to act according to the prescription which 
results from deliberating in the manner of our ideal 
agent. 	 Thus, in the example, if we find that our 
preference for avoiding disruption is beginning to assert 
itself, and threatening to influence our action, then we 
should put it out of our mind and remind ourselves of 
just how our children would feel if he were to come to 
our home, and so on - we should focus on those 
preferences which our critical thinking showed to be 
decisive. 
If we were disposed in this way to focus upon decisive 
preferences then we would be disposed to reaffirm our 
critical thinking without the necessity for a detailed 
repetition of that thinking. 	 Such a disposition would 
underpin a disposition to act according to the results of 
critical thinking in a way which, I believe, would 
enhance our ability to maintain that disposition over 
time. 	 More importantly (perhaps), the disposition to 
focus upon decisive preferences also provides a means of 
giving an alternative account of moral worth at the 
'intuitive' level. 
Decisive preferences and general moral principles. 
Most of us are seldom capable of perfect critical 
thinking aimed at prescribing for one particular 
situation. Many people (especially the very young) are 
not capable of critical thinking even in the context of 
very general principles. Ought such people to behave in 
a way which merely conforms to principle? 
According to the theory here outlined, actions which 
merely conform to principle have no moral worth (they 
have mere 'legality'). To tell the truth because one has 
been 'educated' to do so, or wishes to please the moral 
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educator, or fears punishment, or expects reward, or 
finds telling the truth pleasurable, or believes truth 
telling is right simply as such, is here (as for Kant) to 
lack moral worth. If our actions are to have moral worth 
they must stem from a form of thinking which in some way 
resembles that of the benevolent archangel - they must in 
some way stem from knowledge of the consequences of our 
actions and benevolent identification with the 
preferences of others. 
Each person may have very different preferences. 	 Each 
may have preferences which others lack and preferences 
which are stronger or weaker than the same preferences 
possessed by others. As Mackie, and others, might say: 
"different people have irresolvably different views of 
the good life" (Mackie 1977 p.169). 
	 But there are 
preferences which all (or most) share. Such preferences 
may be for those things which are prerequisites to the 
pursuit of our 'good life': to avoid injury, to keep what 
is ours, to not have false beliefs, to go where we 
choose. Other such preferences may be more fundamental: 
to be free from physical pain, to eat when hungry. 
This is not to claim that all (or any) such preferences 
are a necessary part of human 'nature'. Nor is it to 
claim - as Foot claims (1958 p.11-12) - that they are 
wants which refer to benefits which "a man has reason to 
want if he wants anything" or to harms which are 
"necessarily something bad and therefore something which 
as such anyone always has reason to avoid". 
	 Such 
preferences may arise out of the social conditions and 
culture in which we find ourselves. But in each society 
or culture there will be a set of preferences which are 
in this way strong and pervasive. 
Not only are such 'central' preferences shared by 
(nearly) all but also the opportunities for us to act in 
ways which have consequences for their satisfaction are 
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extremely extensive. In almost every situation in which 
we find ourselves we have the opportunity to lie to, or 
steal from, or hit, or kill, or coerce others and thus to 
affect the satisfaction of the central preferences of 
others. Furthermore, situations in which such actions as 
these would bring significant benefit, or avoid 
significant harm, to ourselves or others are, 
comparatively, extremely rare. 
Thus, across the widest possible range of situations, 
central preferences will be decisive in relation to 
prescriptions such as 'do not hit'. 	 We do not need 
knowledge of the probabilities of different types of case 
within that range to determine that this is so; knowledge 
of the extensiveness of our opportunities and the 
strength and pervasiveness of the preference is 
sufficient. 
If such preferences are in this way decisive then we 
ought to focus upon them in the way that was outlined in 
the previous section. 	 That is, we ought to strive to 
maintain our benevolent identification with those 
preferences, and to discount all other preferences, in 
those situations where we may be tempted to act against 
prescriptions such as 'do not hit'. If we were disposed 
in this way to focus upon decisive preferences then we 
would be disposed to reaffirm our critical thinking 
without the necessity for a detailed repetition of that 
thinking. 	 Such a disposition would underpin a 
disposition to act according to the results of critical 
thinking in all such situations. 
Even if we are not capable of critical thinking we may 
well be capable of focussing on such preferences. We may 
know that hitting will cause physical pain to the other 
person and we may be able (since we also have that 
preference) to benevolently identify with the preference 
of that person not to suffer physical pain. 	 If our 
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actions stem from such a focus then they stem from 
knowledge of decisive consequences and benevolent 
identification with the decisive preferences of others. 
Thus I propose the following criterion for the moral 
worth of an action: 
the action arises from benevolent identification with 
the decisive preferences of those involved. 
If I do not hit you because I want you not to suffer 
physical pain (just as you want not to suffer) then my 
action has moral worth. If I do not lie to you because I 
want you not to have false beliefs (just as you want not 
to have false beliefs) then my action has moral worth. 
Dispositions to act in such ways are dispositions to be 
motivated by the features of a situation which are, in 
fact, morally decisive in relation to those actions. 
Such dispositions may arise from critical thinking and, 
as we saw in the previous section, that would be a 
rational response to our weakness. Thus the disposition 
to focus in this way upon certain preferences will be a 
characteristic of the imperfect moral agent at every 
level of critical thinking (from the most general to the 
most particular). What I am proposing here is that it 
also be a characteristic of the imperfect moral agent at 
the intuitive level - the level at which no critical 
thinking has taken place. 
In the context of our imperfection the ideal that 
we ought all to be (more like) a benevolent archangel 
will thus require that we be disposed to: 
focus upon decisive preferences; 
engage in critical thinking; 
be restrained by cognitive humility. 
For those capable of critical thinking, the disposition 
to focus upon decisive preferences can be and ought to be 
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informed and underpinned by, or arise out of, critical 
thinking constrained by cognitive humility. 	 For those 
not (yet) capable of critical thinking the aim of moral 
education must be to develop an ability and inclination 
to benevolently identify with the (decisive) preferences 
of others. The aim of moral education cannot simply be 
the development of a disposition to act in accordance 
with the critical thinking of others. Actions ought not 
to be merely 'right' they ought to have moral worth. If 
the actions of those educated have no moral worth then 
moral education has not begun. 
Morality and education in the light of our imperfection. 
CHAPTER 11. 
An educational approach to moral theory. 
Summary. 
Human nature, moral intuitions and decision procedures. 
The benevolent archangel as an educational ideal. 
Morality and the limits of philosophy. 
Summary. 
Hare's moral theory has the following features: 
the informed preferences of each individual are to be 
given a weight in our moral deliberation which 
corresponds to their strength; 
moral judgment involves a comparison of alternative 
actions which is based upon knowledge of preferences 
and consequences; 
the morally right action in each situation is that 
which would maximise the preference satisfaction of 
all concerned; 
moral judgment aimed at selecting general principles 
for action will yield principles which would ensure 
overall maximisation of preference satisfaction; 
in determining general principles moral judgment will 
yield principles for action which conform to moral 
'intuition'; 
a sound moral education will result in a reluctance 
to act according to moral judgment which does not 
thus conform to moral intuition. 
That theory is founded upon an appeal to the 'logic' of 
our moral language. 
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A theory which is derived from the universal ideal of the 
benevolent archangel shares all the features listed above 
but two of those features acquire a new significance. 
Firstly, a respect for the informed preferences of others 
is extended to include the second-order preferences (the 
personal ideals) of others. Such preferences need not be 
construed in terms of degree of attainment of personal 
first-order preference satisfaction. 	 The moral theory 
outlined takes account of the fact that we can and do 
strive to be other than we are but does not insist that 
this should be seen in terms of the struggle to satisfy 
the preferences we now have - it does not insist upon a 
reductionist utilitarian perspective in the context of 
personal ideals. Benevolence demands a concern for the 
preference satisfaction of others but it does not demand 
that our concern for ourselves should only be a concern 
for the satisfaction of our preferences. The utilitarian 
theory offered here is not based upon the value of 
preference satisfaction in the way that the 
utilitarianism of (for example) Mill is based upon the 
value of happiness. 
Secondly, if we are to have moral worth then a reluctance 
to act against general moral principles cannot be based 
upon a habit successfully instilled, or upon a 
'knowledge' of right and wrong, or upon a desire to 
please our educators. It must be based upon cognitive 
humility and a disposition to focus upon decisive 
preferences. A moral education which develops the moral 
worth of the agent will ensure that whenever we are 
inclined, in a given situation, to question the 
application of such principles that inclination will be 
inhibited by the focus upon decisive preferences and that 
questioning will be constrained by cognitive humility. 
The ideal (as interpreted in the previous chapter) 
entails several further features which stem from the 
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direct commitment to benevolence and the direct rejection 
of malevolence. 
I claimed (in chapter 7) that Hare's indirect approach to 
the rejection of malevolence rests upon an over-
optimistic view of the prevalence of sadistic 
inclinations and our ability to redirect them. It seems 
to me that, just as a direct commitment to benevolence is 
a feature of our 'intuitive' moral views, so also is the 
direct rejection of malevolence. 	 Such a view may be 
justified, in part, by a recognition that Hare's view is 
over-optimistic; we recognise that, just as we can all be 
moved by the joy of others, so too we can all desire the 
suffering and frustration of others. Human history not 
only inspires through its examples of pure benevolence 
but also repels through its endless succession of 
examples of pure malevolence between individuals, groups, 
societies and races. 
But it is not only the case that Hare's view may be over-
optimistic it is also, and more importantly, the case 
that it fails to respond to the fundamental difference 
between bringing about an outcome in order to satisfy my 
preference and bringing about an outcome in order to 
satisfy or frustrate a preference which I know to be 
yours. It is a feature of human nature that we do not 
benefit or harm others only in order to bring about an 
outcome which we already prefer - we have pure 
benevolence and pure malevolence. 
It is this difference which Schopenhauer made use of in 
claiming that there are three basic human motives: self-
interest, benevolence and malevolence. To a greater or 
lesser degree, we are all motivated in these ways. The 
direct rejection of malevolence stems from a recognition 
that malevolent preferences are not simply self-
interested preferences the satisfaction of which 
unfortunately reduces the preference satisfaction of 
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others. As Schopenhauer (1851 p.136-139) says, "everyone 
bears within him something altogether morally bad" and 
the worst and most distinctive trait of wickedness that 
we possess is that which leads us to take pleasure in the 
frustration and suffering of others, to "torment another 
simply for the sake of tormenting". 
	 Malevolence and 
benevolence correspond to aspects of our nature which are 
fundamentally different to that of self-interest. 
The theory here outlined gives rise to the claim that the 
moral worth of an agent is related to the way in which he 
is motivated by the preferences of others - it is 
centrally about becoming benevolent and ceasing to be 
malevolent. Moral worth involves (at most) judging as if 
we were members of a community of benevolent archangels 
and being, thereby, motivated to act; and (at least) 
judging on the basis of benevolence towards those 
preferences which a more complete judgment would reveal 
to be decisive. Thus, according to the theory, the moral 
worth of an individual cannot be seen in terms of how 
conducive that individual is to some end - whether that 
be the maximisation of overall preference satisfaction or 
the absence of lies. 
If this were all then it would still be possible to claim 
that, although the moral worth of an agent is determined 
in this way, nevertheless morality is centrally about the 
'legality' (the moral worth) of our actions. 
	 Those 
having moral worth would (as a result of their 
benevolence) wish to ensure that others act rightly 
(either in a particular situation or in general) and they 
might consider that the best way of achieving that is to 
ensure that the behaviour of others conforms to general 
moral principles (by whatever means is most effective). 
But the theory here outlined is based upon the universal 
ideal of the benevolent archangel. The theory consists 
only of that ideal and its interpretation in the context 
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of our imperfection. That theory assigns no moral worth 
whatsoever to actions in respect of their legality and 
requires that all ought to be more like the benevolent 
archangel. To ensure only that the actions of others has 
legality is to entirely ignore their (actual or 
potential) moral worth. My desire that you should do 
right has moral worth if it stems from my benevolence; 
but your doing right has moral worth only if it stems 
from your benevolence. 
The theory permits us to say, with Kant, that nothing 
"can be called good without qualification except a good 
will" and that "a good will is good not because of what 
it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the 
attainment of some proposed end, but simply in virtue of 
the volition". But the theory also permits us to say 
(again, perhaps, with Kant) that not only ought we not to 
treat others merely as a means to our own satisfaction 
but also that we ought not to treat others merely as a 
means to right (ie. to the satisfaction of all). 
	 As 
moral agents each of us is, in this sense, an end in 
himself. 
Moral education, therefore, cannot simply aim to instil a 
sense of right and wrong in terms of a disposition to 
obey such principles as 'do not lie'. 
	 It must be 
concerned with benevolence and non-malevolence as the 
motivation for our action and as the inspiration for our 
lives. 	 A capacity and disposition to determine the 
consequences of our actions and to benevolently identify 
with the preferences of others is the beginning and end 
of moral education. 
There cannot be, therefore, a 'deeply uneasy gap' between 
the spirit of the theory and the spirit it justifies. 
Truth-telling, loyalty, and so on do, in a sense, have 
instrumental and not intrinsic value. 
	 But they are 
instrumental in satisfying the preferences of others (not 
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to be deceived for example) and our desire to satisfy 
such preferences stems from critical thinking restrained 
by cognitive humility. At all levels it is our knowledge 
of the consequences of our actions and our benevolence 
towards the preferences of others which ought to motivate 
us to act. 
The theory here outlined is, however, not founded upon an 
appeal to logic. It is founded upon the universal ideal 
of the benevolent archangel and the appeal to that ideal 
has not yet been argued. 
Human nature, moral intuitions and decision procedures. 
I have argued that the theory here presented can 
accommodate certain fundamental features of human nature. 
The first of those is the capacity which we have for 
self-evaluation. We are capable not only of evaluating 
the outcomes of our actions but also of evaluating the 
quality of our own motivation. To leave this dimension 
of human agency out of account is to give a hopelessly 
shallow account of what it is to be human. 	 Such a 
dimension gives rise to personal and universal ideals of 
self. 	 The theory incorporates a respect for personal 
ideals of self and is founded upon an appeal to a 
universal ideal. 
The second is our propensity for benevolence and 
malevolence. We do not merely pursue our own interest; 
we are all inclined, to varying degrees, to engage in 
acts of gratuitous malevolence and benevolence. 	 This, 
one might also claim, is a peculiar characteristic of 
human agents. This feature is linked with the first in 
that both require imaginative identification - the first 
with the preferences of an ideal self, the second with 
the preferences of others. Both are linked with prudence 
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insofar as that involves the capacity to imaginatively 
identify with the preferences of one's future self. The 
capacity to identify with, and to be motivated (in 
various ways) by, preferences other than those we now 
have has a central role in the theory. 
These features also provide a means by which we can make 
intelligible the experience which Kant claims is central 
to morality. That is: it is possible to choose to act in 
a way which would lead to something we wanted to avoid 
more than we wanted anything else. Our recognition of 
this possibility may be seen as a recognition of the fact 
that we all can deliberate as if we had preferences other 
than those we now have. Furthermore, that we can do this 
is not just a feature of our human nature it is, 
according to the theory, the feature without which we 
could not have moral worth. 
It is also the case that the theory (as interpreted) 
responds to our imperfection in a way which links us (all 
too imperfect) to the ideal of perfection by means of a 
common motivation. 	 Benevolence, non-malevolence, and 
knowledge of consequences is, whatever the level of 
ability, the source of actions which have moral worth. 
Finally, the theory incorporates or underpins many of our 
moral intuitions. Firstly, it underpins a view of others 
which requires that we treat them as ends and not as 
means. 	 Secondly, it involves a direct commitment to 
benevolence and a direct rejection of malevolence. 
Thirdly, it incorporates a form of thinking which would 
give rise to moral principles largely in accordance with 
moral intuition. 
The last feature is one which the theory has in common 
with other forms of utilitarianism but the first three 
stem from the approach taken here. In requiring a moral 
education which does not result in an 'uneasy gap' 
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between theory and action, and in directly rejecting 
malevolence, the theory (I would claim) conforms even 
more closely with our moral intuitions than does a 
consequentialist utilitarianism. 
The non-consequentialist nature of the theory gives rise 
to the requirement that we engage in a form of thinking, 
rather than that we act according to the results of such 
thinking. But the form of thinking which is required by 
the theory is essentially one that corresponds to a 
preference-based 	 approach 	 to 	 consequentialist 
utilitarianism. Such thinking provides a means not only 
of resolving those moral conflicts which result from 
moral intuition but also, as Sidgwick points out (1874 
Book 4, Chapter 2), of systematising the exceptions to, 
and clarifying the vagueness in, our intuitive moral 
principles. 
Utilitarian theories offer a method of judgment which can 
be applied to selecting very general principles and to 
prescribing for one particular situation. 	 Use of the 
method in these ways can, itself, lead to apparent 
conflict - between the prescription given directly for 
the particular situation and the prescription yielded by 
the principle. In Hare's theory that conflict is removed 
by distinguishing between a good man and a right action. 
The good man is disposed to act according to those 
principles which are most likely to result in an overall 
maximisation of preference satisfaction (the generality 
of those principles will depend upon the sophistication 
and moral self-discipline of the individual concerned -
see Hare 1976 p.34). In the theory presented here the 
good man uses the method to consider a range of 
situations which is such that his knowledge of 
preferences and consequences is sufficient for judgment; 
his focus upon decisive preferences is the result of 
critical thinking restrained by cognitive humility. In 
both theories, the right action is that which would be 
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prescribed as a result of applying the method for the 
particular situation. 
The principles which a good man would obey will be the 
same in either theory - each would be a principle which 
would maximise preference satisfaction over the range of 
situations to which the principle applies and which the 
agent would be disposed to obey. Whichever approach is 
taken, the same method of judgment is used to select 
principles, make prescriptions, resolve conflicts, 
clarify and systematise our intuitions. All of these are 
subject to one and the same criterion of decision. 
Thus (I am claiming) the theory offered here can 
accommodate certain fundamental features of human nature, 
can incorporate or underpin many of our moral intuitions, 
and can offer a uniform criterion of decision. But, even 
if all of these were granted, would that provide any 
reason for our adopting such a theory? 
The benevolent archangel as an educational ideal. 
I have argued against Hare's highly rationalist thesis 
and, more briefly, against Kant's equally rationalist 
thesis. I shall now assume that we cannot ground a moral 
theory in reason; that is, a rational agent may not only 
be immoral or amoral but may also subscribe to one of a 
variety of different sets of moral views. But is it at 
least a requirement of reason that if we have moral views 
then we should have a theory of our morality, we should 
attempt to systematise those moral views in some way? 
Williams argues (1985 Chapter 6) that there is no such 
requirement. 
If we start from our moral intuitions then we may attempt 
to construct a moral theory by, say, representing those 
intuitions in a set of stateable principles, making 
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explicit the relationships between those principles, 
deriving them from some small set of fundamental ideas, 
and resolving conflicts between them by means of some 
kind of decision procedure. 	 In constructing such a 
theory we may modify the theory and, to some extent, the 
intuitions until they roughly fit one another. 
Williams calls this approach 'rationalistic' (1985 p.100) 
and points out that some may feel that such a 
rationalistic approach "simply follows from being 
rational". But, he claims, rational reflection need not 
draw us towards theory and systematisation and "it is 
quite wrong to think that the only alternative to ethical 
theory is to refuse reflection and to remain in 
unreflective prejudice" (1985 p.112). 
With this I can agree. 	 The rational agent need not 
attempt to systematise his moral intuitions and he 
certainly need not attempt to provide some fundamental 
idea or a single decision procedure. 	 As Sen and 
Williams say (1982 introduction): 
"a large question is being begged .. if one assumes 
that the agent is required in rationality to subject 
all .. decisions to one criterion of decision, and it 
is still being begged if one assumes that rationality 
requires that any other criteria of decision must 
themselves be justified by one over-riding 
principle". 
However, if we grant that rationality does not require a 
moral theory of that sort that does not mean, of course, 
that good reasons cannot be given for attempting to 
provide one. It may be the case that the reasons we give 
for providing a moral theory, or for selecting a 
particular moral theory, cannot appeal to some notion of 
rationality; but we may still make a rational choice 
between having this theory or that theory or no theory. 
It may still be the case that there are good reasons for 
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representing our moral intuitions in a set of stateable 
principles, making explicit the relationships between 
those principles, deriving them from some small set of 
fundamental ideas, and resolving conflicts between them 
by means of some kind of decision procedure. 
It is at this point, I believe, that an educational 
perspective is most important. From that perspective the 
primary aim is to promote a particular set of moral 
views. It may be the case that some sets of moral views 
are more easily promoted than others. It will clearly be 
the case that moral views which closely fit the moral 
intuitions of the educatees and educators (parents, 
teachers and others) will be more easily promoted than 
those which do not. It may further be the case that 
moral views which not only underpin and illuminate our 
moral intuitions but also are systematised and founded 
upon some fundamental idea will be more easily promoted 
than those which do not. If this is the case then it 
provides a very good reason for striving to formulate a 
moral theory of that sort. 
The discovery that moral intuitions can not only be 
clarified by critical reflection but can also be derived 
from and illuminated by a fundamental idea may inspire 
and profoundly influence development. It may do so in a 
way which an unsystematised set of moral views will not. 
After reflecting upon our moral intuitions it may be 
perfectly rational to offer a moral view which, say, 
incorporates a number of values or principles which are, 
to various degrees and in various ways, incommensurable 
with one another; but such a view may be less easy to 
promote. As philosophers we may be reluctant to accept 
any moral view which, in any way, goes beyond intuition; 
but as educationalists this may not be the most important 
issue. 
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An educational perspective can provide further reasons 
for adopting such a theory. These relate to the nature 
of the fundamental idea and the way in which that idea 
indicates a certain view of moral development. 	 If the 
view of moral development is one which can be elaborated 
into a clear and practical educational programme then we 
will be all the more inclined to adopt it. 
According to the theory here outlined, moral education 
would begin with a focus upon those central preferences 
which are decisive for the widest possible range of 
situations. We will encourage a disposition to act in a 
certain way (not to hit others) which is such that it 
results from knowledge of consequences (it will hurt him) 
and benevolent identification with the decisive 
preference (he does not want to be hurt). We will also 
foster the ability to determine the consequences of 
actions and to determine and identify with the 
preferences of others - in any situation or type of 
situation. 	 Such an ability can then be used in 
considering situations in which preferences have to be 
compared and balanced. 	 As the ability to thus think 
critically develops we will hope that the focus upon 
decisive preferences will be informed by, or arise out 
of, such thinking constrained by cognitive humility. 
This is a very brief and inadequate description but it is 
sufficient to make clear the way in which the initial 
disposition to identify with the preferences of others 
and consider consequences will provide a thread which 
runs through moral development. 
	 From an educational 
perspective we will want to ask, for example, whether 
such a disposition can appear at an appropriate stage in 
overall development. 
Such a disposition may manifest itself in a reaction to 
the distress of others and action in order to prevent or 
alleviate that distress. Research would seem to indicate 
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that such behaviour occurs at a very early stage of 
development. 	 Bottery (1990 Chapter 7) points to such 
research in order to challenge a view which he attributes 
to Piaget. 	 According to that view, moral development 
presupposes cognitive development and children are, for a 
considerable part of their early life, cognitively 
egocentric - they are simply incapable of taking another 
person's point of view. 	 Bottery calls this the 
cognitive-developmental model and he contrasts this with 
a model in which empathy and cognition develop together. 
For example, in one experiment children of 18 to 24 
months responded to a show of distress by, say, offering 
a doll. The child may learn that other responses are 
more appropriate but, it is claimed, the experiment shows 
that very young children can see how others feel and so 
be motivated to do something. 
In The Emergence of Morality in Young Children (Kagan 
1987) several writers offer evidence of responses by very 
young children which appear to be motivated by knowledge 
of the preferences and feelings of others. Jarrett (1991 
p.38) maintains that "the prerequisites for moral 
behaviour, such as empathy, sensitivity to others' 
distress, and being able to understand what kind of help 
is needed, have their origins very early along" 
It may thus be the case that very young children will act 
to prevent or alleviate distress just because they know 
that is what the other person is feeling. It might also 
be the case that such motivation can occur at a stage 
which is at least as early as alternative motivations -
for example, alleviating distress because the child knows 
that others will approve, or a reward will follow, or it 
is right to do so. If that were so then the view of 
moral development outlined above might begin to 
correspond with views resulting from research into 
overall development. 
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An educational perspective may thus provide a means of 
choosing between particular moral theories (or of 
choosing no theory at all). I shall not attempt to argue 
in any detail that the theory here outlined is (on these 
grounds) worthy of choice for that can only be determined 
empirically. 	 I would argue that the theory underpins 
moral views which closely match intuition and provides an 
ideal which may both inspire and humble - the ideal of 
the benevolent archangel may both inspire us to be other 
than we are and provide us with the humility which stems 
from knowing what we are not. 
Morality and the limits of philosophy. 
My approach involves an appeal to empirical claims in 
justifying adoption of a moral theory. Those empirical 
claims relate to education. If we (teachers, parents and 
others) have a set of moral views such that we believe 
that all ought, say, "to keep their word, to tell the 
truth, to refrain from physical and mental maleficence, 
to be helpful to people in distress or need, and to be 
tolerant and fair" (to quote J.White 1990 p.36) then we 
will wish to educate so that all are disposed to keep 
their word etc.. If systematisation of our moral views 
helps in that aim then, I am claiming, that provides a 
good reason to strive for such systemisation. 	 If 
systemisation in terms of a fundamental ideal helps in 
that aim then that provides a reason to strive for 
systemisation involving such an ideal. 	 If the 
systemisation of our moral views yields a view of moral 
development which corresponds with aspects of overall 
development then that provides further justification. 
From a realist perspective such an approach would appear 
bizarre. 	 We do not choose to teach, say, Einstein's 
theory of relativity because we believe that more 
children would understand physical aspects of phenomena 
An educational approach to moral theory. 
257 
in terms of that theory than would understand physical 
aspects of phenomena in terms of an alternative theory 
(or no theory at all). We teach such a theory because we 
believe that it gives the best account of such phenomena, 
because we believe that (in some sense) it is correct. 
If it were not correct then children who learned such a 
theory would misunderstand such phenomena. 
However, I have assumed that moral realism is false. A 
moral theory relates to motivations and dispositions 
which can be systematised in various ways. The universal 
ideal of the benevolent archangel is not offered as a 
'correct' way of understanding such motivations and 
dispositions (nor of understanding the moral 'facts' 
which a realist would see as underlying them) but, 
rather, it is offered as a way (perhaps the best way) of 
inspiring, strengthening and underpinning those 
motivations and dispositions. 
The choice between theories (or of no theory) is thus 
made on educational grounds. 	 However, it might be 
claimed that the push to theory is merely a push into 
disagreement and away from consensus. We may agree upon 
examples of moral motives, dispositions and behaviours 
but, as J.White claims (1990 Chapter 3), once we begin to 
ask what makes them 'moral' - once we attempt to 
systematise and theorise - then all kinds of divisions 
appear. 
This may well be true; but it may also be true to say 
that such disagreement arises because of the nature of 
the criteria which moral theorists have applied in 
selecting a favoured theory. If we see a moral theory as 
essentially incorporating a rational justification for 
morality (or as revealing the impossibility of such a 
justification) then we will select that theory which 
incorporates the 'best' such justification. Given such 
an approach, a major aspect (the major aspect) of any 
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moral theory will consist of an attempt to provide such a 
justification. The direction in which that attempt takes 
the theorist will determine the nature of the 
systematisation of our moral views which is then offered. 
Even where there is broad agreement upon what would 
constitute such a rational justification, divisions will 
rapidly appear. For example, as Maclntyre claims (1981 
Chapter 5), those involved in the 'Enlightenment project' 
all agreed that the key premisses in such a justification 
"would characterise some feature or features of human 
nature; and the rules of morality would then be explained 
and justified as being those rules which a being 
possessing just such a human nature could be expected to 
accept". But whereas Hume looked to "characteristics of 
the passions", Kant looked to "the universal and 
categorical character of certain rules of reason". 
MacIntyre claims that all such routes to justification 
are doomed because there is an 'ineradicable discrepancy' 
between the shared conception of moral rules and the 
conception of human nature - this is ineradicable since 
the conception of moral rules derives historically from a 
fundamental contrast between man as he is and man as he 
could be if he realised his 'true end'. 	 According to 
Maclntyre, we must, therefore, seek a basis for morality 
in some notion of the good life for man (or the ends of 
human life). 
I would agree with Maclntyre that the enlightenment 
project fails. 
	 We cannot appeal to features of human 
nature (man is such) in order to justify morality (man 
ought to be such). However, I would not agree with the 
claim that "the whole point of ethics - both as a 
theoretical and a practical discipline - is to enable man 
to pass from his present state to his true end" 
(MacIntyre 1981 p.52) for there is (I believe) no 'true' 
end for man. 	 This is not to say that we cannot form 
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notions of a good life, or of a good man, and go on to 
show how these relate to our moral views. 
	 But, I am 
claiming, we should not be asking which such notion is 
true but rather which such notion would best inspire, 
strengthen and underpin those motivations and 
dispositions which we see as constituting morality. 
J.White (1990 p.46) recommends that, when considering 
'moral' education, we should turn away from moral theory 
and concentrate upon various "types of altruistic 
behaviour, reactions or attitudes towards others"; this 
because it is a fact that we cannot come to any agreement 
over which moral theory to select. 
	 If, however, we 
adopted the above criterion for selecting a moral theory 
then, perhaps, we might reach agreement more easily. 
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CHAPTER 12. 
A community of (imperfect) benevolent archangels. 
Aims for education and aims for moral education. 
Moral relativism and moral education. 
Educating for benevolence, non-malevolence and humility. 
Love, humility and assessment. 
Preferability of a community of benevolent archangels. 
Aims for education and aims for moral education. 
In both The Aims of Education Restated and Education and 
the Good Life, J.White offers a systematisation of, and a 
rationale for, our wider educational aims in terms of a 
notion of the well-being of an autonomous pupil. This 
contrasts with his approach to aims for moral education 
where he recommends that we move away from an attempt to 
offer a systematisation and rationale based upon moral 
theory and, instead, look towards the consensus which 
exists with regard to a range of 'altruistic' 
dispositions. His approach to education as a whole is, 
in this way, the reverse of his approach to moral 
education. 
In the Introduction, I claimed that the attempt to 
systematise our wider educational aims in terms of an 
underlying rationale quickly leads to disagreement - we 
reach differing bed-rock commitments at an early stage in 
the justification process. I suggested that we turn away 
from such educational theory and adopt an approach based 
upon practical consensus. Thus my approach to education 
as a whole is also the reverse of my approach to moral 
education - but in both cases I am recommending that we 
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move in the opposite direction to that which J.White 
recommends. 
We could adopt an approach to aims for education as a 
whole which was similar to that which I have recommended 
for moral theory; that is, we could take our shared views 
about the aims of education and attempt to systematise 
them in terms of some fundamental idea. As in the case 
of moral theory, such an approach need not involve an 
attempt to provide a 'rationale' for that systematisation 
of aims - that is, it need not attempt to provide a more 
ultimate justification for those aims. But, firstly, do 
we have shared views about the aims of education; and, 
secondly, what would be the benefits of such a 
systematisation as compared with piecemeal consensus? 
There is substantial agreement over moral views. 	 The 
disagreement comes when we try to systematise and 
theorise. The agreement over aims for education is, I 
believe, much less substantial. 
	 This is not just a 
matter of disagreement over priorities, interpretation 
and attempts to systematise; the disagreement comes 
earlier. This can be seen most clearly if we consider 
dispositions. 	 We might agree that if someone has no 
disposition to help people in distress then their moral 
education has failed. But can we agree that if someone 
has no disposition to pursue (a possible) excellence in 
some field then their education has failed? The same 
question can be repeated in respect of any of the aims 
which are "currently at large in the world of education". 
Ought educated people to be disposed to use their 
knowledge and understanding, to exercise their autonomy, 
to take pleasure in art and culture? 
If, on the other hand, we consider capacities (knowledge, 
skills and understanding) there will be substantial 
agreement over aims. But what would be the benefits of a 
systematisation of those aims in terms of some 
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fundamental idea? We cannot inspire or strengthen a 
capacity in the way in which we can inspire a disposition 
to use that capacity (or to use it in a particular way, 
or to use it in the service of some particular end). 
Agreement over dispositions is less easy because we, 
perhaps, shrink from imposing a way of life or from 
imposing an ideal of self. We can agree over capacities 
because such capacities provide the means to pursue one's 
own view of the good life and one's own ideal self. Our 
reluctance to insist that an educated person should, say, 
take pleasure in art and culture stems from a respect for 
the individual's view of that life and self. 	 The 
universal ideal of the benevolent archangel, as 
interpreted here, enshrines such a respect. However, it 
does (in common with all other moral views) impose an 
ideal, viz: all ought to be (more like) a benevolent 
archangel. 
If we cannot (as I have claimed) provide any 'ultimate 
rational justification' for that ideal then do we have 
any right to impose it by means of moral education? 
Moral relativism and moral education. 
Before considering the issue of 'imposing' moral views 
upon others, I would like to consider the related issue 
of whether our own moral views would or should survive 
the realisation that they have no 'ultimate 
justification'. 	 As Blackburn (1985 p.9-11) says, those 
who believe that our moral views would not and, perhaps, 
should not survive such a realisation have much in common 
with "those thinkers who felt that if there were no God 
or after-life then it would be rational to ignore the 
claims of morality whenever self-interest suggested it". 
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Morality may indeed lose some of its hold upon those 
people who cease to believe in God; and, so too, morality 
may lose some of its hold upon those who cease to believe 
that moral commitments have "real, objective truth values 
certified by an independent reality". But, as Blackburn 
points out, it will do so only if such people believe 
that "things do not matter unless they matter to God, or 
throughout infinity, or to a world conceived apart from 
any particular set of concerns and desires, or whatever". 
It will do so only if they have, what Blackburn calls, a 
'defective sensibility'. 
Morality matters to us because we do approve of certain 
types of action or motivation (and recoil from others) or 
because we do approve of the consequences of those 
actions or motivations. However, this does not bring us 
any closer to a 'justification' of morality; and those 
with objectivist or rationalist leanings will find it 
unsatisfactory because the 'we' may not be all of us. 
Those with such leanings will hanker after a means of 
ensuring that the 'we' is at least all those who are able 
to rationally decide what is right or wrong - whether 
that be by means of establishing the moral facts, or by 
means of a particular type of prescriptive moral thinking 
which is rationally required. But, I have argued, it is 
likely that such people will be disappointed. 
Now Mackie (1977) claims not that we all have such 
hankerings but, rather, that we all do feel that the 
demands of morality are, in some sense, independent of us 
and our motivations - whereas in truth they are not and 
we are, therefore, in error. 
	 Furthermore, as Williams 
(1985a) suggests, this feeling "can be plausibly 
explained by supposing that ethical constraints and 
objectives have to be internalised in such a way that 
they can serve to control and redirect potentially 
destructive and uncooperative desires, and that they can 
do this, or do it most effectively, only if they do not 
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present themselves as one motivation or desire among 
others .. [if, that is, they] present themselves as 
something given". If this were true (and Mackie's error 
theory were true) then, as Williams says, it would be 
difficult to claim that moral conviction need not be 
upset by a realisation that the demands of morality lack 
any such independence. 
I have claimed that our moral views may rest upon, and be 
interpreted in terms of, a universal ideal. If our moral 
views are related in this way to a universal ideal then 
our moral conviction (our inclination to respond to those 
views) will be relative to our commitment to that ideal. 
From this perspective our moral views lack the sort of 
independence which Mackie describes. If we feel that our 
moral views do have, or should have, such independence 
then it may be that our commitment to those views would 
be weakened by an acceptance of a lack of that 
independence. But if we believe, as I do, that our moral 
views cannot have such an independence then our 
commitment to those views need not be weakened at all. 
Mackie's claim that we (all) believe that our moral views 
have such independence is false; and the claim that our 
moral conviction may be weakened by an acceptance of 
moral relativism is only true of (some of) those who feel 
that our moral views do have, or should have, such 
independence. 
It may be that some perspectives upon our moral views 
incorporate, what Blackburn calls, a defective 
sensibility. Those who have such a perspective may not 
only find it difficult to accept moral relativism (and to 
cease to hanker for objectivism or rationalism); but may 
also find that an acceptance of moral relativism brings 
with it a weakening of moral commitment. 	 But, as 
Williams claims (1985a p.213), some moral perspectives 
are better adapted to being seen for what they are. I 
would claim that a perspective upon our moral views which 
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rests upon an ideal of benevolence, non-malevolence, 
understanding and humility may ensure that our moral 
commitment survives the realisation that moral relativism 
is our only option. 
Having adopted a relativist position we may now consider 
the issue of whether that relativism should bring with it 
a reluctance to impose those moral views upon others by 
means of education. But first we perhaps need to clarify 
our use of the expression 'relativist'. 
According to Krausz and Meiland (1982 Introduction) the 
view that there is no criterion which would reveal a 
particular set of moral beliefs to be the true or correct 
set of moral beliefs may lead us in one of two 
directions. The first involves concluding that there is 
no truth (or that the truth cannot be known) and this 
they refer to as moral scepticism. The second involves 
concluding that there are many truths (the truth may be 
different for, say, different societies) and this they 
refer to as moral relativism. In making this distinction 
they draw a parallel with empirical beliefs. 
However, throughout this thesis I have been concerned, 
like Hare, to describe a form of thinking which will 
yield prescriptive moral judgments. 	 So a distinction 
which runs parallel to that made for descriptive 
empirical judgments may not be helpful. 	 My aim, and 
Hare's, is "to find a system of moral reasoning which we 
can use when faced with moral questions" (Hare 1981 
p.214). Hare claims that there is only one such system 
which is rational. I would claim that there are many: 
Hare's critical thinking would be one, deriving 
prescriptions from a limited set of general principles 
would be another, and deliberating as a member of a 
community of (imperfect) benevolent archangels would be a 
third. 
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My position, and Hare's, is thoroughly 'sceptical' with 
regard to the claim that moral beliefs can be true of 
moral 'facts' but it is not sceptical with regard to the 
claim that there are rational methods of determining 
prescriptive moral judgments. 	 Hare's position is 
rationalist: there is only one such method and that 
method is employed by all rational agents. My position 
is relativist: there are many such methods and each such 
method is employed by all rational agents who share a 
fundamental commitment. That commitment may be to a form 
of thinking, or to a set of principles, or to an ideal. 
I would claim that a commitment to the ideal of the 
benevolent archangel can yield a commitment to a set of 
moral principles and moral views which most of us share. 
But neither the commitment to the ideal nor the 
commitment to the principles and views has any ultimate 
justification. 	 Some might then argue: if there are 
alternative commitments or moral systems and none of them 
has any ultimate justification, then each is as good as 
the other; and, if that is so, then we have no right to 
impose our moral system upon those whom we educate. 
There are several key expressions here: 'right', 'impose' 
and 'as good as'. Firstly, I would agree with Chamberlin 
(1989 p.32) who claims that nothing extra is gained "when 
we say 'I have a right to do this' or 'You have no right 
to do that' beyond what is expressed by 'You ought not to 
stop me doing this' and 'You ought not to do that'". 
Claims about rights are basically statements about how 
people ought to be treated and how others ought to treat 
them. 	 Secondly, to say 'impose' is, here, simply to 
convey a rather unacceptable manner of influencing and 
educating. So I will recast the conclusion of the above 
argument: 
(given one moral system is as good as another) we 
ought not to educate others according to our moral 
system. 
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In a different context this would be the same conclusion 
as that which says that one ought to be tolerant of, and 
not interfere with, the actions and views of people in 
another society where those actions and views stem from 
the moral system which prevails in that society. 	 We 
ought to be tolerant because their moral system is just 
as good as ours. 
But, as Harrison (1976 p.240) points out, the phrase 'as 
good as' is highly ambiguous - it "can be taken in a 
moral or non-moral sense". In the moral sense it might 
mean that the actions and views of those in another 
society are morally as good as our own; we could then 
have no moral reason for interfering or failing to be 
tolerant. But this sense simply builds the conclusion 
into the premiss. In the non-moral sense it might mean 
that each moral system was equally consistent and 
coherent (or rational). But the fact that one system of 
morality (or immorality or amorality) may be no more and 
no less rational than another does not entail that those 
committed to one system ought to be tolerant of the 
actions and views of those committed to another. 
The degree of tolerance one has towards the actions and 
views of others will be determined by one's moral 
judgment not by one's judgment as to the rationality of 
their moral (or immoral or amoral) views. If our moral 
judgments did not determine our actions - if they did not 
determine the way in which we interact with, seek to 
influence or educate others - then they would not be 
moral judgments. Insofar as our actions and views derive 
from a moral system we will, and we ought to, influence 
and educate others accordingly. 
This is not to argue against tolerance or to advocate 
intolerance - it is merely to argue that tolerance is not 
to be derived from moral relativism. Nor is it to say 
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that we ought to seek to influence the views of others in 
an authoritarian way, or by means of coercion and 
confrontation. The manner in which we seek to influence 
and educate others will be determined by a variety of 
factors, and the most important of those will be our 
moral views. 
Educating for benevolence, non-malevolence and humility. 
The moral system here outlined will have two facets; one 
deriving from the application of the universal ideal to 
ourselves and the other deriving from its application to 
others. Insofar as we apply the ideal to ourselves we 
will seek to engage in critical thinking restrained by 
cognitive humility. In doing so it may be that we will 
acquire a preference to act in ways which involve 
preventing, interfering with and controlling the 
behaviour of others. 	 However, there are many factors 
which may lead us to prefer an alternative action. 
Harrison (1976 p.242) lists some of those factors but I 
will modify and elaborate the list in the light of the 
moral theory offered here: 
in most cases an action by a person which satisfies 
that person's own preferences will be the right 
action; 
in many cases interfering with an action will create 
ill-will and further consequences sufficient to 
outweigh the benefits of interference; 
in some cases the right action will not involve 
interfering with or preventing the actions of others 
but will involve compensating for, or preventing, 
some of the consequences of that action; 
in many cases our moral judgment may not be correct 
and the judgment of the other person will result in 
right action; 
in some cases interference and control may inhibit 
moral development. 
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The first four of these factors give reason to refrain 
from interference which is wilful, trivial, unnecessary, 
or lacking in humility. However, the extent to which 
they influence our interaction with others will, clearly, 
depend upon the abilities of those with whom we are 
dealing. An educator is likely to be dealing with those 
whose preferences are often not well-informed, the on-
going relationship with the educatee may allow ill-will 
to be countered, and the judgment of the educator is more 
likely to be correct. 	 In all cases it will, 
nevertheless, be possible for the educator to try to not 
only interfere with and control behaviour but also to 
make clear the way in which that interference and control 
stems from critical thinking. This possibility will also 
play a part in determining the extent to which the final 
factor in the list influences interaction. 
That final factor (not included in Harrison's list) 
brings us to the other facet of the moral system. In 
applying the ideal to others we will seek to encourage 
their focus upon decisive preferences, critical thinking 
and cognitive humility. The way in which we respond to 
the behaviour of others will not only be influenced by 
the application of the ideal to ourselves (in the ways 
outlined above) but will also be guided by this further 
aim. It is likely that the most powerful factor in this 
respect will be the opportunities which are provided for 
witnessing and experiencing the benevolence, non-
malevolence and cognitive humility of others. 
It is clear that interference with, or control of, the 
behaviour of others may sometimes contribute nothing 
towards moral development. This will be true whether the 
control is direct or whether it is by means of, say, 
reward and punishment. Such control may also be counter- 
productive. 	 This is clearly the case, for example, of 
punishment which is vindictive, relentless or 
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humiliating. Whilst such punishment may (in some cases) 
produce a long-term inhibition from certain types of 
behaviour, the person experiencing such punishment is 
witnessing and experiencing, at best, a marked lack of 
benevolence or, at worst, clear malevolence. 
But control may be counter-productive in less obvious 
ways. 	 Docking (1987 p.111-112), when considering the 
advantages and disadvantages of techniques of behaviour 
modification, points out that just as providing extrinsic 
rewards for a task such as drawing may undermine a 
child's wish to engage in the activity for its own sake, 
so too behaviour modification programmes may create 
problems of motivation. "The crucial question", (Docking 
suggests) "is this: Does the approach not only seem to 
get the child acting more acceptably but also help him to 
view his behaviour and those of others in a different 
light?". 
Peters (1974 p.151-2), when considering the development 
of a disposition to act according to rules or principles, 
points out that a desire to strengthen such dispositions 
may lead us to discourage any questioning of the validity 
of the rules and thereby to inhibit development of an 
ability to see the reasons for the appropriateness of the 
rules. What we ought to seek to develop, according to 
Peters, is an awareness of those features of a course of 
conduct "which constitute a non-artificial reason for .. 
decision and judgment, as distinct from extrinsic 
associations provided by praise and blame, reward and 
punishment, and so on". 
This is not, of course, to argue against employment of a 
whole range of means of controlling or influencing 
behaviour. But it is to argue against losing sight of 
the central aim of moral development. It is to point out 
that if we lose sight of that aim then our interactions 
with others, however successful and laudable they may be 
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in terms of controlling and influencing behaviour, will 
contribute nothing to that development and may actually 
impede that development. In terms of the moral theory 
here outlined, it is to emphasise that: 
a) judgments as to appropriate means of control and 
influence ought to derive from our benevolence, 
non-malevolence and cognitive humility; 
but 
b) moral development of others rests not upon the 
successful control and influence of behaviour but 
upon the development of their benevolence, non-
malevolence and cognitive humility. 
The aim of moral education is to influence educatees in 
such a way that they will be motivated by knowledge of 
consequences and preferences; to ensure that for them 
consequences matter, preferences matter, but malevolent 
preferences count for nothing. Such an education will 
require not only opportunities to gain knowledge of 
consequences and preferences, and to be motivated by 
them, but also opportunities to witness and experience 
such motivation in others. The educator will need to 
respond to, and create, opportunities in which such 
motivation can be made explicit. 
There has been a great deal of research into the 
development of benevolent identification (called 
'empathy' by Bottery and others). As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, such research points to evidence that 
empathy is present at very early stages of development, 
and evidence that the emergence of a cognitive grasp of 
alternative viewpoints is not a separate and earlier 
stage of development. Bottery (1990 Ch.7) also outlines 
some of the suggestions which have been made with regard 
to the various modes and phases which might be involved 
in the development of empathy with cognition, the ways in 
which it may be evoked, and the techniques which might be 
employed to help development. I have neither the space 
A community of (imperfect) benevolent archangels. 
272 
nor the expertise to explore these suggestions here. 
What is clear is that unless we create appropriate 
opportunities for educatees to witness, experience and 
engage in actions motivated by knowledge of consequences 
and awareness of the preferences of others then moral 
development is unlikely to take place. 
However, what is also clear is that development of 
knowledge of consequences and awareness of preferences is 
not sufficient. Awareness of preferences may result in 
malevolent identification and knowledge of consequences 
may then serve that malevolence. 	 Bottery (1990 p.67) 
says: "Techniques must .. be developed stimulating the 
empathic abilities and especially the emotional type. 
Then not only will children understand a situation as 
another views it, but will also see how that person feels 
it as well, and so be motivated to do something about 
it". But to see how a person is, say, feeling distress 
may, alas, result in a desire to see that distress 
continue. 	 If empathy is the ability to gain knowledge 
and understanding of the feelings and preferences of 
another then it can result in malevolent identification. 
If empathy is sharing the feelings and preferences of 
another then it is benevolent identification but it goes 
beyond mere knowledge and understanding. 
Awareness, knowledge and understanding of the feelings 
and preferences of others is not sufficient for 
benevolent identification. The educator must encourage 
such benevolence and discourage malevolence. 	 There is 
much psychological evidence to indicate that the 
fostering of one's own self-esteem is a crucial factor in 
the development of benevolence towards others. One might 
speculate that it is also the case that experiencing the 
benevolence of others towards oneself is a crucial factor 
in the development of benevolence towards others and in 
the development of that self-esteem. 
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Such development might also bring with it a rejection of 
malevolence. 	 However, all of us (even the most 
benevolent) are prone to malevolence. 	 When, for 
example, someone has caused our suffering it is, at the 
very least, difficult not to gain satisfaction when they 
in turn suffer. The educator will need to encourage an 
ability to recognise and guard against the many ways in 
which malevolence may manifest itself. 	 Just as the 
development of benevolence is likely to require 
opportunities to experience, witness and be involved in 
actions explicitly motivated by benevolence; so too the 
development of non-malevolence is likely to require a 
similar exposure to actions and responses involving an 
explicit rejection of malevolence. 	 One might again 
speculate that the most crucial factor may be 
experiencing the fact that malevolence towards oneself 
arouses the indignation of others. 
The emphasis upon benevolent identification leads to an 
approach to moral education which is very similar to that 
of Wilson (1967). He identifies several components which 
are necessary to a consideration of moral problems: 
counting other people's feelings and interests as of 
equal validity with our own; awareness and insight into 
one's own and other people's feelings; knowledge of what 
is likely to occur if one acts on one's feelings in this 
or that way; formulation of, and commitment to, a set of 
rules relating to other people's interests; and the 
ability to act, to live up to, those rules and 
principles. 
I too have argued that just this sort of caring and 
concern lies at the heart of morality. But I would also 
emphasise that recognition and rejection of evil 
(recoiling from malevolence) is as central to morality as 
that caring and concern (the inclination to benevolence). 
Educators will need (as Noddings says - 1989) to pay 
attention and, at some stage, to draw attention to the 
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cruelty, the torture, the hatred for other individuals or 
groups (marked out by race, gender, nationality or 
religion) which we see around us now and throughout human 
history. 
Equally important, however, is learning to be restrained 
by cognitive humility. In making motivation explicit the 
educator must make clear the knowledge, and the 
limitations of knowledge, which are involved. 	 The 
benevolence, concern and love which we have for one 
another, and our responses to (and observations upon) the 
benevolence and malevolence we detect in others, must 
contain humility. 
We must learn that it is often the case that we do not 
know all the preferences of others and we do not know all 
the consequences of our actions. It is our awareness of 
the limitations of such knowledge which ought to dispose 
us to focus upon decisive preferences and to be guided by 
rules and principles of action. If our knowledge were 
greater then perhaps we could love our neighbours as we 
love ourselves but we must be ready to acknowledge our 
imperfection. 
We must also learn that we do not have any great insight 
into the knowledge of preferences and consequences which 
underlies, or fails to underlie, the actions of others. 
If our insight into others were deeper then perhaps we 
could judge our neighbours as we judge ourselves but, 
again, we must be ready to acknowledge our imperfection. 
Love, humility and assessment. 
Benevolent identification with the preferences of others 
brings with it a caring and concern for others. 	 Our 
morality requires such concern. But morality does not 
require that we share all the concerns of others, nor 
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that their joys and sorrows are always our joys and 
sorrows. To always seek knowledge of the preferences, 
joys and sorrows of another; to share all the joys and 
sorrows of another; to always seek opportunities in which 
we may be able to bring joy to, and to prevent or 
alleviate the sorrow of, another - these are the 
characteristics of love not of morality. 
If we were benevolent archangels then, perhaps, we would 
have such love for all. As a benevolent archangel we 
would know, and share, all the preferences of everybody 
in each situation; we would, therefore, share all their 
joys and sorrows. 	 We would also know all the 
consequences of all possible actions in each situation; 
we would, therefore, know when and how it would be 
possible to bring joy to, and prevent the sorrow of, 
others. 	 Such a being could not 'take seriously' the 
separateness of persons. Such a being would, of course, 
know that we are each different persons but he would love 
us all equally and thus always treat all of our equal 
interests and preferences as of equal weight (see Hare 
1990 p.257). But we are not such beings. The scope and 
extent of our concern is determined not only by the ideal 
of the benevolent archangel but also by our imperfection. 
We take seriously the separateness of persons when we 
have cognitive humility. We ought to have such humility 
even in our dealings with those for whom we have the 
closest attachment. We know less than we think of the 
preferences of our loved ones; and we know very little of 
all but the decisive preferences of others. 	 All too 
frequently we also have a thoroughly imperfect grasp of 
when and how we might bring joy to, or alleviate the 
sorrow of, others. In our dealings with others, and in 
our close attachments,°we can only aspire to love. 
In most situations we ought, therefore, to be guided and 
motivated by our knowledge of the decisive preferences of 
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others and our knowledge of the ways in which our actions 
may affect the satisfaction of such preferences. 
However, it may be that in some situations we can engage 
in perfect critical thinking. If this is so then at such 
moments we too would not, and ought not to, take 
seriously the separateness of persons - it is as if we 
loved each equally. 
Murdoch (1970) claims that "we need a moral philosophy in 
which the concept of love, so rarely mentioned by 
philosophers, can once again be made central". She says 
that, although love is the source of our greatest errors, 
"it is the energy and passion of the soul in its search 
for Good .. its existence is the unmistakeable sign that 
we are spiritual creatures, attracted by excellence and 
made for the Good" (Murdoch 1970 p.103). I would claim, 
perhaps with Murdoch, that through sharing and 
experiencing the love a person can have for another we 
have glimmerings of our perfectibility. 	 I would also 
claim that the ideal of the benevolent archangel is an 
ideal of love and that morality is, in a sense, love 
written small (the love of imperfect beings). However, 
Murdoch's notion of love is very different to the notion 
which is encapsulated in that ideal. 
Murdoch holds that in loving others we do not merely 
overcome our selfish concerns but we also suppress our 
own self will. That will - "the avaricious tentacles of 
the self" - is, for Murdoch, the source of evil and of 
blindness. 
	 Human will is relentlessly concerned with 
looking after itself and with fabricating a veil with 
which it conceals the world (1970 p.78-79). 	 Through 
pureness and meekness we may suppress that will and thus 
overcome our evil and achieve clarity of vision. Murdoch 
draws a parallel with art and science: with clarity of 
vision comes appreciation of beauty, knowledge of truth, 
and compassion for others. The search for Good involves 
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striving for a selfless attention to art, nature and 
others. 
Murdoch's thoroughly pessimistic view of human will has 
much in common with Schopenhauer, but her view is tied in 
with arguments for moral realism. Morality and goodness 
require attention to reality, an ability to perceive what 
is true, and that, she claims, is automatically at the 
same time a suppression of self. 
With true vision comes right conduct: "the more the 
separateness and differentness of other people is 
realised, and the fact that another man has needs and 
wishes as demanding as one's own, the harder it becomes 
to treat a person as a thing" (Murdoch 1970 p.66). To 
see justly and clearly requires that we turn away from 
self; to see thus is to love and to be thereby both 
liberated from fantasy and motivated to act. 
But, I have claimed, the malevolent archangel sees 
clearly, and knows the needs and wishes of others. 
Clarity only brings right conduct if it is motivated by 
love. Love does not require the suppression of self-will 
and a detachment from selfish concerns. 	 Love is the 
extension of those concerns, it is to have the concerns 
of others as one's own and alongside one's own. 
For Murdoch humility is the suppression of self - the 
absence of those avaricious tentacles. The humble man 
sees himself as nothing and thus sees other things as 
they are (1970 p.104). 
I would claim that the role of humility in morality is to 
enable us to see not that we are nothing but that we are 
unavoidably imperfect. We can seldom truly love, we can 
seldom have the concerns of others as our own. 	 We, 
therefore, recoil from the illusion of love; submit 
ourselves to moral principles as motivated by the central 
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needs and decisive preferences of others; and thus we do 
indeed suppress our own self-will. 	 But we do so only 
because we recognise our imperfection and recognise that 
we cannot meet the demands which love would place upon 
us. We cannot love others as we love ourselves. 
Such humility limits not only the demands we place upon 
ourselves but also those which we place upon others. 
Furthermore, that humility ought to constrain the 
judgments we make of the moral worth of others and of 
their actions. We may make our judgment of the rightness 
or wrongness of the actions of others, but in order to 
judge moral worth we must judge their knowledge and 
benevolence - that is, the quality of their motivation. 
Our humility ought to lead us to hesitate when judging 
and assessing the morality, and the moral progress, of 
those whom we educate. 
Many aspects of educational development are difficult to 
assess. As Bottery (1990 p.123/4) points out, assessment 
of, for example, an appreciation of drama may require 
evaluation of achievement of objectives which are varied, 
vague, complex and unpredictable. 	 Furthermore, as he 
also points out, assessment of, say, a readiness to 
cooperate with others may require not only observation of 
but also interaction with those educated, and may require 
that both extend over a considerable period of time and 
over a range of activities. 
It is clear that assessment of moral development shares 
such difficulties. 	 Moreover, if moral development is 
centrally about motivation, and not merely about 
achievement of behavioural objectives, then there will be 
another layer of difficulty. Do those who tell the truth 
do so because they hope for reward or fear punishment? 
Do those who fail to tell the truth (on an occasion when 
the educator believes that the truth ought to be told) do 
so because of a disregard for the preferences of those 
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deceived, or a lack of knowledge of preferences and 
consequences, or a greater knowledge than that of the 
educator? 
The educator's desire, and the desire of others, to know 
what progress is being made may lead to a demand for 
forms of assessment and evaluation which, whilst being 
more easily achieved, have little or nothing to do with 
assessment of moral development. This may then lead to 
an inadvertent failure to prioritise achievement of moral 
development. But the difficulties of assessment may also 
lead directly to the rejection of such a priority. The 
educator may decide to prioritise only those objectives 
which are such that achievement is readily evaluated and 
demonstrated. 
A clarification and systematisation of our moral views in 
terms of a fundamental universal ideal may help us to 
avoid inappropriate (or over-ambitious) forms of 
assessment and may inspire us to resist abandonment of 
those objectives which our moral views require. If we 
have the cognitive humility which comes from recognition 
of the ways in which we cannot live up to that ideal then 
we know that we cannot judge others as we judge 
ourselves. If we have,a moral outlook which is inspired 
by that ideal then we know that we ought to foster the 
moral development of those whom we educate just as we 
ought to foster such development in ourselves. 
The priority which our own moral development has for us 
will determine the priority which we give to the moral 
development of those whom we educate. 	 If our moral 
development has a high priority for us then we will 
strive for morality in ourselves and in others. Finally 
it is, perhaps, through witnessing and sharing our 
struggle for morality that the morality of others is best 
fostered. 
A community of (imperfect) benevolent archangels. 
Preferability of a community of benevolent archangels. 
Although I have argued that there is no 'ultimate 
justification' for any moral system, I have thus far 
assumed that there is a large measure of agreement over 
moral views with regard to behaviour, dispositions and 
motivations; and I have argued that, given that 
agreement, we have reason to systematise those moral 
views in terms of a universal ideal. However, I may have 
over-estimated the extent of agreement over moral views 
and, even more likely, I may not be able to convince 
others to adopt that perspective upon those moral views. 
I would like to end by offering a few considerations and 
speculations which might convince some educationalists to 
adopt that perspective. 
Most of us (I speculate) would prefer a life guided by 
the ideal of the benevolent archangel. 
	 If we could 
attain a clear view of the nature of such a life then 
most of us would prefer it. Mill (1863 p.31) claims that 
those who have a care and concern for others regard those 
feelings as ones which it would not be well for them to 
be without; that view of those feelings is, for Mill, the 
"ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality". 
Perhaps we can claim that to clearly see ourselves as 
guided by informed benevolence, and as lacking in 
malevolence, would be (for most of us) to prefer to be 
thus. 
But most of us would also prefer a life in which our 
preference satisfaction was maximised. A life guided by 
the ideal is likely to have a cost on the scale of my 
overall preference satisfaction. 
	 In a world in which 
selfishness, unscrupulousness, corruption and evil are, 
to say the least, not unknown the cost may be great. One 
living such a life may often sacrifice self-interest out 
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of consideration for others but may seldom receive such 
consideration themselves, may be abused and mistreated by 
others who confidently expect not to be abused and 
mistreated in return, and so on. In short, the decrease 
in that person's own overall preference satisfaction may 
be sufficient to outweigh the preference for such a life. 
This may not be true for some. On the one hand there may 
be those who are able to attain a clear view of the 
nature of such a life and yet would not find such a life 
preferable even if there were no cost. On the other hand 
there may be those (saints) for whom the preferability of 
such a life is so great that it would outweigh any cost. 
Most of us (I speculate) lie somewhere in between. Most 
of us would find such a life preferable even if there was 
likely to be some cost in terms of our own overall 
preference satisfaction. 	 If we were able to attain a 
clear view of such a life then a choice of that life 
would not require (contra Hare and others) a conviction 
that it would be (or would be likely to be) in our own 
self-interest. 
Most of us would prefer to live in a community largely 
consisting of people whose lives were guided by the 
ideal. Whether or not our own life were guided by that 
ideal, we would prefer to live in such a community 
because it would be conducive to the satisfaction of our 
own preferences. But if our life were guided by that 
ideal then we would have further reason to prefer that 
the life of each member of the community be guided by the 
ideal. Firstly, we would benevolently identify with the 
informed preferences of others for such a life. 
Secondly, we would benevolently identify with the 
preferences of others and thus prefer a community which 
was conducive to the satisfaction of those preferences. 
Most would prefer a life guided by the ideal, and most 
would prefer to live in a community largely consisting of 
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people whose lives were guided by the ideal. Those who 
have the first preference have a stronger and deeper 
reason for having the second. Once we acknowledge that 
it would not be well to live a life which did not involve 
a struggle inspired by that ideal then we have a 
compelling reason to strive for a community which is also 
inspired by that ideal. We strive for that community by 
educating ourselves and others according to that ideal. 
We do so because we glimpse the preferability of life as 
an (imperfect) benevolent archangel in a community of 
(imperfect) benevolent archangels. 
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